Young children's categorical thinking about gender : the importance of imitation, attention and self-categories by Grace, Diana Maree
Errata to PhD Thesis “Young children’s categorical thinking about gender: The 
importance of imitation, attention and self-categories” by Diana M. Grace, 2005.
Chapter 4, p.62. Following line 5 (and before the final paragraph) insert:
Summary
In this chapter we have emphasized the individualistic focus that has dominated both 
theory and research in gender development. This was contrasted with a more social, or 
categorical, approach to gender which, it is suggested, may be more useful in 
explaining gender differences. Given the amount of time that young children spend in 
these gender, or sex, segregated groups, we are particularly interested in the influence 
process as it affects groups of boys and groups of girls.
Chapter 6, p.l 12. Following line 5 (and beginning the second last paragraph) insert: 
Summary
In this chapter we have explored social psychological approaches to the concepts of 
categorization, identity and influence.
Chapter 7, p .l20. Line 22 (following “... models.”) insert:
“Given the importance of gender to the thesis as a whole, planned comparisons 
between boys and girls will be conducted in all analyses.”
Chapter 7, p.l28. Line 21 (following “... behaviour.”) insert:
“All pairwise comparisons were conducted using an overall alpha level of 0.05 with a 
Bonferroni correction for the specific set of comparisons being reported.”
Chapter 8, p .l63. Line 12 (following “... performed.”) insert:
“All pairwise comparisons were conducted using an overall alpha level of 0.05 with a 
Bonferroni correction for the specific set of comparisons being reported.”
Chapter 9, p. 181. Line 13 (following “... ANOVA.”) insert:
“All pairwise comparisons were conducted using an overall alpha level of 0.05 with a 
Bonferroni correction for the specific set of comparisons being reported.”
Chapter 10, p.214. Line 2 (following models.”) insert:
“All pairwise comparisons were conducted using an overall alpha level of 0.05 with a 
Bonferroni correction for the specific set of comparisons being reported.”
Chapter 11, p.257. Line 16-17 insert:
“they had played” after “opposite-sex games” and before “at this age.
*
Chapter 12, p.276. Line 6 (between “...behaviour.” .. and ... “Through ...”) insert: 
“However, gender is only one of the many potential social categories that children 
use. Studies 1, 2 and, in particular, 4 demonstrated how gender and age could equally 
be used to inform children’s behavioural choices. Throughout this thesis we have 
argued that it is the categorical nature of gender, or age, that both informs and guides 
children’s behaviour. This does not, however, reflect the intrinsic significance of these 
categories, nor does it arise from any innate tendency to categorize along these lines. 
Rather, children make use of gender, or age, categories because it is meaningful and 
appropriate to do so.
Given the importance of the categorization process as a guide to children’s behaviour, 
this thesis drew heavily on existing, and substantive, theories of social categorization. 
While neither of these theories (i.e., social identity and self-categorization theories) 
was conceived of as developmental theories, the psychological processes outlined in 
each have, in recent years, been increasingly applied to the developmental domain, in 
particular to work with children (e.g., Bennett et al., 1998, 2000; Bigler et ah, 1997; 
Powlishta, 1995; Yee & Brown, 1992). Indeed the approach put forward by these 
theories has been recognized as ideally suited for the integration of developmental and 
social psychology (Bennett & Sani, 2004). In concert with the notion that gender does 
not represent a “special” category, it seems unnecessary to propose an alternative 
theory specifically for gender.”
YOUNG CHILDREN’S CATEGORICAL THINKING
ABOUT GENDER: THE IMPORTANCE OF IMITATION, 
ATTENTION AND SELF-CATEGORIES.
Diana Maree Grace
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University
March 2005
DECLARATION
The research reported in this thesis is my own and has not been 
submitted for a higher degree at any other institution.
c
Diana Maree Grace
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Having finally reached the stage of writing my acknowledgements, I am 
overwhelmed with a sense of privilege that undertaking my PhD has been. 
Not only have I had the opportunity to work with some amazing people, 
many of these have become my dearest friends. Together we have shared the 
experiences of life of which a PhD is but part. I thank you all for this.
I would first like to thank my supervisor, Dr Barbara David, without whom I 
would not have written this thesis. Thank you for allowing me the freedom to 
pursue my own questions, and for throwing me life-rafts to stop me from 
drowning in them. You always had confidence in me and I thank you for it.
In particular, your commitment in the final stages has been outstanding.
I would also like to thank my panel members, Professor Penny Oakes and 
Associate Professor Craig McGarty, for your insightful comments, your 
encouragement and your continued enthusiasm for my work.
For allowing me to conduct my research, 1 would like to thank the staff, 
parents and especially the children at all the childcare centres, and especially 
thank you to Donna for your assistance in data collection.
Indescribable thanks also go to the following people: Brenda, Janet, Girish, 
Karen, Ken, Mark, Michelle, Rachael, Rina, Robbie, Ruth and Tricia. A 
measure of coffee consumed over the years would be a small indication of 
the wonderful times we have shared.
I would also like to thank my parents and my sisters, whose unwavering 
belief in my ability, though it remains a mystery to me, is hugely appreciated. 
Of course there is my other family who provide a never-ending source of 
both distraction and motivation. To Gemma and Murray for your support 
over the long haul, and more recently to Ethan, who remains blissfully 
ignorant that mummy looks at anything but The Wiggles on her computer.
My final thanks remain the most difficult to express. You have taught me so 
much -  most importantly to just keep on going. Thank you Michael.
Table of Contents
Declaration of Authorship.............................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements........................................................................................ iii
Abstract.......................................................................................................... ix
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Thesis................................. 1
Chapter 2: The Socialization of Children.................................................. 12
Introduction.................................................................................................12
The Child as Tabula Rasa..........................................................................13
The Child’s Innate Desires.........................................................................15
Freud’s Views of the Child.........................................................................16
Importance of Parents.................................................................................19
Individual Differences.............................................................................. .20
Socialization, Social Learning and Social Psychology...............................22
More Child-Centred Approaches to Socialization......................................25
Research and New Technologies................................................................26
Socialization and the Transmission Process..............................................26
Separate Worlds?....................................................................................... 27
Gender Differences in Socialization Practices...........................................28
Summary.................................................................................................... 30
Chapter 3: Theories of Gender Development........................................... 32
Introduction.................................................................................................32
Psychoanalytic Theory................................................................................33
Cognitive Developmental Theory...............................................................35
Social Learning/ Social Cognitive Theory.................................................39
Gender Schema Theory..............................................................................43
Summary.................................................................................................... 49
Chapter 4: Gender: Individual or Category?..........................................50
Focus on Individual Development..............................................................51
Gender as a Category..................................................................................53
Characteristics of Same-Sex Groups..........................................................59
Chapter 5: The Role of Attention and Memory.......................................63
Introduction.................................................................................................63
Early Signs of Sex Differences...................................................................65
Explaining Sex Differences........................................................................67
The Ontogeny of Memory..........................................................................70
Attentional Strategies for Storing Information ..........................................71
Memory Strategies for Retrieving Information..........................................72
Attention, Memory and Implications for Gender Development.................73
The Role of Attention and Memory in Gender Schema Theory................74
The Role of Attention and Memory in Cognitive Developmental Theory. 75 
The Role of Attention and Memory in Social Leaming/Social Cognitive
Theory........................................................................................................76
Summary.....................................................................................................80
Chapter 6: Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Influence. 82
Introduction..........................       82
Early Studies of Social Categorization.......................................................84
Social Categorization and its Relation to Object Categorization...............86
Social Categorization and (Social) Stereotyping........................................89
Effects of Categorization............................................................................91
Categorization and Social Identity..............................................................95
Social Identity Theory................................................................................96
Self-Categorization Theory...................................................................... 101
Self-Categorization and Social Influence................................................. 106
Social Identity Development Theory........................................................ 109
Chapter 7: Study 1....................................................................................113
Introduction............................................................................................... 113
Method...................................................................................................... 121
Participants............................................................................................ 121
Design.................................................................................................... 121
Materials................................................................................................ 121
Procedure............................................................................................... 123
Memory/ Manipulation Check............................................................... 124
Gender Constancy.................................................................................. 124
Parent Questionnaires............................................................................ 125
Scoring -  Modelling Behaviour, 126
Scoring -  Parent Questionnaires............................................................ 126
Results.......................................................................................................127
Modelling Behaviour.............................................................................127
Imitation of Adult Models..................................................................... 131
Imitation of Child Models..................................................................... 132
Gender Constancy..................................................................................133
Age of Participants................................................................................136
Memory/ Manipulation Check............................................................... 138
Household Information and Parental Responsibilities.......................... 142
Discussion.................................................................................................146
Chapter 8: Study 2....................................................................................155
Introduction...............................................................................................155
Method......................................................................................................159
Participants............................................................................................159
Design....................................................................................................159
Procedure...............................................................................................159
Results....................................................................................................... 162
Modelled Behaviour.............................................................................. 162
Age of Participants................................................................................ 164
Memory for Modelled Behaviour.......................................................... 165
Liking Measures.................................................................................... 167
Discussion................................................................................................. 168
Chapter 9: Studies 3 and 4....................................................................... 173
Study 3 Introduction.................................................................................173
Method...................................................................................................... 177
Participants............................................................................................ 177
Design....................................................................................................178
Procedure............................................................................................... 178
Results.................................................................................................181
Modelled Behaviour......................................................................... 181
Memory for Modelled Behaviour.................................................... 182
Liking Measures............................................................................... 186
“Want to Be” (Desire) Measure....................................................... 188
Comparison of Liking and Wanting................................................ 189
vi
Discussion........................................................................................... 189
Study 4 Introduction........................................................................... 193
Method................................................................................................ 197
Participants....................................................................................... 197
Design.............................................................................................. 197
Procedure......................................................................................... 197
Results................................................................................................. 199
Modelled Behaviour......................................................................... 199
Memory for Modelled Behaviour....................................................201
Manipulation Check/ Similarity Measure........................................202
Discussion...........................................................................................202
Chapter 10: Study 5 ............................................................................207
Introduction.........................................................................................207
Method................................................................................................211
Participants.......................................................................................211
Design..............................................................................................212
Procedure.........................................................................................212
Results.................................................................................................213
Discussion...........................................................................................216
Chapter 11: Study 6 ............................................................................219
Introduction.........................................................................................219
Method................................................................................................224
Participants.......................................................................................224
Design..............................................................................................224
Procedure.........................................................................................224
Results.................................................................................................227
Early Childhood...............................................................................227
Middle Childhood........................................................................234
Adolescence.................................................................................240
Memory of Participants................................................................246
Aggregated Dependent Measures................................................246
Discussion.......................................................................................225
Chapter 12: Summary and Conclusions.......................................261
Introduction........................................................................................261
vii
Review of the Thesis..........................................................................262
Limitations of the Thesis and Future Directions...............................275
References.........................................................................................281
viii
Abstract
This thesis takes a social psychological approach to childhood socialization, 
focusing specifically on gender socialization. In doing so, it hopes to address 
some long-standing issues concerning the association between 
developmental and social psychology, and the potential contribution each can 
make to the other.
The thesis begins with a review of historical approaches to childhood 
socialization in general, examining how children have been conceptualised 
over time, before turning to the specific approaches to gender development. 
Here the important point is made concerning the individualistic focus that 
has dominated developmental theories. This is at odds not only with the 
empirical evidence concerning gender differences, but with the group, or 
categorical, nature of gender itself.
In an attempt to integrate these ideas, a social identity approach is adopted, 
incorporating self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987). Parallels are also drawn with recent adaptations of the 
social identity/ development perspective concerning ethnic identity (see 
Social Identity Development Theory, Nesdale, 2004).
Throughout the investigation, however, commonalities of the developmental 
and social psychological literature abound. These include the importance of 
role models to children’s learning about gender, along with a focus on who
children pay attention to, and who they remember, as appropriate conveyors 
of gender-related information.
A series of six empirical studies is presented. The first four of these involve 
child participants, and examine the notions of category-based imitation and 
differential processing of information for boys and girls. These studies also 
begin an exploration of status-related liking for, and satisfaction with, 
category memberships.
The final two studies involve adult participants and extend the investigation 
of gender-related attention to models, with the final study drawing upon 
memory for childhood events. This study also incorporates measures of 
(category-based) satisfaction with gender ingroups.
Taken together, the results provide a convincing case for a self-categorization 
approach to children’s understanding of gender categories, and the continued 
application of social psychological theory to gender development.
Limitations of this, however, are noted in the final chapter, along with 
suggestions for future research directions.
Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview of the Thesis
Teaching a new skill undoubtedly involves, at some stage, demonstration of 
that skill. We often teach by demonstration, and we learn in part through 
observation. This is particularly true of social learning for young children. 
Providing a young child with nothing more than a verbal explanation of how 
to tie his/her shoelaces would undoubtedly only lead to grazed skin and 
bruises from the tripping and falling that would result. Similarly, merely 
telling a child to be polite, or not to hit others, will be unlikely to result in 
polite, or non-aggressive, behaviour if the child is, at the concrete level, 
exposed to rudeness and violence. By observing considerate and gentle 
behaviour children are more likely to incorporate good manners into their 
own behaviour than if they are simply told that it is a good idea to do so. The 
premise underlying the demonstration method is that by showing the child 
how to perform a particular behaviour, they will imitate or copy that 
behaviour. Through continual demonstration of the behaviour, it is expected 
that the child will eventually adopt the behaviour for themselves, particularly 
if the model is a significant, caring adult. (See, for example, Eisenberg & 
Murphy, 1995; Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002; Zhou et al., 2002.)
However children also imitate behaviour that has not been intended 
consciously as a model and the behaviour of people whom they do not 
necessarily even know. The behaviour of any human being is a potential 
source for imitation. So when faced with the vast array of information around
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them, just what, or who, do children copy? What influences their decision to 
imitate some people and behaviours in preference to others? Do they, for 
instance, pay equal attention to everything and make a conscious choice to 
imitate only some things, or do they only pay attention to things that are of 
immediate relevance to their lives? (See, for example, Gelman, 1969; 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1999.) What, of the information to which they do pay 
attention, do they remember and what, in this complex learning process, do 
they incorporate into their repertoire of behaviours and their developing 
sense of selves? Social imitation is the central theme of this thesis and the 
associated role of attention and memory its specific focus.
In learning about the world and themselves, there is evidence to suggest that 
children first learn about the categories of age, sex (or gender)1 and race (or 
ethnicity) (Bennett, Sani, Hopkins, Agostini & Malucchi, 2000). The 
empirical work in this thesis focuses on two of these: age and sex. The 
questions concerning attention and memory apply equally to both of these 
categories: Do children look to same-sex or opposite-sex adults or children to 
provide them with information about how to behave appropriately? With 
increasing exposure to information, not only in the home and in the 
neighbourhood, but via video technologies and the internet (not to mention 
mesmerising plasma and LCD screens on which to view this information), 
the potential for modelling seems limitless. Given the enormity of available
1 Throughout this thesis the terms sex and gender are used interchangeably. The distinction 
made by some writers to use sex for biological factors and gender for social factors is 
regarded as unnecessary given the present focus on psychological processes which may 
involve a combination of the two. See also Maccoby (1998).
social information, the questions posed here are perhaps more important than 
ever.
Traditional work on child development has focussed on parents, or other 
adult caregivers, as the primary sources of influence in a child’s life. Harris 
(1995), however, controversially proposed the idea that peers, not parents, 
are the only ones who have a lasting impact on children. Her work was 
prompted by Maccoby and Martin’s (1983) review of the child socialization 
literature which concluded that either the family environment must vary 
greatly with each child, or that parental behaviours have no effect (Maccoby 
& Martin, 1983, p.82).
Harris formalized her ideas in Group Socialization Theory (Harris, 1995, 
1998), derived largely from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
1986) and Self-categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987). Her claims that peers are the only relevant source of social 
influence are based on the idea that children see themselves as similar to 
other children, leading them to identify primarily, if not solely, with other 
children. Put briefly, she sees that peers are more influential than parents 
because, in determining what is appropriate for themselves, children firstly 
divide the social world into dichotomous categories (males/females, 
children/adults, black/white), perceive that they are similar to one of those 
categories, identify with that category, and use the behaviour of the relevant 
category members as a model for their own behaviour.
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As mentioned previously, the social categories of interest in this thesis are 
age and sex, and in particular it focuses on children’s understanding of 
gender. In order to address gender socialization, the thesis will therefore 
make reference to the social psychological process of influence (Chapter 6), 
the approaches traditionally used in understanding gender development 
(Chapter 3), as well as the general topic of child socialization (Chapter 2). It 
will be argued that identification is a core element of all of these, and 
imitation (or modelling) is one of the primary ways in which gender, as well 
as other, norms are transmitted and perpetuated.
As will be detailed in Chapter 3, there are four major theoretical approaches 
to gender development within developmental psychology: psychoanalytic 
theory (Freud, 1917), cognitive-developmental theory (Kohlberg, 1966), 
social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) (known more recently as social- 
cognitive theory, Bandura, 2002), and gender schema theory (Bern, 1981; 
Ruble, 2000). Despite the different conceptualisations of gender and the 
variations in developmental trajectories proposed by each of these theories, a 
common thread in all is the overwhelming emphasis on gender development 
as a process that occurs within the individual.
An alternative explanation focuses explicitly on the group, or categorical, 
nature of gender development. Maccoby (1998), for example, reasons that 
the influence exerted by peers is strongly associated with the development of 
gender norms largely because it occurs in sex-segregated groups. This, she 
claims, explains why the adoption of gendered norms and behaviours is
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largely unrelated to the individual attributes of the children who comprise 
these groups.
Work by Bussey and colleagues (Bussey & Bandura, 1984; Bussey & Perry, 
1982) further demonstrates how acceptance of same-sex, and rejection of 
opposite-sex, behaviours depends upon those behaviours being seen as 
normative for a whole category of models. Thus the individual versus the 
group is an important theme of Chapter 4. This chapter incorporates Harris’ 
(1995, 1998) emphasis on children’s self-categorizations as group members 
but points out that her analysis fails to recognize that the same psychological 
processes operate, whether one is self-categorizing as an individual or as a 
group member.
Having articulated an understanding of the social psychological processes of 
gender socialization, the thesis then turns to the role played by the cognitive 
variables of attention and memory. Whereas imitation of, and attention to, 
stimuli provides information about what children are doing at the present, 
measures of memory (for stimuli) provide information about what aspects of 
that information are retained. Paradoxically, retrospective studies provide us 
with prospective information -  they tell us what children are likely to do, or 
pay attention to, in the future. The focus in Chapter 5 on attention and 
memory also addresses the issue of differential processing of gender 
information by boys and girls. That is, do boys and girls pay attention to and 
remember gendered information in the same way?
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Empirically, the questions raised will be addressed in Chapters 7 to 11. The 
first study in this thesis (presented in Chapter 7) used an experimental 
paradigm devised by Bussey and Bandura (1984). It examines children’s 
imitation of male and female models, as well as their memory for the actions 
of those models. Bussey and Bandura’s work has been extended by using 
child as well as adult models, and by comparing children’s behaviour in the 
experiment with what they see within their home environment. This latter 
investigation was achieved with parent questionnaires concerning household 
and childcare tasks and responsibilities. Thus the first study is an initial look 
at both age and gender influences upon the child participants.
The results of Study 1 showed that gender categories are an important guide 
to children’s behaviour. However, the age of the model was also seen to have 
an effect on children’s imitation. Children imitated same-sex adults more 
than they imitated same-sex children. In all conditions, however, children 
demonstrated equal memory for the behaviours of the models they had seen, 
whether those models were male or female, children or adults, suggesting 
that, at least in the short term, modelling of behaviour is a choice from a 
mental array of possibilities, rather than a result of attention having been 
limited to personally relevant models.
Study 2 (presented in Chapter 8) follows directly from the first study, but 
looks explicitly at the influence of the age of models on children. This was 
achieved using the Bussey and Bandura paradigm of the first study but 
removing gender as a possible source of influence. Thus children were
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exposed only to same-sex models who were either children or adults. The 
second study also begins to explore the issue of children’s satisfaction with 
their category membership by introducing a measure of liking to the design. 
This study showed that, when gender was removed from the design, children 
clearly acted in accordance with the modelled behaviour of their own age 
category. Furthermore, they exhibited high levels of satisfaction with their 
category membership. Slight sex differences, however, emerged in this 
study, raising the issue of category membership and status: it was observed 
that high status group members (boys) reported higher levels of satisfaction 
with their category membership than did low status group members (girls).
The first study in Chapter 9 (Study 3) sees the reintroduction of gender into 
the design. In a similar vein to Study 1, children were confronted with both 
age and gender categories of models as possible sources of influence. In this 
study, all possibilities were presented simultaneously, with all children being 
exposed to behaviours performed by male and female adult and child models 
(i.e., men, women, boys and girls). Children’s actual behaviours, as well as 
their memory for the behaviours, was recorded. The liking measure from 
Study 2 was extended in this study to incorporate the additional category 
presented. The complexity of the task in this study, however, appeared to be 
too great for children of this age to reliably make sense of the behaviours 
they had seen; on the whole they both enacted, and recalled, the behaviour 
most recently exhibited.
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To eliminate the confound of excessive complexity, the second study 
presented in Chapter 9 (Study 4) used simplified tasks, by exposing children 
to fewer behavioural (indeed categorical) options. This study tested the idea 
that children would be able to self-categorize along either age or gender 
lines, depending on which category was salient at the time. The salience 
manipulation was achieved by asking children questions pertaining to gender 
(or age) and by having them complete a gender- (or age-) related sorting task. 
The results of this study provide strong support for this hypothesis and, in 
turn, for a self-categorization approach to gender development: children 
imitated either same-age or same-sex models according to which category 
had been made salient to them. Boys and girls responded equally to the 
salience manipulation, and children demonstrated an equal amount of 
modelling in both age and gender salience conditions.
The role of gender differences in memory, or attention, is the focus of Study 
5 (presented in Chapter 10). In this chapter, the question previously applied 
to children was reapplied to adults. That is, do adult males and females pay 
equal, or differential, attention to men and women, or to boys and girls? 
Using a similar measure to that used in the first study, adult participants were 
shown video sequences and were asked to recall the behaviours of the male 
and female actors. While neither males’ nor females’ memory was affected 
by the age of the participants, females demonstrated better memory for 
behaviours performed by both male and female models than did males. 
Indeed the poorest memory score was males recalling behaviours performed 
by female models. Combined with the results of Studies 1 to 4, this suggests
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that sex differences in attention to, and memory for, models are acquired 
after the age of three or four.
Study 6 (Chapter 11) continues the emphasis on adult memory in categorical 
terms. Again using adult participants, this study required men and women to 
recall friends and events from their own childhood and adolescence. This 
occured in a context of high gender salience for all participants. Results of 
this study found support for differential processing of information by adult 
males and females: on a variety of measures, women demonstrated equal 
memory for activities and members of the opposite sex and those of their 
own sex. For men, however this was not the case: while their memory for 
knowledge of same-sex activities and friends was equal to that of females’ 
knowledge of either sex, males’ knowledge of opposite-sex activities and 
friends was significantly lower. Consistent with the hypotheses, these gender 
differences changed over the developmental timespan, with the possible 
explanation of recency effects in memory being clearly eliminated.
Uncertainties remain as to whether this decrement of male memory is the 
result of them not having paid attention to what the girls were doing at the 
times of interest, or whether they paid equal attention to both boys’ and girls’ 
activities and subsequently forgot the latter information. Studies 1 to 4 go 
some of the way to addressing this question since they measure children’s 
immediate recall of behaviours. Consistent with Study 5, however, the results 
of this study point to a different outcome of this attention process (i.e., 
memory) some time during adolescence.
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Overall, this thesis demonstrates that young children clearly do make use of 
age and gender categories, basing their behaviour on whatever is relevant at 
the time. Furthermore, the importance of either of these categories can be 
manipulated experimentally, resulting in children modelling different 
behaviours (same-age when age was salient, same-sex when gender was 
salient) despite watching the same video in both conditions. What varies is 
who becomes the important source of influence i.e., who provides the 
appropriate information (or behaviours) to be modelled. Imitation, or 
modelling, is neither a random nor an unconsidered action. It is a deliberate 
choice resulting from specifiable factors such as situational salience.
Children do use gender as a guide to their own behaviour. However, as this 
thesis shows, this does not reflect the intrinsic significance of the gender 
categorization, nor an innate tendency to categorize on gender lines. Despite 
the pervading importance of gender in their world, young children are 
capable of basing their behaviour on another categorization (in this case, age) 
when it is appropriate to do so (Study 4). As has been demonstrated in work 
with primary-school-aged children (e.g., Bigler, Jones & Lobliner, 1997; 
Powlishta, 1995; Yee & Brown, 1992), social psychological processes such 
as categorization and social identification are evident well before adulthood. 
The studies presented in this thesis, however, suggest that children begin to 
make use of these processes from the age of three.
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In summarising the research findings, Chapter 12 suggests the theoretical 
implications to be drawn from them. It proposes firstly that a theory of 
gender development must necessarily incorporate a conceptualisation of 
gender as a category, not as a biological imperative or an individual attribute. 
Furthermore, it emphasises the dynamic nature of the influence process that 
we suggest is ultimately dependent upon the categorization process. This 
chapter cautions against a simplistic application of social psychological 
principles to children without regard for the specific limitations of the young, 
and suggests ways in which this regard could be incorporated in future 
research. For now, however, we turn our attention to an overview of 
childhood socialization research that provides a basis from which to begin 
our investigation of the ubiquitous role of gender.
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Chapter 2
The Socialization of Children
Introduction
This chapter traces the history of developmental theories that echo changes 
in conceptualisation of the nature of children and of child-adult relationships. 
It begins with the child seen as a blank slate, infinitely dependent on, and 
able to be shaped by, adults, and ends with the current view which focuses 
more strongly on the child’s active contribution to his/her own socialization. 
Since the empirical work in this thesis makes extensive use of a modelling 
paradigm, this chapter will specifically address socialization theories that 
incorporate, or have some comment to make about, imitation by children of 
the behaviour of adult exemplars of their society. Additionally, and also 
since it is a focus of this thesis, the current chapter will address evidence of 
different socialization practices for boys and girls.
The socialization process itself involves providing children with skills 
necessary to live in a society with other people. The skills required refer not 
only to the physical abilities needed to take care of themselves, but to the 
social and psychological skills necessary to live in harmony with others. It 
involves taking other people as individuals and group members, and their 
perspectives, into account. Put simply, socialization is about becoming a 
functioning member of the human species.
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Specific socialization outcomes depend upon the particular constellation of 
sub-groups into which the child is born, and will therefore differ from one 
society to another. Children develop self-regulatory skills in accordance with 
the particular social norms of their society. Yet the actual process of 
developing these self-regulatory skills occurs independently of the content of 
the social norms. Put another way, the actual process of socialization is 
separate from the outcomes of that process. For example, a child in Asia and 
one in North America may both learn by imitation of parents and peers, but 
in one instance they learn to be quiet and polite, in the other to be vocal and 
assertive. So whether we are talking about the fostering of independence or 
interdependence, agency or community, the means by which the child 
acquires these ideals or values is the focus of the socialization process, and 
hence of this chapter.
The Child as Tabula Rasa
The idea of the child born as a “blank slate” onto which experience writes its 
story was initially put forward by John Locke (1699/1938), the English 
academic, doctor, philosopher and political theorist. Although consideration 
of the child as a tabula rasa was apparent in ancient Mediterranean 
civilizations (French, 1977), attention given to children in Greek and Roman 
times was guided primarily by their future importance to society. Children in 
those times were seen to be especially lacking in self-control, and so 
childrearing was thought to necessitate a certain (harsh) level of discipline. In 
contrast, Locke’s revolutionary ideas on education dealt with the physical,
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psychological and spiritual upbringing of the child, and foreshadowed 
modern authoritative childrearing practices (e.g., Baumrind, 1966, 1989).
Locke emphasized the importance of the home environment and of 
appropriate parental models. He recognized differences in children’s 
temperaments that affected parents’ treatment of each individual child. Locke 
recommended that parents be neither punitive nor indulgent with their 
children, but provide consistent encouragement to motivate independence.
He believed that children needed to learn self-control, but that this could not 
be attained through obedience for obedience sake. Rather, the use of external 
reasoning, along with parental modelling would allow the child to internalise 
the process. Thus Locke’s seventeenth century advice explicitly recognized 
the role of experience (Cleverley & Phillips, 1976), of teaching, and of 
modelling, in a child-sensitive manner, and was responsible for the 
reasonable, and comfortable, upbringing of children of the English 
Enlightenment -  at least for those of middle-class, educated households 
(Borstelmann, 1983).
Locke’s emphasis on the child in need of nurturance and protection placed 
the responsibility for childrearing and socialization squarely on adults, in 
particular parents. These ideas, however, were overshadowed to some degree 
by approaches that emphasized the child’s innate desires and motivations 
(see next section in this chapter) until the rise of behaviourism in the first 
half of the twentieth century.
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The behaviourist view, which also presented an innocent view of the child, is
probably best described in the words of Watson (1924) who said,
“Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own 
specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take 
any one at random and train him to become any type of 
specialist I might select -  doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant 
chief and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his 
talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of 
his ancestors.” (p. 82).
This view held that the child was essentially good, however the socialization 
of the child, the training of the child for the world at large, was still largely 
something that was done to the child (Feinman & Lewis, 1991). Hence the 
environment in which the child was raised was seen as critical. By and large, 
however, the socialization process was conceptualised as a relatively 
peaceful one. Any resistance by the child to socialization attempts was not 
seen as an impediment to the process. Indeed, resistance by the child was not 
really given consideration beyond the idea that the application of appropriate 
rewards and punishments would result in any necessary behaviour 
modification. This view is in stark contrast to approaches that emphasize the 
child’s innate, but potentially impure, motivations.
The Child’s Innate Desires
Influenced by Locke, the eighteenth century had seen another influential 
philosopher and writer of childrearing and education -  Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. In contrast to Locke, however, Rousseau considered the child to 
be both full of consuming impulses, yet infinitely malleable, and therefore
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perfectible (Borstelmann, 1983). He saw young children only as capable of 
learning through perception, and thus through experience. Borstelmann 
(1993) challenged the common view of Rousseau believing in the innate 
goodness of the child as a misinterpretation (p. 24). Rather, Rousseau 
believed that God made everything good, including children, but that they 
could be misled both through experience and through their own desires. 
Although extolling the virtues of allowing the child to perceive the world for 
himself, Rousseau recommended that this occur under the guidance of 
appropriate tutors, in an age-appropriate manner. His idea was that if 
children were properly guided and allowed to make choices, their choices 
would always be the right ones (Cleverley & Phillips, 1976). As with Locke, 
Rousseau stressed the importance of good role models for the development 
of the child.
The ideas of Locke and Rousseau, however, brought the needs of the child to 
centre stage and lay the groundwork for later psychological approaches, and 
institutional policy, geared specifically to the needs of children. Rousseau’s 
ideas about stages of development were also adopted by later developmental 
psychologists (Kessen, 1965). Both, however, gave credence to the 
motivational forces within the child, and how these affect learning.
Freud’s Views of the Child
The child’s internal motivations were foremost in Freud’s early twentieth 
century account of childhood, but the child was no longer represented as 
innately, or even inadvertently, basically good. Rather, Freud saw children,
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like adults, as motivated by instinctual desires that were frequently sexual in 
nature. His psychoanalytic approach to the socialization of children involved 
conflict between the child’s instinctual desires and the demands placed on 
him/her by the expectations of the society into which the child was raised 
(Freud, 1933). In Freud’s view, the process was inherently conflictual 
because the internally motivated desires of the child and the external 
demands of socialization were inevitably discordant. This somewhat 
“wilder” view of the child conveys an image of one in need of “civilizing” or 
“taming”. Socialization was viewed as something external to the child, with 
the socialization process fraught with inevitable disagreements and tensions.
In addition to Freud’s views that children were far from innocent, placing 
enormous responsibility on parents whose role it was to control these 
impulses, his work highlighted the importance of the first years of life. 
According to Freud (1940/1949), the unparalleled mother-infant attachment 
relationship served as a prototype, and formed the basis upon which all 
subsequent relationships are formed. Despite Freud’s theoretical revisions, 
together with numerous changes in terminology, his basic idea that 
attachment (with the mother) leads, in one way or another, to identification 
(with the same-sex parent), which in turn leads to socialization, remained 
throughout his work. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed summary of this.) 
Thus twentieth century infants were conceptualised quite differently to those 
of previous centuries who were often given to (the families of) wet-nurses for 
the first two years (McLaughlin, 1988). In contrast, Freud saw the first years 
of life as paramount with the child’s parent playing a crucial role.
17
According to Freud, socialization is the process by which a child’s natural 
erotic and aggressive instincts are gradually brought under control by the 
superego (Richters & Waters, 1991). The superego is formed quite early in 
life and is quite resistant to change. Children identify with the parents’ 
superegos as well as the parent’s situational behaviours.
Identification, itself, has two phases. The first, called “anaclitic” (or primary) 
identification, originates with the child’s complete (biological and emotional) 
dependence on the mother. Since the mother must inevitably withdraw some 
of her attention away from the infant, the child is said to incorporate some of 
the mother’s own characteristics into his/her own. This process is both 
comforting and reassuring to the child and, according to Freud, describes 
how the mother’s superego is incorporated into the developing superego of 
the child. The same process is repeated with the father, as well as other 
figures who serve as parental substitutes throughout the child’s life. The 
initial identification with the parents, however, is claimed to be the most 
powerful, and to lay the foundation for socialization.
During the preschool years, Freud proposed that the child’s developing 
conscience is reliant on a process of “defensive” identification, which differs 
for boys and girls. (A detailed description of each appears in Chapter 3.) For 
both boys and girls, however, the strength of the identification process relies 
on the strength of the initial mother-child attachment. This attachment 
relationship, while promoting anxiety in the child, also motivates the child
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toward identification with one or the other parent. Without this initial 
attachment, and the subsequent anxiety it produces, there is no reason for the 
child to pursue further identification.
Importance of Parents
Both the psychoanalytic and behaviourist views saw the parent-child 
relationship as primary, and explicitly recognized the power-dependency 
relationship between the two (Emerson, 1962). The child was seen as 
dependent on the parent for rewards and punishments and this made 
behaviour modification possible. It was the child’s dependence on his/her 
parents that allowed the parents to be so influential in the socialization 
process.
These two approaches also shared the assumption that the socialization 
process was essentially the same for all children. Neither view allowed much 
scope for the role of individual differences of the child. This is not 
surprising, however, as the child was essentially seen as a recipient of 
parental influence in both the psychoanalytic and behavioural approaches. 
The environmental emphasis allowed little room for individual difference 
variables including the temperament, or even the intelligence, of the child. 
The power relationship of the parent over the child would be seen to override 
any effects of these. Indeed any thoughts on bidirectionality of influence 
were not addressed at this stage of theorizing.
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Despite their gradual decline, behaviourism and psychoanalytic theory still 
guided the study of child socialization into the 1960’s. Domain-specific 
theories became popular, but psychoanalytic theory determined both the 
content and outcomes of the research. Children’s aggression, their 
dependency on adults (particularly parents), sex-typing and identification 
were important themes (Maccoby, 1992). Although some attempts were 
made to take account of the role of the child in the socialization process (e.g., 
Caldwell, 1964), the socialization-through-parental-reinforcement approach 
(Yarrow, Campbell & Burton, 1968) remained dominant.
Individual Differences
There was growing recognition, however, that not all children responded in 
the same way to the socialization efforts of their parents. This was apparent 
from infancy and prompted a burgeoning of work on infant temperament 
(e.g., Bates, 1980; Bates, Freeland & Lounsbury, 1979; Thomas & Chess, 
1977; Thomas, Chess, & Birch, 1968). Distinctions were made between 
“easy”, “difficult” and “slow-to-warm” babies on dimensions including 
activity level, rhythmicity (or regularity), responsiveness and adaptability.
The focus on individual differences continued into work with young children 
(e.g., Bell, 1968; Caldwell, 1964; Richards, 1974). Along with the realization 
that the child played a contribution to his/her own development, there was 
the recognition that this occurred in concert with the efforts of the parents. 
Child socialization therefore involved discerning which parenting techniques 
would work with which children. Baumrind, for example, distinguished
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between authoritarian, permissive and authoritative parenting styles on such 
dimensions as parental warmth (or nurturance), control, maturity demands, 
restrictiveness and dependency (Baumrind, 1967, 1973; Baumrind & Black, 
1967).
Hence the child was seen as being capable of various abilities and ways of 
thinking, as well as possessing unique attributes that would impact on these 
abilities. More important, however, was the recognition that the child utilized 
these skills by actively, and deliberately, engaging with both the environment 
and their relationships with people in that environment.
This view, however, did not completely undermine the process of 
socialization proposed by the Freudian-Watsonian model. Possessing 
abilities and qualities, even unique ones, does not make a child immune to 
the socialization process. Even if these qualities made a child more resistant 
to parental efforts, the power-dependency relationship described earlier 
should take precedence over that resistance. Similarly, the active and 
purposeful efforts on the part of the child to learn about, and make sense of, 
his/her environment, were not believed to prevent the parent guiding, indeed 
determining, that learning. Furthermore, the recognition of individual 
differences did not preclude there being common influences and experiences 
to which all children are exposed.
Despite their similar aim, research on socialization of infants and 
socialization of children diverged during this time. Research with infants
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continued to be influenced, almost exclusively, by the research and 
methodology of developmental psychology. Studies were primarily aimed at 
determining the sequence in which children, or infants, acquired specific 
skills and abilities, while research into the socialization of children fell into 
the domain of social psychology. Here the crucial concept of social 
influence, the process by which people are influenced by others, was applied 
to children. In addition to affording children an active role in their own 
socialization process, the social psychological emphasis led to more indirect 
ways of studying the process than simply detailing at what ages children 
acquire particular, albeit social, abilities. Indirect social influence processes 
included imitation and vicarious learning.
Socialization, Social Learning and Social Psychology
The dominance of behavioural learning theories was thus replaced by social 
learning theories. This approach, which is more a collection of theories rather 
than a single theory, began with Robert Sears who first synthesized, and then 
applied, the psychoanalytic and learning approaches to the study of children 
(Sears, Whiting, Nowlis & Sears, 1953). Sears and his colleagues 
emphasised that “aggression” and “dependency” were important motivators 
for the child. However, these were not considered innate (as proposed by 
Freud), but were thought to be learned through universal experience. They 
also argued that the strength and expression of these drives varied as a result 
of unique parent-child relationships, in particular the mother-child 
relationship.
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Arising from his work on a dependency drive, Sears also emphasized the 
importance of identification (e.g., Levin & Sears, 1956), although his first 
attempts at defining this were little more than a restatement of Freud’s 
anaclitic identification theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1960). According to Sears, 
the child’s initial complete dependence on the mother for both biological and 
emotional needs was sufficient to explain the child’s identification with her 
(Richters & Waters, 1991). Indeed identification (with the same-sex parent) 
remained the primary mechanism for socialization (e.g., Sears, Rau & Alpert, 
1965). Despite numerous revisions of his “theory” and attempts to explain 
children’s identification with their parents (e.g., Sears, Maccoby & Levin, 
1957), Sears ultimately abandoned the notions of identification and drives in 
the socialization process. Dissatisfied, he returned to a focus on simple 
reinforcement, and the stimulus-response approach of traditional learning 
theories.
Meanwhile the social learning movement gained momentum in the 1960’s, 
although it split into two major divisions, “each of which was in intellectual 
debt to the parental movement and to the reinforcement concepts of B. F. 
Skinner” (Cairns, 1983, p.88). The first of these, led by Gewirtz and 
colleagues (Bijou & Baer, 1961; Gewirtz, 1961), focussed on behaviour 
modification, rather than the socialization process per se, with the continued 
application of operant conditioning techniques. As with Sears, the concepts 
of “conditioning” and “social reinforcement” continued to be problematic.
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The second reformulation of the social learning approach was led by 
Bandura and Walters (1963). Influenced by Sears’ work on identification, 
and his emphasis on dyadic relationships, Bandura and colleagues placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on “imitation” in the learning process. Although 
imitation and the importance of parental modelling had been stressed 6y 
writers such as Rousseau centuries earlier, the concept had been largely 
ignored in more recent learning theories. Unlike earlier studies on imitation 
(e.g., Miller & Dollard, 1941) that considered imitation in reinforcement 
terms, Bandura (1962, 1965; Bandura & Walters, 1963) claimed that children 
could acquire new behaviours in the absence of reinforcement.
Imitation, they noted, did not always occur immediately following a 
modelled behaviour, nor even in the actual presence of the model. Moreover, 
seeing another person experience consequences for a behaviour could be 
enough to encourage, or inhibit, reproduction of that behaviour in the 
observer. Hence imitation could occur with or without the presence of a 
model, and regardless of whether it was the model or the observer who 
experienced the consequences of the behaviour. In Bandura’s approach, 
observational learning became the primary learning mechanism; drives and 
the Freudian concept of identification were abandoned. As noted by Bandura 
and Walters (1963), social learning, and socialization, required cognitive 
input.
Thus Bandura’s (1969) reformulation of social learning theory included a 
more cognitive emphasis on the concepts of imitation and modelling.
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Modelling, according to Bandura (1969, 1977, 1986, 1992) was comprised of 
four components, or processes. These are the attention (paid to a stimulus); 
the retention (of the information); behavioural production (or the actual 
modelling/imitation performance); and the motivation (to re/produce the 
behaviour). (These are described in detail in Chapter 5.) This emphasis on 
the child’s cognitive abilities clearly placed the emphasis on the child’s role 
in his/her own socialization process.
More Child-Centred Approaches to Socialization
By the 1970’s it was clear that researchers had reacted strongly against the 
traditional parent-focussed view of socialization, claiming the child 
him/herself as a more active participant in the socialization process (Feinman 
& Lewis, 1991). Piaget’s work on cognitive development contributed to this 
idea, particularly his claims that the child’s view of the world was not 
necessarily wrong, but rather that it represented a different view to that held 
by adults (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966, 1969).
This recognition of the child’s competence was echoed even in research with 
infants. Bower, in particular, saw the infant this way. “A newborn thus 
begins life as an extremely competent social organism, an extremely 
competent learning organism, an extremely competent perceiving organism” 
(Bower, 1977, p. 35). These abilities, even in very young infants, meant that 
they could influence those around them, in addition to being influenced by 
them.
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Research and New Technologies
Research in the 1970’s and 1980’s underwent a dramatic change, brought 
about by the introduction of new computer and video technologies which 
allowed for detailed analyses of parent-child interactions. As a result, the 
focus shifted from the individual (child) to the (parent-child) dyad. 
Reciprocity of behaviours was recognized (e.g., Bowlby, 1969) and an 
interactionist perspective on socialization took hold. The long-standing 
tradition whereby influence was viewed as a one-way process, passed from 
parent to child, was replaced by the recognition, and empirical evidence, that 
children were equally capable of influencing adults. This was evidenced 
from infancy. Not only did infants imitate adults, but adults often mimicked 
infants in such a way that could enhance both the affective quality of the 
relationship and the infant’s social capabilities (Schaffer, Collis & Parsons, 
1977; Tronick, Als & Brazelton, 1980).
Bidirectionality of influence was not a new idea. It was originally conceived 
as the idea that the parent and child provided reinforcement, or aversive 
consequences, for each other’s behaviour (e.g., Sears, 1951). In the 1980’s, 
however, the emphasis shifted to relationships, which are constructed and 
reshaped over time (e.g., Hartup & Rubin, 1986).
Socialization and the Transmission Process
But experiences between parent and child are not simply transferred to new 
situations. Although attachment theorists, for example, view a person’s 
relationships with both his/her peers and later romantic relationships as
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derived, in some way, from the initial parent-child relationship (e.g., 
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1988) this view is not 
universally held. Harris (1995, 1998), for example, maintains the opposite. 
Indeed she claims that the only lasting effect of the parent-child relationship 
is between the particular parent and child. Lasting influence, she claims, is 
due to a child’s relationships with his/her peers, not the relationship with 
parents. Using examples as diverse as non-English speaking immigrants to 
the upper-class English boys at Eton, as well as deaf children, she argues that 
children are socialized into the “new” or the dominant culture by other 
children. Linguistically and culturally children exhibit the characteristics of 
their peers and the experiences they share outside the home. According to 
Harris, the effects of parental efforts are severely limited.
Separate Worlds?
Harris’ ideas concerning the “separate worlds” of children and adults (Harris, 
1998) only represent contemporary thinking about childrearing and 
socialization. Indeed prior to the last few centuries, children’s lives were not 
particularly separate from adults. Both children and adults of the lower 
classes were required to work; children’s play was not particularly separate 
from adults, and children attended rituals, such as church and even funerals, 
along with adults (Tucker, 1988).
More common has been a separation between boys and girls. Throughout the 
centuries, boys and girls have been explicitly prepared for their future 
gender-differentiated places in society: boys have received education and
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formal training for their place in the workforce, girls have been (primarily) 
prepared for their roles as wife and mother. While exceptions to this have 
existed, formal legislation actually preventing discrimination based on one’s 
gender in education and in the workplace has only come into practice in 
recent times. (Examples include the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 (amended) 
which came into operation on 24 June, 2004 in the United Kingdom, and the 
Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, in Australia.)
Developments such as these could lead the naive observer to rightfully 
expect that sex differences in childrearing and socialization practices would 
no longer be apparent. The brief review of the literature that follows shows 
the opposite to be more the case.
Gender Differences in Socialization Practices
From birth, children’s environments and experiences differ, based purely on 
their sex. Infant boys and girls receive different toys as gifts, they are dressed 
differently, and their rooms are decorated in different colours and styles 
(Rheingold & Cook, 1975). Infant boys and girls are perceived differently by 
both strangers (Condry & Condry, 1976) and also by parents (Rubin, 
Provenzano & Luria, 1974).
During their first year of life, parents continue this differentiation based on 
gender by encouraging their sons and daughters to play with different toys 
(Roopnarine, 1986) and by using different language styles with boys and 
with girls (Goldberg & Lewis, 1969; Walker & Armstrong, 1995). This
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difference only intensifies in the second year both in the type of play (Fagot, 
1974; Lamb, 1977) and in the responses they provide to children, such as 
praise or criticism (Fagot, 1974, 1978). This continues into the preschool 
years with both mothers and fathers demonstrating greater leniency toward 
their sons’ behaviour than to their daughters’ (Leaper, Hirsch & Kremen, 
cited in Maccoby, 1998; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1983).
Parents also make distinctions between their sons and daughters in domains 
other than behavioural ones. Furnham and Gasson (1998) found that parents 
(particularly fathers) even differentiated in their estimates of the intelligence 
of their children. This was irrespective of the birth order of the children or 
the age of each child. This is consistent with Siegal’s (1987) meta-analysis of 
mothers’ and fathers’ treatment of their sons and daughters that revealed a 
consistent trend toward fathers differentiating between their children on the 
basis of their sex more than mothers.
Outside-the-home socialization pressures on children continue to 
differentiate between the sexes. Educational settings tend to exacerbate 
already existing gender preferences. Sex segregation is often formalized, and 
analyses of teacher-student interactions replicate those of parents and their 
children. Tittle (1986) reviewed numerous studies in which teachers, often 
unwittingly, promoted sex differences in both behaviour and academic 
performance. These distinctions are reinforced by peers who consistently, 
and reliably, reinforce sex-appropriate behaviours both in early childhood 
(Corsaro, 1990) and beyond.
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The mass media, and in particular television, is widely acknowledged as a 
reinforcer of sex differences. Media content is highly sex-stereotyped: men 
outnumber women overall and are shown far more often than women in 
dominant and/or high status positions (Durkin, 1985). Given that boys spend 
an increasingly greater amount of time watching television than girls 
(Huston, Wright, Marquis & Green, 1999), it would appear that the potential 
ability of television to influence attitudes and behaviours might be greater for 
boys than for girls. In any case, the proclivity toward television as a means of 
providing children with information is utilized in this thesis.
Summary
In reviewing the history of socialization research, a number of themes 
emerge. Firstly there has been the continuing debate concerning parent-to- 
child or child-to-parent effects, as well as the extent of each. Despite the 
Ancient Greeks’ realization that children’s behaviour could affect parents’ 
treatment of them, as well as Locke’s seventeenth century recognition of 
children’s differing temperaments, these were all but ignored in twentieth 
century psychoanalytic and behaviourist theorizing. Current thinking, 
however, reflects a more middle-of-the-road view. Characteristics of both 
child and parent (for example) impact on the relationship between the two, 
with the relationship itself responsive to more than the input of those it 
comprises. Relationships exist in a dynamic form in a dynamic context. 
Socialization research now recognizes not only the multiple effects upon 
both adults and children, but the interconnectedness of these effects.
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Arising from this, the second theme concerns exactly how children learn 
from parents and others. Modelling, for example, is much more than simple 
imitation; it involves motivational aspects. Identification has been a recurrent 
theme of this work as evidenced in theoretical views as diverse as 
psychoanalytic theory and social-cognitive theory. Despite a general 
acceptance that identification involves some form of self-definition, just how 
this is achieved and the processes underlying it remain elusive.
Finally, there has been a tendency in socialization research to acknowledge 
gender differences, both in the treatment of the young (e.g., Condry & 
Condry, 1976; Rubin, Provenzano & Luria, 1974) and in children’s reactions 
to this (e.g., Fagot, 1985a, 1986). Thus a closer examination of gender 
socialization is the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Theories of Gender Development
Introduction
We have seen in Chapter 2 how socialization practices differ for boys and 
girls. In that chapter, it was seen that the socialization process is largely 
treated as something that is external to the child, the process whereby 
children are moulded to fit their ordained place in society.
Since gender is arguably the primary organizing social dichotomy, the 
current chapter examines the specific socialization of gender. Here we see 
that the process of learning about gender involves not only pressures from 
the social structure, but a crucial motivation that comes from within the child 
itself. The approaches presented in this chapter differ in the relative emphasis 
they place on the external or innate forces and the internal pressures 
motivating the child’s learning about gender.
Four major theories have dominated this field over the last century. These are 
psychoanalytic theory, social-cognitive theory, social learning/ social- 
cognitive theory, and gender schema theory. Each proposes somewhat 
different paths to children’s development of a sense of being male or female. 
There are differences, too, in the way gender is conceptualised in each of 
these theories, and in the methodologies used to assess the development of 
gender identity/knowledge. All, however, see the process of understanding
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what it is to be a boy or a girl (a male or a female) as an important task of 
childhood development.
Psychoanalytic Theory
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the development of psychoanalytic theory (e.g., 
Freud, 1917, 1933) dramatically altered views on children. In particular, 
Freud emphasized the importance of the first years of the child’s life. He 
rejected the notion of childhood innocence, claiming instead that children 
were born with innate desires, or motivations, that needed to be brought 
under control -  specifically by the child’s parents.
Freud believed that biologically based drives motivated human behaviour. 
One of these, the sexual drive, was present at birth and played a critical role 
in the child’s relationship with his/her parents and the consequent 
development of the child’s sexual identity. The importance of the early 
parent-child relationship is no more clearly presented than in Freud’s account 
of the development of gender identity. Since gender identity has its roots in 
biological sex differences, the process is theorized to be somewhat different 
for boys and girls. Both, however, are said to develop from the primary 
relationship between the infant and its mother.
The Oedipal complex results from a boy’s strong attachment to his mother, 
which eventually places him in competition with his father for his mother’s 
affection. This produces enormous anxiety in the male child, by placing him 
at risk, not only of losing both the mother’s and the father’s love, but also of
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being (either physically or symbolically) castrated by a retaliating father. 
Ultimately, the male child chooses to identify with the father, which the boy 
believes will not only reduce his father’s jealousy (and consequently the 
chance of castration), but will allow the boy to remain a potential object of 
affection from his mother. Moreover, he is believed to assume that his father 
will be more likely to love a son who is similar to him.
The purported process of defensive identification for girls is “far more 
obscure and full of gaps” (Freud, 1924, p.77). Still focused on penises and 
castration, the process involves a girl’s love-hate relationship with her father 
(whom she believes to be responsible for what she sees as her castration) and 
her mother (who failed to prevent the castration). At the same time, the girl 
experiences increased attraction to the father due to her desire for a penis. 
Resolution of this conflict is brought about by the continued, though 
weakened, identification with the mother. Similar to the resolution of the 
Oedipal conflict, identification is believed by the girl to decrease the chances 
of retaliation by her mother, while maintaining a position for potential 
affection from her father. According to Freudian theory, female sexual 
identity is weaker than that of the male because the mother is seen as 
similarly “mutilated”.
In both accounts, gender development is motivated by innate biological 
forces against which the child, itself, is powerless. The process is seen as 
both natural and inevitable, particularly as it occurs, by and large, 
unconsciously. Despite its conflictual nature, the development of gender
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identity in the mentally healthy human is argued to be as inexorable as the 
sex of the child. Boys will follow one path toward the development of a male 
identity, and females one toward a female identity.
The relatively “afterthought” approach to the development of sexual identity 
for girls (or women) prompted several feminist revisions of psychoanalytic 
theory, most notably that by Chodorow (1978). Essentially she argues that 
the search for sexual identity for girls involves continual identification with 
the mother, as opposed to boys whose initial attachment to the mother must 
be replaced by that to the father. This leads to a more independent sense of 
self for males and a greater sense of “connectedness” for females.
Although many researchers have found evidence for sex differences in 
independence and connectedness (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto & 
Norasakkunkit, 1997; Markus, 1977), attempts to find empirical support for 
the psychoanalytic explanation of gender development, however, have 
remained unsuccessful. (See Sears, Maccoby & Levin, 1957, and more 
recently, Sroufe, 1985).
Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Explicitly rejecting the psychoanalytic emphasis on innate drives and 
unconscious motivations, Kohlberg (1966) argued that knowledge about 
gender is acquired in the same way as all knowledge. This is to say that 
children’s understanding of gender is reliant on their developing cognitive
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abilities, and a continual construction of meaning that comes from interaction 
with their world.
Kohlberg (1966) developed an account of gender development, based on 
Piaget’s (1952) stage theory of cognitive development. During the Piagetian 
“preoperational” stage, between approximately eighteen months and seven 
years of age, children’s thought processes are characterized by specific 
limitations. In particular, children’s thinking is “perception bound”, or 
influenced by the most perceptually salient feature of an object. This 
contributes to their inability to make perceptual transformations, or to 
understand “conservation”, the fact that certain physical properties of objects 
remain constant despite an outward change in appearance.
Kohlberg linked these abilities to children’s understanding of gender. As 
children’s cognitive abilities increase, so too does their ability to consider 
themselves, and others, in terms of gender. Complete understanding of 
gender is referred to as “gender constancy”, a child’s knowledge that they are 
a boy or a girl and that this will not change with age or with changes in 
appearance.
Kohlberg (1966) outlined three stages that children undergo in the 
development of gender constancy, which accompany the changes from 
Piaget’s preoperational to concrete operational stages. These stages continue 
to dominate cognitive-developmental research and are utilized in Study 1.
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The first of these is gender identity. This involves the ability to correctly 
identify both themselves and others as either male or female. In the second 
stage, gender stability, children acquire the knowledge that people remain 
male or female over time. That is, a girl will become a woman (not a man), 
and a boy will become a man (and not a woman). Finally, children are said to 
develop gender consistency, or an understanding that gender remains 
consistent across situations, regardless of superficial changes such as a 
change of clothing or hairstyle. This final stage requires the Piagetian ability 
to “transform” objects, or the understanding that perceptually salient features 
may not truly represent the true nature of the underlying object (or person). 
Gender constancy is thus an accumulation of the knowledge comprising each 
of the three stages, and is acquired in this order.
In line with Piaget’s work on conservation, Kohlberg first claimed that full 
gender constancy was not attained until six or seven years of age. However, 
variations in methods used to assess gender constancy, such as Slaby and 
Frey’s (1975) verbal interview, have shown children as young as four to 
exhibit high levels of gender constancy, while Martin and Halverson (1983) 
found that the use of perceptual transformation tasks, such as those used by 
Emmerich, Goldman, Kirsh, and Sharabany (1977) and Marcus and Overton 
(1978), resulted in much later displays of gender constancy, e.g., around 
seven years of age.
Despite these anomalies, the basis of the cognitive-developmental approach 
is that children’s gender role development is dependent upon their cognitive
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development. Since cognitive ability determines the child’s level of 
understanding (of gender), this ability precedes the search for gender-related 
information. Indeed gender constancy is said to motivate this search. Once a 
child knows that s/he is a girl/boy, and will remain so always, s/he begins to 
seek out more information about gender-appropriate behaviours. So 
children’s cognitive awareness of the unchanging nature of gender -  both in 
themselves and others -  leads them to search for gender-relevant information 
and, because human beings desire cognitive/behavioural consonance, gender- 
appropriate behaviour is found to be rewarding in itself. (This sits Kohlberg 
apart from theorists who emphasize other people as the source of rewards for 
gender-appropriate behaviour.) People of the same sex as the child thus 
become potential sources of this information and gender constancy is thus a 
prerequisite for identification with same-sex models.
If children are motivated to seek out same-sex information, then an increase 
in preference for same-sex activities and possessions should occur along with 
higher levels of gender constancy. Gender constancy should also be 
associated with attention to gender-consistent information and the imitation 
of these same-sex behaviours (Kohlberg, 1966). Little empirical support, 
however, has been found for this prediction (e.g., Bussey & Bandura, 1984; 
Carter & Levy, 1988; Marcus & Overton, 1978).
Bussey and Bandura (1984), for example, found that children’s levels of 
gender constancy did not predict their tendency to imitate same-sex models. 
Using a modelling paradigm in which children were given the opportunity to
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copy male or female models, the only effect of gender constancy was that 
higher levels of gender constancy were associated with a greater number of 
behaviours performed. After controlling for the age of the child, gender 
constancy exerted no effect.
Common to all interpretations of cognitive-developmental theory, however, 
is the idea that “the child moves from a disorganized, undifferentiated initial 
state ... (to) conformity to socially imposed values about sex-typing” 
(Huston, 1983, p.399).
Social Learning/ Social Cognitive Theory
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the social learning approach dominated 
socialization research in the 1960’s. With its basis in traditional learning and 
reinforcement theories, social learning theory (Bandura & Walters, 1963) 
stressed the importance of learning through observation and imitation, and 
was particularly applied to the acquisition of gender-related behaviours (e.g., 
Mischel, 1966).
As with cognitive-developmental theory, sex-typed behaviours are learned in 
the same way as other behaviours. In social learning terms, however, this 
learning occurs via the basic learning principles of operant conditioning and 
observational learning (Huston, 1983). A contingency exists between sex- 
typed behaviours and the reinforcements they elicit. However, this 
relationship is more complex than the simple stimulus-reinforcement models 
proposed by Watson (1928) and Skinner (1953).
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In particular, it was recognized that children are not passive recipients and 
respondents to external stimuli, but are actively engaged in the learning 
process. Importantly, children’s abilities to anticipate, and reflect on, both 
their own and others’ behaviour expands their response repertoire beyond an 
immediate reaction to reinforcement for their own behaviour.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Bandura and Walters (1963) noted that children 
do not only learn from contingencies with respect to their own behaviour. 
Furthermore, their responses are not contingent on the actual presence of the 
model. Bandura (1977) and Mischel (1973, 1977, 1979) developed these 
ideas, incorporating the child’s cognitive abilities into the learning process. 
Both claimed that children develop “expectancies” regarding the 
consequences of their behaviours. Rather than merely causing an immediate 
reaction, behavioural reinforcement (either positive or negative) teaches 
children what to expect from a particular behaviour. This notion is 
particularly useful in terms of learning about gender-related behaviours.
By observing the consequences of both their own and others’ gender 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, boys and girls learn to expect 
particular reactions. The wearing of pretty dresses elicits positive responses 
for girls, but negative responses for boys. The more this occurs for herself 
and others, the more the child learns what response to expect. Reinforcers act 
both as conveyors of information and as incentives for praise (Bandura,
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1977). Girls and boys not only learn what is appropriate behaviour for their 
sex, but that engaging in sex-appropriate behaviour is rewarded.
Put simply, behaviours are seen to precede thought processes. This idea is at 
odds with cognitive-developmental theories, where cognitions come first. In 
social learning approaches, it is the behaviours themselves that elicit 
responses. It is these responses that then affect how the child thinks about 
their behaviour and the response it produced. In order to fully understand the 
impact of their sex-typed behaviours, they need to be able to (i) attend to the 
situation; (ii) retain the information; (iii) produce the relevant response; and 
(iv) be motivated to do so. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed description of this.)
As a result of observing the consequences of sex-typed behaviours (in both 
the self and others), there is a shift from external (social) sanctions to self­
regulation. External sanctions are gradually replaced by internal, or self, 
sanctions, which are translated into personal standards (Bandura, 1986; 
Bussey & Bandura, 1992). While this process necessarily involves cognitive 
ability, it is not dependent upon a particular requisite ability (such as 
conservation). Indeed, the process is one of constant self-monitoring that 
results just as much from experience as it does from cognitive development. 
Initially, children evaluate and regulate their sex-typed behaviour according 
to external anticipatory sanctions, such as the response they receive from 
playing with particular toys. With experience and development, they begin to 
behave in accordance with anticipatory self-sanctions. Girls learn that 
“babying” their dolls will produce sweet sighs and praise from adults, while
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boys will be encouraged to have their dolls drive the tip-truck (if not told 
explicitly that, “dolls are for girls”). Self-regulation of behaviours involves 
both a standard-matching function (i.e., matching the behaviour to their 
personal standards), and an affective component to the self-reaction (e.g., 
children engage in behaviours that induce self-satisfaction and self-worth) 
(Bandura, 1986, 1991).
Another feature of social learning theories is the recognition of the multiple 
influences to which children are exposed regarding sex-role information 
(Bandura, 1969, 1986). Possible sources of information include parents, 
peers, teachers and the media. This is because sex-typed learning is not 
motivated by either innate, or even cognitive, forces within the child, but is 
heavily reliant on the reinforcement of others. What is necessary, however, is 
some level of identification with (specifically liking for) the person(s) 
providing the reinforcement. Sex-typing is thus seen as a product of 
identification (Bussey & Bandura, 1984).
Gender labelling is an important part of identification. By labelling both the 
self and others as either male or female, the child begins to form categories 
and to place both themself, and others, into those categories. However, 
children are able to distinguish on the basis of gender long before they have 
the verbal ability to apply labels. Seven month old infants have demonstrated 
the ability to distinguish between male and female faces (Cornell, 1974; 
Fagan, 1976; Fagan & Singer, 1979) and voices (Miller, 1983; Miller, 
Younger & Morse, 1982). By two years of age, many children are correctly
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able to label themselves and others according to gender (Fagot & Leinbach, 
1989, 1993).
Having developed the ability to categorize along these (gender) lines, 
children begin to place themselves into one of these categories, based largely 
on their similarity to other category members. This process is intensified by 
the pervasiveness of gender distinctions all around them (see Rheingold & 
Cook, 1975). Coupled with the evaluative reactions from others, such as 
positive and negative responses from parents for engaging in gender-typed 
activities (e.g., Caldera, Huston & O’Brien, 1989), it is not surprising that 
engaging in sex-typed behaviours increases with age for both boys and girls.
Importantly for social cognitive theory, however, is the idea that the ability to 
differentiate between the sexes, and to link these with different activities (and 
their associated social sanctions), is all that is necessary for children to learn 
about gender stereotypes. Such a level of gender understanding precedes 
gender identity (Bussey & Bandura, 1999, p. 695).
Gender Schema Theory
Once again, there is not a single gender schema theory. Rather, there exist 
two distinct theories: the first proposed by Bern (1981), and the other by 
Martin and Halverson (1981). Both, however, share the common construct of 
a gender schema -  “a cognitive structure consisting of a set of expectations 
or a network of associations that guide and organize an individual’s 
perception” (Huston, 1983, p. 399). Schemas are used to understand the
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world. Information that is consistent with a particular schema is processed 
more easily than information that is not. Schema-inconsistent information 
may not even be attended to in the first place, and is thus more likely to be 
forgotten or simply ignored.
The concept of sex-typing is crucial to gender schema theory. According to 
Bern (1981, 1983, 1984), sex-typing is largely a result of “gender-schematic 
processing”, an individual’s generalized readiness to process information in 
terms of its associations of maleness or femaleness. This gender-based 
distinction affects information processing at all levels, i.e., encoding, 
organizing and retrieving the information. It enables the individual to 
anticipate, and selectively impose meaning onto, incoming stimuli. It also 
allows the individual to disregard certain information (or components of that 
information) if it cannot be assimilated into the existing schema.
Thus according to Bern people vary in the degree to which sex-typing 
influences their readiness to encode, and their ability to remember, 
information in terms of gender. Gender schemas, themselves, are said to 
derive from the “sex-differentiated practices of the social community” (Bern, 
1984, p.186), and individual differences arise from the “extent to which 
one’s particular socialization history has stressed the functional importance 
of the gender dichotomy” (Bern, 1981, p.362). In this approach, people are 
categorized according to their “gender schematicity”, or the degree to which, 
for an individual, gender is an enduring, and frequently employed, category 
by them. People said to be highly “gender schematic” commonly use gender
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as a determinant of, or explanation for, behaviours and events in their 
environment. Those who are “gender aschematic” use gender no more than 
any other category when interpreting their social surrounds (Bern & Allen, 
1974). People are therefore classified as being either masculine, feminine or 
“androgynous”. Rather than being a combination (or sum) of masculine and 
feminine characteristics, androgynous people are relatively free from using 
gender as a consistent guiding principle. As such, androgynous people are 
also “gender aschematic”, and may equally employ an alternative category to 
gender when thinking about, and remembering, particular information.
There are several predictions deriving from this model concerning sex-typed 
behaviour. The first assumes that people who are highly sex-typed are more 
likely to engage in sex-stereotypical behaviour, or to avoid opposite-sex or 
gender-inappropriate behaviour, than are androgynous or “undifferentiated” 
people. Bern & Lenney (1976) found that sex-typed participants were not 
only more likely to choose sex-stereotypic behaviours, but also to reject sex- 
inappropriate behaviours, than were androgynous or cross-sex-typed 
participants. This finding was replicated by Helmreich, Spence and Holahan 
(1979), but only for males.
The second prediction applies to people other than the self. In other words, 
highly sex-typed individuals are more likely to organize information about 
others according to sex, and may even be more likely to confuse members of 
the opposite sex (Frable & Bern, 1985). Andersen and Bern (1981) also 
found that sex-typed individuals differentiated more strongly in their
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judgement of attractive and unattractive partners (of the opposite sex) than 
did androgynous or undifferentiated people.
For Bern, it is the cultural importance of gender that impacts on the 
individual’s propensity to be gender-typed. If the world at large did not place 
such an emphasis on sex/gender, those schemas based on gender would be 
relatively unimportant, and therefore less influential.
Martin & Halverson (1981) also stressed the organizing function of (gender) 
schemas, but they differentiated between self-schemas and general schemas 
(or stereotypes) that are used to describe other people in the world. In their 
theory, applying gender schemas to the self is part of the developmental 
process. Girls learn to define themselves in terms of feminine stereotypes, 
and boys in terms of male ones.
What is necessary for this to occur is the ability to differentiate information 
categorically. Once information can be labeled as appropriate for either 
males or females, it can be placed into one or the other category. The 
formation of a male schema around masculine attributes and information 
(and a female schema around feminine ones) affects the way that information 
is attended to, encoded and recalled. It also allows children to infer schema- 
consistent properties, or characteristics, when information is lacking in some 
way. For example, when being taken to the dentist, children will likely 
expect the dentist to be male, as this is more consistent with the stereotype.
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Schemas can also result in errors being made concerning the accuracy, and 
recall, of particular information (see Taylor & Crocker, 1979).
As with cognitive-developmental theory, this approach recognizes the 
importance of the child’s developing cognitions in their ability to process 
(gender-related) information. What differs, however, is that, in order to 
utilize gender schemas, all that is necessary is the ability to label both the self 
and others as either male or female.
Both boys and girls have been shown to do this at an early age. The ability to 
label both self and others as male or female, and the ability to incorporate 
sex-typed information from the world into knowledge about appropriate self­
behaviour has been shown to occur at three or four years of age (Martin & 
Halverson, 1983). This is much earlier than the age predicted by cognitive- 
developmental theory.
Furthermore, the externally-determined salience of a particular schema is 
more important in predicting how that information will be used than is the 
importance of the schema to the particular individual. In other words, certain 
situations will be more likely to invoke the use of a gender schema. Martin & 
Halverson (1981) argue that, for children, gender schemas are frequently 
salient. Parents and teachers often make reference to, “All the girls line up 
here,” or, “When the boys stop talking ... ”.
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Another feature of schematic processing, and stereotyping, is that 
information is discretely categorized. In terms of gender, this categorization 
is dichotomous, making it both easier to place information into one or the 
other category, and to apply those categories to either the self or another. 
Such categorization (into “in-groups” and “out-groups”) has been associated, 
as will be outlined in Chapter 5, with the evaluation of those groups. 
Members of in-groups are evaluated more positively than those of out-groups 
(Allen & Wilder, 1975; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Billig, 
1974). Hence, as gender schemas become more self-defining, they will lead 
to more positive evaluations of males by boys, and of females by girls, an 
issue that will be addressed in Studies 2, 3 and 4.
Also in contrast to Bern’s conceptualization of gender schemas, Martin and 
Halverson’s (1981) model sees the development of sex/gender schemas as a 
normal part of child development, in particular the self-socialization process. 
Importantly, these self-definitions vary between the sexes, rather than 
between individual boys or girls. Thus boys will see particular attributes, 
such as the tendency to play in a rough-and-tumble manner, or to be good at 
maths, as part of their self-schema, and girls will include such characteristics 
as nurturance and understanding into their self-schema.
Given that the development of these gendered self-schemas is seen as a 
normal part of cognitive development, this places them in a position of being 
relatively immune to change. Sex-typing results from society’s propensity to 
differentiate along gender lines. This differentiation (or categorization) is
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then applied to the self (and others). The only way to eliminate these 
differences, therefore, is to change the importance placed on sex/gender in 
the world at large and/or prevent children incorporating these schemas about 
others into schemas about themselves.
Summary
The theories presented in this chapter all share a common theme in that they 
each propose a generic process of gender development, with individuals 
learning at different rates, or with differing “success”, as a result of different 
life experience or genetic potential. Thus, while they can explain individual 
differences, none can explain why the outcome might be different for boys 
and girls, as much research suggests is the case. (Bussey and Bandura, 1984, 
for example, address the variable of social control of resources but this has 
not been followed up or incorporated into their subsequent research). Only 
by treating gender as a truly social variable, as will be done in this thesis, can 
such results be explained.
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Chapter 4
Gender: Individual or Category?
Focus on Individual Development
A common thread running through the theories presented in Chapter 3 is an 
overwhelming emphasis on gender development as a process that occurs 
within the individual. Psychoanalytic theory clearly places the emphasis on 
the individual child’s struggle with his/her attachment to, and separation 
from, both the mother and the father. Resolution of this conflict plays a 
critical role in the development of the child’s personality, and in all his/her 
future relationships. Cognitive-developmental theory sees the attainment of 
gender constancy as a three-stage process undertaken by each child. In social 
learning theory, a child’s degree of gender-typing is largely dependent upon 
their exposure to gender role models and the consequences they receive, and 
see others receiving, for modelling this behaviour. Finally, gender schema 
theory explicitly regards a person’s gender schematicity/ aschematicity, or 
their masculinity/ femininity/ androgyny as an individual difference, indeed 
personality-like, characteristic that is highly predictive of their approach to, 
and interpretation of, their social environment.
Thus the acquisition of gender knowledge, whether it be by way of an 
increasing ability to understand the world, or by an increasing awareness of 
the social world, is still seen as a developmental milestone within the 
individual child. This immediately raises two issues.
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Firstly, the focus on the individual’s understanding of gender is consistent 
with the general view within the field of developmental psychology. That is, 
it concerns the changes that occur, across time, to the individual. In the area 
of cognitive development, and language acquisition, the focus is on the 
developing skills of the child -  specifically the individual child. For example, 
Chomsky’s (1959, 1968) nativist view of language development proposes a 
universal language acquisition device, which prewires children for learning 
language, and is triggered by the specific verbal input to which a child is 
exposed: individual children, therefore, acquire different languages 
depending on where they are reared and acquire them at different rates 
depending on their exposure to language in their specific environment. It is 
only the underlying capacity to learn language that is common to all. 
Language remains a skill to be acquired by each, and every, individual child.
Similarly the area of social development has focused on how a child learns to 
live in their social surrounds, how s/he perceives, interprets, and interacts 
with the social environment, and how the environment, in turn, influences the 
child as an individual. This is evident, for example, in the area of 
temperament research (e.g., Thomas & Chess, 1977), as well as attachment 
research (e.g., Feeney & Noller, 1996; Main & Cassidy, 1988).
In turn, the individual focus has influenced the way research in the area has 
been conducted. Consider, for example, cognitive-developmental theory, 
which posits a stage-like process through which all children pass. Gender 
identity is followed by gender stability, which is followed by gender
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consistency. The assessment of gender constancy is used as an indicator of 
where an individual child lies on this particular developmental path. It is not 
until a child has passed through each stage and acquired the relevant skills, in 
the assigned order, that s/he is said to have attained complete gender 
constancy. So while the process is the same for all children, the timing is a 
matter of individual difference, and is predictive of the individual child’s 
reaction to gender-linked information. Thus the attainment of gender 
constancy is seen as a developmental milestone achieved by an individual 
child, in much the same way as individual children learns to walk at different 
ages. Although both of these things (the attainment of gender constancy and 
the ability to walk) can be influenced, and accelerated, by exposure and 
practice (and, as such, can be “taught”), they are used as a measure of an 
individual child’s development. These individual measures are then used as 
predictors of other abilities and behaviours.
Similarly, the predictive ability of gender classifications is paramount in 
gender schema theory. Again, assessment of a person’s gender-typing 
provides information about that particular individual’s understanding of, and 
response to, gender-related information.
The aim of these approaches, therefore, is to find a measure for each 
individual child, which can then be used to predict that child’s gender-related 
behaviour. These approaches explicitly recognize that, even if children are 
exposed to the same environmental influences, they will not all respond in
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the same way. Gender-typed behaviour is thus a reflection of these effects on 
individual children.
Gender as a Category
An alternative explanation focuses explicitly on the group, or categorical, 
nature of gender development. Being male or female is not just about the 
individual; it implies membership of one category or another. Boys and men 
are male; girls and women are female. Hence learning about gender may 
result from learning about, and engaging in, the categorization process.
Although this approach sounds similar to gender schema theory, there are 
important differences. Gender schema theory (e.g., Stangor & Ruble, 1987) 
views the self as a social structure, and people as various “types” within that 
structure. In contrast, the approach taken in this thesis explicitly rejects the 
notion of the self as a fixed construct, instead conceiving of the self as a 
labile, context-dependent process (Onorato & Turner, 2001). The role of 
categorization, of self and others, is central to this process. (See Chapter 6 for 
a detailed discussion of the implications of social categorization, and 
membership of social groups.)
Even very young children have demonstrated the ability to categorize 
information. This categorization ability develops throughout the first year of 
life, with some forms of categorization, arguably, operating from birth 
(Cohen, 2004). In the social arena, gender, along with age and race, appears 
to be one of the very first categories children learn and may be the most
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“fundamental” (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Children 
as young as six months have been shown to use gender to match faces and 
voices (Walker-Andrews, Bahrick, Raglioni & Diaz, 1991) with some 
evidence that they can do this at four months. Moreover, at seven months 
children can distinguish faces and voices on the basis of gender and age 
(Bahrick, Netto, & Hernandez-Reif, 1998).
Children are generally able to distinguish between members of different 
racial groups by four years of age, although there is some evidence of racial 
preference at three (Katz & Kofkin, 1997). From four years, children’s 
awareness of racial, or ethnic, categories develops rapidly (Aboud & Amato, 
2001), with five- and six-year-olds clearly able to make use of these 
categories, often expressed in terms of ingroup bias (Aboud, 1988; Black- 
Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Katz, 1976). This conclusion, however, may be 
limited to ethnically dominant groups (see reviews by Aboud, 1988; Nesdale, 
2001).
As with the development of gender identity (refer to Chapter 3), an age- 
related progression is assumed in developing the ability to perceive and 
interpret ethnic differences. Given the inconsistencies observed between 
ethnically dominant and non-dominant children, as well as the expression of 
these differences between different racial groups (e.g., Bennett et al., 2004), 
it has been suggested that social and cultural influences may play crucial 
roles in the acquisition of racial, and ethnic, identity (see Verkuyten, 2004). 
Again echoing the calls in gender research, Barrett (2000) points out that
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research in this area should involve the socio-cultural context, rather than 
simply the individual child. For example, African-American children in 
Clark & Clark’s (1947) classic study were more likely than white American 
children to claim that they were like a doll of the wrong colour. Unless we 
assume that their individual perceptions and cognitions were 
developmentally delayed, the marginalized social position of African 
Americans must be seen as having an influential role in the expression of 
ethnic identity, if not its actual attainment.
Many approaches to the learning of gender or ethnic categories implicitly 
assume that there is equal information available about both categories. In 
reference to national categories, Bennett, Lyons, Sani & Barrett (1998) make 
the cogent point that for groups who live in ethnically homogeneous areas, 
children may be exposed to differing amounts and types of information, with 
more information about the ethnic ingroup and less (and more negative) 
information about the ethnic outgroup. In the case of gender, information 
about males and females is potentially available to boys and girls. Yet even 
in this case there is not equality in the available information because children 
spend much less time with the opposite sex. Children’s propensity to 
voluntarily sex segregate should also mean that they know more about their 
own sex than about the opposite sex. As will be seen in Chapter 11, this is 
true for boys but not for girls, suggesting that not only are there two sets of 
behaviours to learn, but also that the implications of the complex power 
systems underlying these behaviour patterns must be learned (Bern, 1993; 
Jacklin & Reynolds, 1993). How the asymmetries of status and power affect
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the actual learning of gender behaviours is unclear. What is clear, however, is 
that there are different, gendered, behavioural outcomes, with boys 
predominantly concerned to not be girls, and girls less constrained.
There is no limit to the examples of gender segregation that occur from an 
early age. Gender segregation is “the most robust gendered phenomenon of 
childhood” (Maccoby, 1998, p.77). At around 30 to 36 months of age, 
children display a marked preference for same-sex peers (LaFreniere, Strayer 
& Gauthier, 1984; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987; Powlishta, Serbin & Möller, 
1993), with these preferences increasing throughout childhood. From the age 
of three, through to the start of formal schooling, many children experience 
increased contact with same-age peers, in the form of day-care centres or pre­
schools. This is certainly the case in Australia, the United States, Canada, 
England, and much of Europe, where various government-assisted (if not 
fully funded) programs exist for three- to five-year olds. It is in these 
settings, where children have increased exposure to same-age peers, that 
gender differentiation emerges. Fabes, Martin & Hanish’s (2003) study of 
preschool age children in group child care, found that 50% of all interactions 
involved only same-sex peers, a third of interactions involved mixed-sex 
play partners, with less than 10% of interactions involving opposite-sex 
peers. These findings echoed those of Maccoby & Jacklin (1987), who found 
that preschool children spent nearly three times as much time playing with 
same-sex peers as with opposite-sex ones.
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These same-sex preferences occur independent of parental, or other adult, 
interactions and even increase when adults are not present (Maccoby & 
Jacklin, 1987; Thorne, 1991). Moreover, they appear resistant to attempts to 
change: Serbin, Tonick & Sternglanz (1977) had teachers provide 
reinforcement to preschoolers for engaging in cross-sex play. Once the 
reinforcement was taken away, however, the children quickly resumed 
playing with members of their own sex.
Once children enter formal schooling, same-sex preference becomes 
extreme. At age six and a half, the children in Maccoby and Jacklin’s 
longitudinal study (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987) spent eleven times as much 
time playing with same-sex, compared to opposite-sex, peers. As already 
mentioned, as preschoolers these children played with same-sex peers three 
times as much as opposite-sex peers. Although the tendency to initiate same- 
sex play is greater with girls than with boys at age three (Serbin, Möller, 
Gulko, Powlishta & Colburne, 1994), this sex difference is reversed, and 
even heightened, by age five (Pitcher & Schultz, 1983). During these early 
school years, gender segregation surpasses even racial segregation. For 
example, when choosing between limited seat availability in the school 
cafeteria, Schofield (1981) found that children would prefer to sit next to a 
same-sex child of a different race than a same-race child of the opposite sex. 
The phenomenon of same-sex preference also becomes one of cross-sex 
avoidance. It becomes equally important not to play with members of the 
opposite sex as it is to play with members of the same sex. This is
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particularly the case for boys who, even in the toddler years, actively avoid 
“not male” activities (Fagot, 1985b).
One suggested explanation for this early gender segregation has been that 
boys and girls simply prefer different playstyles (Maccoby, 1988; Möller & 
Serbin, 1996). Boys’ play is typically more boisterous, while girls’ play 
involves verbally articulated roles and adherence to social rules. Maccoby 
(1998) suggests that the tendency of boys to engage in more physical play 
may be situational; girls tend to restrict their high activity play to outdoors. 
When children are playing alone, however, there is no difference in their 
activity levels (Halverson & Waldrop, 1973). Indeed, measures of children’s 
activity levels, when alone, represent an individual difference measure of the 
child, and are not predictive of the individual child’s activity levels in a 
group situation (Maccoby, 1990). Importantly, it is when children are placed 
into groups, that these sex differences in playstyles, and activity levels, 
become apparent. For this reason, Maccoby suggests that it is equally 
plausible to see rough-and-tumble play as a consequence of all male play, 
rather than a cause. Since the majority of boys’ play time is spent in all male 
groups, these high activity levels may equally be a result of the all male 
groupings.
Either way, given the amount of time children spend in same-sex peer 
groups, and the qualitative differences in activities of the groups, we would 
expect that boys and girls have different childhood experiences, and that this 
would impact, in some way, on their development (Fabes, Martin & Hanish,
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2003). Moreover, this impact would be greater than any innate tendency of 
boys’ or girls’ playstyle preference that may have initially led them to 
segregate into same-sex groups (Fabes, Hanish & Martin, 2003; Martin & 
Fabes, 2001).
Characteristics of Same-Sex Groups
As noted earlier, all-male play is characterised by high levels of boisterous 
activity, which is more likely to occur outdoors, and away from adult 
supervision (DiPietro, 1981; Fabes, Martin & Hanish, 2003). Boys’ groups 
are more likely to establish dominance hierarchies, whereas girls’ groups 
focus on cooperation, and the use of communication in order to promote 
group harmony (Maccoby, 1990). This is not to say that girls’ groups are 
devoid of conflict, or even aggression. Rather, aggression takes different 
forms among boys and girls: boys are more likely to engage in physical 
aggression, whereas girls are more likely to use relational forms of 
aggression, such as name-calling and exclusion from the group (Crick & 
Grotpeter, 1995).
Perhaps the most striking difference, however, is that more gender-typed 
activities appear in these segregated play groups than in other contexts, such 
as solo play, mixed-sex groups or even same-sex dyads (Fabes, Martin & 
Hanish, 2003). This suggests that the extreme sex-segregated play seen 
among young children could be an emergent property of the group itself 
(Maccoby, 2002).
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Maccoby in fact (1988, 1998) makes the explicit claim that gender is a 
group-based phenomenon, i.e., that gender is a social category. She reasons 
that the influence exerted by peers is strongly associated with the 
development of gender norms largely because it occurs in sex-segregated 
groups. This explains why the adoption of gender norms and behaviours is 
essentially unrelated to the individual attributes of the children who comprise 
these groups. Maccoby (1990) argues that minimal sex differences are 
observed when children are tested individually. In contrast, it is in a group 
situation that preferences for same-sex toys, games and models are strongest 
(Lloyd & Duveen, 1992; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987).
Moreover, Maccoby suggests that the different experiences that boys and 
girls have in their same-sex groups may actually reinforce the importance of 
gender as an organizing property of children’s peer groups (Maccoby, 1990; 
see also Fabes, Martin & Hanish, 2003). As such, we can see gender as being 
important to children not only for its use in organizing information, but for 
instructing them concerning appropriate behaviours. This conceptualisation 
helps explains why young children imitate others of the same sex as 
themselves. Little boys not only tend to play with other boys, they copy their 
behaviours. Similarly, little girls engage in the same behaviours as other 
girls. However, again we see the important difference that boys are more 
likely than girls to reject, or tease, each other for engaging in opposite-sex 
behaviour (Feiring & Lewis, 1987). It is rare that little boys will copy the 
play of little girls, particularly when there are other boys present, while “tom 
boys” are not uncommon and are not rejected by more stereotyped girls.
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Particularly relevant to the idea that gender is a social construct, a group 
product, is work by Bussey and colleagues (Bussey & Bandura, 1984;
Bussey & Perry, 1982) whose work on modelling demonstrates that adoption 
of same-sex behaviours, and rejection of opposite-sex ones (the latter 
particularly by boys), depends upon those behaviours being seen as 
normative or not for a whole team of men or women: It appeared that 
children waited to see if a particular behaviour was exhibited by all the men 
or all the women, before adopting (or rejecting) it for themselves. This, the 
authors argue, reflects how children see their social environment. On any 
given day, children are exposed to numerous people exhibiting a variety of 
behaviours. What they encode as gender normative, however, are those 
behaviours exhibited most frequently and consistently by multiple members 
of the different gender categories. Thus, the mere demonstration of one 
enlightened male performing household tasks will not be sufficient for young 
boys to perceive this as typical male behaviour. For this to be so, they would 
need to see it displayed by the majority of males they encounter.
This idea is similar to the more extreme view put forward by Harrris (1995, 
1998) that parents have very limited influence on their children. Rather, she 
claims the world outside the home, and in particular the child’s peer group, 
has a more lasting impact than parents on the type of adult a child becomes. 
She emphasizes the group basis of lasting influence by making a clear 
distinction between dyadic friendships and group memberships (Harris, 
1998). The effects of dyadic relationships are claimed to be shortlived, with
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any long-term influence attributed to the fact that friends tend to be members 
of the same social groups. Thus Harris claims that it is the processes 
functioning within the child’s peer group that are responsible for the lasting 
transmission of culture, and the ultimate influence on the type of adult a child 
will become. Our own approach to influence will be outlined in Chapter 6.
Before this however, while our research emphasizes social rather than 
individual cognitive development, it is obvious that children need to pay 
attention to a whole range of behaviours and remember those they will adopt 
into their own repertoire. In our empirical work we will in fact be attempting 
to discover whether children only attend to self-relevant information, or 
attend to all information and actively choose to copy that which is self­
relevant. It will be seen that there is a sex difference in adults’ memory for 
opposite-sex childhood behaviour suggesting that females have paid attention 
to the whole range, while males may have given selective attention to 
gender-consonant behaviour. Thus it is to these cognitive variables that we 
will now turn our attention.
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Chapter 5
The Role of Attention and Memory
Introduction
Throughout this thesis we have looked at how children learn to fit into 
society. This been seen to involve intentional reinforcement by others (in 
particular, parents and other adults) for “appropriate” behaviour, as well as 
the self-reward that comes from acting in a way that children perceive to be 
consonant with the social categories into which they fit. It was noted in 
Chapter 2 that a critical factor in the socialization process is the sex of the 
child. Put simply, boys and girls have different reinforcement experiences for 
different sets of behaviour, and consequently have different socialization 
experiences.
Chapter 3 subsequently explored the specific process of gender socialization. 
In examining the major theoretical approaches to this topic, we saw how 
theorists differed with respect to the emphasis placed on the child’s cognitive 
abilities. This is not to say that any of the theories propose that the child’s 
developing cognitions have no place in how the child thinks about his/her 
gender. Rather, the theories presented in Chapter 3 differ in terms of their 
emphasis on the specific cognitive abilities considered necessary for children 
to consider both themselves and others in terms of gender, and in how these 
cognitive abilities interact with aspects of the environment.
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Fundamental to learning about oneself and others in terms of gender, is the 
ability to pay attention to gender-relevant information. Equally important is 
the ability to remember that information. Very young infants, for example, 
are not particularly interested in whether mummy or daddy changes their 
dirty nappy. Nor do they pay particular attention to what mummy or daddy 
are wearing when nappy-changing is taking place. They are more interested 
simply in being put into a clean, dry nappy (or perhaps more accurately, in 
being wrapped up all snugly warm again).
As that infant grows older, and his/her brain and cognitive abilities develop 
and mature, s/he will begin to notice much more about the environment in 
which this nappy changing activity (along with other less frequent activities) 
occurs. The baby will begin to notice many things: the same person usually 
changes nappies as feeds them; the various objects hanging in the nursery are 
predominantly one colour; they are dressed most often in one particular 
colour; they are responded to more quickly when they cry than when they 
vocalize (or vice versa). What processes, we need to ask, are involved in this 
learning? What, in particular, will the child take notice of? What behaviours 
will be of particular interest to the child, and of the myriad of things going on 
in the world, what will be remembered? Of particular importance to 
developmental psychologists are the measures used in an attempt to answer 
these questions.
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Early Signs of Sex Differences
As noted in Chapter 4, even very young infants have demonstrated the ability 
to distinguish between faces, and voices, on the basis of both gender and age. 
These findings are typically achieved using the “preferential looking 
paradigm” (originally devised by Spelke, 1976) which measures the time an 
infant spends looking at pictures or objects. The duration of an infant’s gaze, 
or even intensity of sucking, is measured as it changes, or increases, with the 
presentation of novel stimuli. The principle underlying this is the idea that 
infants habituate to familiar stimuli and this is indicated by looking at them 
for shorter periods of time and sucking more slowly. Gazing more intently or 
sucking more energetically is taken as indication that the infant recognizes a 
stimulus as different.
This method, however, measures the ability to recognize differences, and the 
recognition that males and females are different is only part of the process 
toward attaining gender identity. Recognition of the difference, however, 
does represent a first step toward learning about gender. Studies using 
preferential looking show that infants pay attention to their environment and 
make at least a rudimentary use of gender as a marker of difference in that 
environment.
For example, using an adaptation of the preferential looking paradigm, 
Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, Sen & Eichstedt (2001) presented pictures 
on a computer screen, and found that eighteen-month old children 
demonstrated gender-stereotyped toy preferences. At this age, the girls spent
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longer looking at dolls, and the boys spent more time looking at vehicles.
This finding corresponds to those by O’Brien and Huston (1985) and 
Roopnarine (1986) attained in more naturalistic settings. What is particularly 
striking about these studies is that they suggest that not only can these very 
young children discriminate between male and female people, they can also 
distinguish between objects that have been imbued with gendered meaning.
In other words, very young children recognize that toys such as dolls and 
cars possess properties that make them appropriate for males or females.
Since toys only become male- or female-appropriate because of their 
associations with gender stereotypical behaviour, and since these gender 
stereotypical behaviours are, themselves, a product of societal, or cultural, 
norms, it is remarkable that children as young as eighteen months have 
acquired the skills to recognize, and remember, these differences. Even more 
remarkable is that they have applied these gender-typed differences to 
themselves in showing an “appropriate” preference. Somehow, these young 
children have learnt, even before they can speak, that particular toys are for 
particular types of children, and that they, themselves, are one of those types. 
At some level, these children have applied these categorical differences to 
themselves.
Perhaps even more remarkable is that sex differences between the boy and 
girl participants emerged as early as eighteen months in Serbin et al.’s (2001) 
experiment 2. In that study, eighteen-month-old girls, but not boys, 
demonstrated the ability to match toys to faces on the basis of gender 
stereotypes. These infant girls were able to match pictures of unfamiliar
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girls’ faces to dolls, and pictures of boys’ faces to vehicles. The boys were 
unable to do this even at 24 months of age. Despite demonstrating a 
preference for vehicles at eighteen months of age, the boys did not reliably 
match these toys with the faces of other boys (nor the pictures of dolls with 
those of girls). This suggests that boys are slower than girls to appreciate the 
categorical nature of gender, and are more likely to understand “boy” to be 
simply another name for themselves (see Bussey, 1986).
In a similar study by Poulin-Dubois, Serbin & Derbyshire (1998), eighteen- 
month-old girls, but not boys, demonstrated the ability to match pictures of 
faces based on verbal gender labels (i.e., boy, girl, man, lady). For example, 
infant participants in this study were specifically asked, “Where is the 
lady/man (boy/girl)”. This matching ability was not demonstrated 
consistently by boys until 24 months of age. Not surprisingly then, 
preschoolers also show differential knowledge of gender stereotypes: 
preschool girls display greater knowledge of gender stereotypes than do boys 
(Bern, 1989; Signorella, Bigler & Liben, 1993).
Explaining Sex Differences
Several reasons have been suggested for these early cognitive sex 
differences, the first of which is simply that girls mature earlier than boys. As 
a consequence, their comparatively advanced cognitive abilities enable them 
to interpret their world somewhat earlier than boys. However, evidence to 
support this idea is weak. Differences, when they do appear, suggest that 
rather than having greater global cognitive maturity, girls mature faster than
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boys in two domains: verbal ability (Huttonlocker, Haight, Bryk, Seltzer & 
Lyons, 1991) and emotional self-regulation, such as “impulse control”
(Fagot, Hagan, Leinbach & Kronsberg, 1985; Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, 
Koenig & Vandegeest, 1996). As such, even if it is not cognitive ability per 
se that places girls ahead of boys at this age, it is possible that their superior 
verbal abilities may play a role in allowing them to at least demonstrate this 
ability before boys.
However some researchers have suggested that the sex differences found in 
language ability may be overestimated -  at least at the preschool age. Leaper 
(1991) and Sheldon (1992) suggest that boys and girls use different discourse 
styles, which is apparent in both cooperative play, and when conflict arises. 
For example, girls’ more “collaborative” style of speech (Leaper, 1991) is 
more conducive to extending, rather than terminating, conversation when 
disagreements occur. Sheldon (1992) describes this as “double-voiced” 
discourse, where each girl pursues her own objective while, simultaneously, 
attempting to take account of the other child’s demands. Boys, by contrast, 
are more likely to use more direct imperatives which, it could be said, serve 
to extend the time spent playing the game, not the conversation surrounding 
the game.
A suggested explanation for boys applying gender-relevant information later 
than girls is that the affective component of boys’ gender knowledge is 
stronger than that of girls (Serbin et al., 2001). Despite their later 
demonstration of knowledge of gender stereotypes, boys nevertheless
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demonstrate actual preferences for male-stereotyped toys and activities at 
least as early as girls (e.g., Fein, Johnson, Kosson, Stork, & Wasserman, 
1975; O’Brien & Huston, 1985). It has been suggested it is the very strength 
of their preferences for male-oriented activities that interferes with them 
paying attention to (and remembering) female-oriented activities, thus with 
the understanding that males and females do, in fact, do different things. 
Toddler boys pay greater attention to, and demonstrate better memory for, 
male-stereotyped events than for female-stereotyped ones. In contrast, girls 
show equal memory for male- and female-stereotyped events (Bauer, 1993; 
Boston & Levy, 1991).
These gender differences are intriguing, and suggest at least two possibilities. 
The first is that some innate cognitive difference causes boys and girls to 
process information differentially -  or, at least, information concerning 
gender. The second possibility is that something external to children makes 
gender differentially important to boys and girls. This is to say that the social 
structure of the world they live in dictates that what it means to be male or 
female differs such that their gender gives more status or power to boys than 
it does to girls, and children recognize and respond to this.
The latter proposed explanation, however, is social rather than cognitive and 
in order to examine the role cognition plays in these sex differences, it is 
necessary to take a brief look at how memory develops. This discussion will 
include a brief overview of strategies used by young children, both to store 
and retrieve information. It will touch on the difficulties experienced in
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measuring these constructs, particularly in young children, and the 
implications of this. The section will be necessarily brief in order merely to 
provide an overview of memory processes, to aid in understanding the role of 
attention, and memory, in approaches to social (specifically gender) 
development which will be investigated empirically in this thesis.
The Ontogeny of Memory
At around the end of a child’s first year, there is rapid development of the 
frontal lobes of the cerebral cortex, which coincides with the ability of the 
child to integrate knowledge with action (Bell & Fox, 1992; Diamond, 1988; 
Goldberg, 1985; Nelson, 1995). This not only enables a child to perform 
more purposeful actions, but it marks the beginning of the child’s ability to 
focus on relevant information -  and pay attention to specific stimuli. Prior to 
this, infants tend to habituate to objects after a short period of time, and are 
easily distracted by novel stimuli.
In addition to having the physiological capabilities necessary to focus on 
information, children need to acquire strategies to aid in the processing of 
this information. Young children appear notoriously poor at remembering 
information, partly because they have not yet acquired these strategies. For 
example, when asked where a particular toy was left, a very young child will 
begin to search randomly throughout a room in expectation of finding the 
toy. By age four, the child will search for an object systematically, in 
locations around where the toy was last seen and where it was discovered
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missing (Wellman, Somerville & Haake, 1979). The use of selective 
attentional strategies increases greatly during early and middle childhood.
Attentional Strategies for Storing Information
As with attention, the use of strategies for storing information emerges 
during the preschool years (although substantial increases are not seen until 
middle childhood). The three most researched strategies for enhancing 
memory for new information are rehearsal (repeating information to oneself), 
organization (grouping information into meaningful “chunks”) and 
elaboration (creating relationships, or shared meanings, for objects). 
Preschoolers show the beginnings of rehearsal, but it is rarely deliberate and 
is therefore of no consequence to their memory processes. Furthermore, the 
training of rehearsal strategies, whilst showing immediate improvement, has 
no lasting benefits (Bjorkland, Miller, Coyle & Slawinski, 1997). 
Preschoolers are unable to make use of the other two strategies. The ability to 
organize information rarely appears before the age of eight (Bjorkland & 
Jacobs, 1985), and elaboration is rarely used before eleven (Schneider & 
Pressley, 1997).
Once information has been placed into memory, further skills are required in 
order to retrieve the information. This can be achieved via recognition, recall 
and reconstruction. Again, young children’s ability to utilize these strategies 
is limited.
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Memory Strategies for Retrieving Information
As noted earlier, very young infants have demonstrated the ability to 
recognize objects. Recognition involves noticing that an object is the same 
as, or similar to, another object. It is the simplest retrieval method, and 
appears to be a relatively automatic process (Rose, Feldman & Jankowski, 
2004). Infant recognition memory is now considered to be quite a robust 
phenomenon, and is even resistant to interference.
Measuring the ability to recall information is somewhat more complicated, 
since the child (or infant) requires a means of conveying this information. In 
contrast to Bauer’s (1995) claim that nonverbal recall is a robust 
phenomenon from nine months of age, more recent evidence demonstrates 
this ability much earlier. Collie & Hayne (1999) demonstrated deferred 
imitation by six-month olds. After a twenty-four hour delay, infants 
reproduced more actions that they had seen demonstrated the previous day 
than control actions, which they only saw on the testing day. (Infants did not 
practice these actions in the intervening time.) There is even some evidence 
of deferred imitation of facial imitation in six-week olds (see Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1994). Clearly, however, the length of delay between the event (or 
presentation of stimuli) and the time of recall, increases with age. Older 
children are more capable of retaining information for longer periods of time 
than younger ones (Bauer, Wenner, Dropik & Wewerka, 2000).
Finally, the ability to reconstruct information requires more complex 
cognitive abilities, and may involve the use of other memory strategies, such
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as organization and elaboration. More fundamental, however, is that event 
reconstruction necessarily involves linguistic abilities, which develop at an 
astounding rate in the second and third years of life. There is also much 
evidence to suggest that reconstruction is affected by the distinctiveness of 
the event, and is highly susceptible to suggestion and misinformation (e.g., 
Wright & Loftus, 1998).
Memory retrieval in any form is reliant on the storage of that information in 
the first place. Not surprisingly then, young children’s inexperience at this 
(see above discussion on storage of information in memory) also limits their 
access to that information. So not only are young children less cognitively 
equipped to remember information, their lack of practice in making use of 
appropriate strategies further limits their performance on such tasks.
Attention, Memory and Implications for Gender Development
The theories of gender development, covered in Chapter 3, varied in the 
emphasis placed on cognitive processes, such as memory. In particular, 
cognitive-developmental theory and social learning/ social cognitive theory 
differ markedly in their predictions of gender-related behaviour. Although 
both theories see cognitions (concerning gender) as paramount, they differ in 
the degree to which these cognitions are said to precede, or follow, gender- 
related actions. Similarly, gender schema theory has a clear role for these 
cognitive processes, although the emphasis is on individual difference in this 
matter. For the purpose of the present discussion, psychoanalytic theory will 
not be considered given its explicit rejection of conscious processes: whilst
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memory for these “childhood desires” that are said to underlie the entire 
process of gender identification are claimed to be repressed, or 
unconsciously withheld, the psychoanalytic approach has no place for the 
role of developing cognitions, and children’s intentional thinking about the 
world.
The Role of Attention and Memory in Gender Schema Theory
Gender schema theory diverges from both cognitive-developmental theory 
and social-cognitive theory in that the motivation for learning about gender 
varies according to the individual. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a person’s 
gender schematicity functions in much the same way as a personality trait.
In terms of cognitive prerequisites for gender orientation, children only 
require the ability to label themselves and others as male or female (“gender 
identity”) (Martin & Halverson, 1981). This ability to label themselves as 
male or female leads children to match their own behaviour to what they 
observe as male or female behaviours to greater or lesser extents depending 
on their gender schematicity. Highly feminine girls will consider wearing 
dresses more important than less feminine (or androgynous) girls. Similarly, 
a boy scoring low on masculinity may continue playing “house” longer than 
his more masculine counterparts. All boys, however, will learn to evaluate 
themselves according to male stereotypes (and girls will evaluate themselves 
according to female ones) once they have learned to identify themselves as a 
boy (or as a girl). What varies is the extent to which they do this, not whether 
or not they do.
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There is, however, mixed evidence concerning the relationship between 
gender labelling and preferences for activities and peers. Most interestingly, 
it seems that parents who are highly evaluative of their children’s gender- 
linked behaviours have children who are “early labellers” (Fagot &
Leinbach, 1989). Thus it appears that both gender labelling and gender 
preferences may be largely a result of parental influences. In any case, the 
continued emphasis of gender typing as a personality-like characteristic, and 
the differences between individual boys and girls, provides no explanation 
for the sex differences found between boys (as a group) and girls (as 
another).
The Role of Attention and Memory in Cognitive-Developmental Theory
At the heart of the cognitive-developmental approach to gender development 
is the idea that cognitions are central to the process. Indeed the learning of 
gender, as with the learning of any other construct, is dependent on the 
child’s developing cognitive abilities. As outlined in Chapter 3, there are 
three stages in the development of gender constancy, each of which cannot 
be attained without a requisite level of cognitive maturity. Since this level of 
cognitive ability necessarily precedes the child’s understanding of gender- 
related information, then the cognitive capacity to understand the world in 
terms of gender necessarily precedes any attempt by the child to seek out 
gender-related information. Children need to have attained the ability to 
think about themselves and others in terms of gender, before they will 
actively search for further gender-relevant information.
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With reference to the discussion of memory processes in the preceding 
sections, this means that children need to have acquired a certain level of 
understanding (of both themselves and others) regarding gender, to motivate 
them to even pay attention to other gender-relevant information. Clearly 
then, children should show no memory for gender-related information prior 
to reaching a certain level of cognitive maturity (that is, they need to have 
attained “gender constancy”).
According to cognitive-developmental theory, with gender constancy comes 
the motivation to pay attention to, identify with, imitate, and remember 
aspects of the environment that are gender-related. With the knowledge that 
one is, and will always be, a girl (or a boy) comes the impetus to pay 
attention to other girls/boys, to imitate them, and to recall information about 
them and their behaviour. Gender constant children should show interest in 
other same-sex children. Gender constant girls should know that girls wear 
dresses, while gender constant boys should know that trucks and guns are 
“boys’ toys”.
The Role of Attention and Memory in Social Learning/ Social Cognitive 
Theory
Recent accounts of social cognitive theory make explicit reference to the role 
of attention and memory (e.g., Bandura, 1992; Bussey & Bandura, 1999). In 
this approach to learning about gender, prominence is given to the role of 
imitation, or modelling. In order to imitate others, one must necessarily pay
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attention to, and remember, another person’s actions. Thus, the learning 
process has an explicit cognitive emphasis, and is said to consist of four 
subcomponents.
The first of these subcomponents refers to attentional processes, which 
determine what people observe. Presented with a stimulus array of infinite 
possibilities, children must pay attention to a particular stimulus (such as an 
object or a behaviour) in order for it to have any later impact. As previously 
mentioned, young children, particularly infants, are easily distracted, so 
information is often presented in a compensatory manner. For example, 
parents often exaggerate their speech and behaviour in order to elicit, and 
maintain, the child’s attention The more attention a child pays to a person (a 
model), the greater the likelihood that s/he will adopt their behaviour.
As with the cognitive-developmental account presented above, the social 
cognitive approach refers to these memory processes in a more general sense 
than was provided in the sections on memory development and the strategies 
employed. The social-cognitive account, however, suggests that attention to 
gender-relevant information develops alongside the more general cognitive 
ability of attention. That is, as children begin to pay attention to the various 
aspects of their world, gender is but one of many features to which children 
will pay attention. A gendered sense of self is not seen as a prerequisite for 
attending to gender-related information.
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According to social-cognitive theory, once behaviour is observed, retention 
processes determine what, of the information attended to, will be 
remembered. In order to do this, a child must have acquired a certain level of 
cognitive, and linguistic, ability since the process of remembering involves 
the transformation of observed information into an imaginary, or verbally, 
represented memorial form (Grusec, 1992).
Once the (gender-relevant) information has been retained in some form, 
behavioural production processes turn the internal conception of the 
behaviour into its enactment. This stage also involves a transformation of 
information -  from the symbolic into the behavioural. This requires complex 
cognitive abilities. Rather than simply matching an observation or the 
remembered concept of this to one’s own actions, as in a one-to-one mapping 
strategy, the conception of an action may need to be adjusted in line with the 
current situation. For example, children observe different reactions, from 
different people, to the same behaviour, in particular fathers’ differential 
treatment of their sons and daughters (Siegal, 1987). Children evaluate these 
various reactions and adapt their own behaviour accordingly. The child’s 
physical capabilities will also affect the production of these behaviours, 
along with cognitive and linguistic abilities that allow the child to monitor, 
and reflect upon, the process.
Finally, motivational processes determine which behaviours (of the multitude 
observed) will be performed. Children (as well as adults) do not perform 
every behaviour they learn. According to social-cognitive theory,
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motivations are largely determined by the outcomes of particular behaviours 
-  whether experienced by oneself, or the observed consequences of the 
behaviour for others. Increasing cognitive ability enables children to more 
accurately judge the probable outcomes of their behaviour (Bandura, 1992). 
While this, the motivational, aspect of social-cognitive theory does go some 
way towards explaining sex differences in behaviour, it still does not address 
the sex differences outlined earlier in this chapter, those in attention and 
memory for gendered information. Since motivation is perceived to be a 
result of the consequences of behaviour, and attention and memory precede 
enactment of behaviour, social-cognitive theory leaves us with only the 
“innate cognitive differences” explanation. The following chapter will 
suggest a more essential motivator than attraction of the positive, or 
avoidance of the negative, outcomes of behaviour. It will propose that 
children, like the rest of the species, are strongly drawn to belong to their 
appointed social categories, and suggest that the differential social power and 
status of the sex categories would mean that members of the dominant 
category need only pay attention to themselves, whereas members of the 
subordinate category must know all about the dominant category as well as 
themselves. It will suggest that sex differences in attention and memory for 
gendered behaviour, as well as sex differences in behaviour itself, could be 
accounted for as a result of children’s response to social reality.
In the social-cognitive approach, therefore, children are constantly observing 
behaviour, and its consequences, in those around them. They simultaneously 
enact behaviours and observe consequences -  for both themselves and
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others. Learning gender-related behaviours involves a continual updating of 
what is regarded as “gender appropriate”. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
children develop self-sanctioning abilities to ensure their own behaviours are 
in line with what they have observed, and learned, to be appropriate.
Summary
Clearly there are differing views on the importance of cognitive abilities in 
general, and memory processes in particular, to the development of a 
gendered sense of self. With gender schema theory, it is the individual 
child’s emphasis on gender-relevant information, that determines the extent 
to which they will pay attention to, and remember, gender-typed information. 
The only requirement is that they are able to label themselves, and others, as 
male or female. As such, the individual’s sense of self, as male or female, is 
a major determinant of memory-related processes. Clearly this is an 
individualist theory which may explain why John is more or less sex-typed 
than Jane, but can shed no light on more general differences between boys 
and girls.
The cognitive-developmental approach views gender identity as a 
prerequisite for attending to and engaging in gender-typed behaviours. 
Children need to have acquired certain cognitive abilities (beyond mere 
differentiation) in order to be able to pay attention to, and remember, this 
information. While less individualistic than gender schema theory, cognitive- 
developmental theory still does nothing to help explain sex differences in 
attention and memory.
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Social cognitive theory suggests that children develop ideas about 
themselves as boys or girls, as part of the normal process of developing a 
sense of self. Gender identity can therefore be seen as something that is 
learned, since the continual enactment of gender-typed behaviours, and the 
modification of these, is an ongoing process (at least in childhood). Children 
pay attention to gender-linked information because gender distinctions exist 
all around them. While providing a satisfactory explanation of general sex 
differences in behaviour, and introducing the important element of 
motivation to perform in “sex-appropriate” ways, motivation is seen as a 
product of reactions to behaviour. As such, motivation cannot be behind sex 
differences in attention and memory that precede behaviour. The following 
chapter will attempt to provide such an explanation.
To this point we have concentrated on developmental theories of gender, 
none of which, as suggested in Chapter 4, take a truly social psychological 
approach to gender. In the following chapter we will be referring to social 
identity theory and self-categorization theory, whose development in the 
latter half of the twentieth century was a reaction to a perceived over-reliance 
on cognitive and individual difference variables to explain social phenomena. 
In addressing this social psychological perspective on categorization, social 
identity and influence, we hope to shed fresh light on gender development.
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Chapter 6
Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Influence
Introduction
In Chapter 4 we were introduced to the idea that gender can be thought of as 
a social category: being male, or female is more than an individual attribute; 
rather it implies commonalities with other males or females. In Chapter 5 we 
saw how these categorical gender differences influence not only young 
children’s behaviour, but also the attention they pay to gendered information. 
Perhaps the most remarkable findings were those by Poulin-Dubois et al. 
(1998) and Serbin et al. (2001) who found that eighteen-month-old girls, but 
not boys, can demonstrate the ability to match gender-stereotyped toys to 
pictures of male and female faces. These findings go beyond mere gender- 
based toy preferences, which have been exhibited by both eighteen-month- 
old boys and girls (O’Brien & Huston, 1985; Roopnarine, 1986; Serbin et al., 
2001).
It was suggested that these sex differences in attention to gendered 
information were either the result of innate biological differences between 
boys and girls, or a reflection of some social structural difference between 
the status of males and females in society. Moreover, children are not only 
aware of these differences, they appear to have incorporated these differences 
into their developing sense of what it means to be a boy or a girl.
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We then attempted to explain these sex differences in attention and memory 
with reference to the dominant theories of gender development that were 
outlined in Chapter 3. Due to its explicit emphasis on individual differences 
in sex-typing, gender schema theory was unable to account for sex 
differences that occur consistently between the sexes. While offering a more 
group-based explanation of sex differences, cognitive-developmental theory 
assumes that knowledge of gender differences (including one’s own gender) 
motivates the search for gender-relevant information, and hence the 
expression of gender-congruent behaviour. Cognitive-developmental theory 
therefore offers no explanation for the early expression of sex differences in 
attention. Although somewhat more promising particularly with regard to the 
role of attention and memory, social-cognitive theory views attention to, and 
memory for, gender-linked information as a result of observing behavioural 
consequences. Thus it, too, was seen to offer no explanation for early sex 
differences in attention to gender-typed information.
What remains unanswered, therefore, is how sex differences, specifically 
categorical sex differences, become important to the young child. Why do 
infant girls process gender-relevant information differently from infant boys? 
In order to investigate this issue, it will be necessary to detail the effects that 
the categorization process, itself, can have on the psychology of the 
individual. We will thus provide an overview of the categorization process, 
together with a brief review of relevant theoretical approaches that tie groups 
(or categories) to the individual. The role of social categories in the social 
influence process will also be discussed. As suggested in the preceding
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chapters, an understanding of gender as a social category necessitates a social 
psychological, indeed a social categorical, investigation of the topic. As 
children develop gender understanding, they are continually influenced by 
others. By incorporating these social psychological approaches into the study 
of gender development, we hope to provide a novel, and much needed, 
direction for gender research.
Early Studies of Social Categorization
In the 1970’s, Tajfel and colleagues (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 
1974; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971) began to document the 
numerous consequences that mere assignment to “empty” social categories 
produced. What later became known as “the minimal group studies” (or “the 
minimal group paradigm”) began as an attempt by Tajfel and colleagues 
(Tajfel et al., 1971) to determine the minimal conditions necessary to achieve 
intergroup discrimination. In order to do this, they began by simply placing 
subjects into one of two groups. This was designed as a baseline condition 
from which they intended to add variables of particular interest (such as 
interdependence between group members, a social structure to the group, and 
the expression of group norms -  all of which were considered to be critical 
components of groups).
Somewhat unexpectedly, they found that the mere placement of subjects into 
one group, or another, was sufficient for them to display behaviours 
consistent with being a group member, such as preferring their own group to 
the other (ingroup favouritism). By simply categorizing people as
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“underestimators”, or “overestimators” of dots on a page, or as preferring 
one artist to another (Klee vs Kandinsky), subjects showed a preference for 
other members of their own group in a resource distribution task. Moreover, 
their distributions tended toward strategies that did not necessarily benefit 
participants’ own group the most overall (maximum ingroup profit). Rather, 
they tended toward strategies that made the largest possible difference 
between the groups, in the ingroup’s favour (maximum difference strategy). 
Without providing the groups with any formal structure (or the group 
members with any roles); without allowing them the opportunity to develop 
any group norms; and in the absence of there being any interdependence 
between the groups (or their members), Tajfel and colleagues observed the 
emergence of group-like characteristics. Subjects preferred their own group 
to the other even though they did not know who the members were, and they 
began to describe themselves and their anonymous fellow ingroup members 
as having something in common. They began to demonstrate a shared 
identity.
Thus social categorization was deemed to share some of the properties of 
object, or perceptual, categorization. In the perceptual formation of 
categories, within group similarities are stressed (all chairs have four legs, all 
girls are sweet), and between-group differences exaggerated (chairs are soft, 
tables hard; girls are small, boys big). Additionally, defining an object as a 
chair not only tells us of that specific object’s uses, it provides us with 
information about other chairs (or other category members). Similarly, the
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process of social categorization both defines and provides additional 
information about a member of the social category.
Social Categorization and its Relation to Object Categorization
Bruner (1957) argued that, by definition, perception cannot occur without 
categorization. Specifically, “all perception is necessarily the end product of 
a categorization process” (p.124). Without the ability to group stimuli into 
meaningful groups (to categorize them), they are devoid of meaning. 
Categorization provides the stimuli with relevance.
In cognitive psychological studies of categorization, Medin and colleagues 
(Medin, 1989; Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987; Murphy & Medin, 1985) 
applied Bruner’s (1957) idea that people develop systems of categories that 
“fit” with the world in which they live. In other words, we develop abstract 
“theories” about the world in order to link reality with the categories we use 
to represent that reality. It is these “background theories” that guide our 
categorization decisions. They do this by helping us determine what are 
relevant similarities between objects (and what are not), along with what is 
an appropriate category to use in a given situation. Certain dimensions of 
similarity and difference will be more appropriate than others, as will 
particular categories.
In making these decisions, we do not perceive similarities and differences 
that do not exist; rather we actively select relevant ones from a potentially 
infinite array (Neisser, 1987). Although all tables may not fit the bill exactly,
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a fairly reliable recipe for a table is that it has four legs, a flat surface, and is 
large enough to sit at for the purpose of eating. Thus from a variety of 
possible defining features, we are able to distinguish what are likely to be 
tables from what are likely to be chairs.
Furthermore, distinguishing between Edwardian dining tables and French 
Provincial ones may be irrelevant to someone merely concerned with 
somewhere to put their plate in order to eat, but to an interior designer with a 
specific brief, the difference is critical. In this way, categorization works to 
maximise relevant information (Rosch, 1978). The French Provincial table 
should be more delicately curved and would be more likely to involve 
ironwork (though if wood, possibly walnut) than would the somewhat more 
solid lines of a, probably mahogany, Edwardian piece. So the category 
“French Provincial” actually provides the interior designer, though not 
necessarily the style-oblivious would-be-diner, with a greater amount of 
information than the simple category “table”. Indeed an important 
determinant of what constitutes the most relevant category, at any given 
time, together with what constitutes appropriate similarities and differences, 
is the perceiver’s current goals (Turner & Oakes, 1989): the diner merely 
wants a surface on which to place food, the interior decorator wants a 
specific style of furniture. Alternative categories become irrelevant, or at 
least less informative. (With her specific goal in mind, the interior decorator 
is only concerned with French Provincial or not, and will not pay undue 
attention to sub-categories of “not”.)
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Children apply these principles when categorizing themselves, and others, as 
boys or girls. They perceive within-gender similarities and between-gender 
differences in both appearances and behaviour. The fact that children also 
perceive within-age similarities and between-age differences in adults and 
children is precisely the reason put forward by Harris (1995, 1998) to support 
her contention that peers exert more influence than do adults. Because 
children see themselves as similar to other children, and therefore different 
from adults, it is other children, Harris claims, who provide appropriate cues 
to behaviour and who serve as appropriate frames of reference.
This “similarity-based” account of categorization, however, fails to provide 
the complete picture. Neither similarity nor difference is a fixed feature of a 
stimulus. This notion has been explicitly rejected by cognitive psychologists 
(Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993; Murphy & Medin, 1985) as well as by 
social psychologists (Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997). Similarities 
(within categories) and differences (between categories) are not only guided 
by a comparative frame of reference, but by the perceiver’s own expectations 
and theories (Brown & Turner, 2002). Children do not only categorize 
children and adults (and boys and girls) because of perceptual similarities 
and differences, but because there is some psychologically meaningful 
reason to do so. They expect children and adults (and boys and girls) to look 
and behave differently partly because they have seen them do so, and partly 
because they have seen the consequences of these different behaviours. From 
a very early age children observe that categories provide meaning. The 
eighteen-month-old girls in Poulin-Dubois et al. (1999) and Serbin et al.’s
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(2001) studies who were able to match gender-linked toys to pictures of male 
and female faces were utilising the meaning of gender categories. These 
categorical differences later provide a meaningful guide to children’s own 
behaviour.
Social Categorization and (Social) Stereotyping
Social categorization has played an important, indeed critical, role in the 
field of social stereotyping (see Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). An 
important feature of the stereotyping work has been the notion of information 
elaboration (as opposed to information reduction). Stereotypes provide 
information about groups of people, and about individual members of those 
groups. Furthermore, stereotypes provide meaning to this information. (See 
McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002, for a full explanation of this distinction.) 
This meaning reflects more of the psychological processes that interact with 
the social information we perceive, as well as the social information itself. 
We do not perceive things in isolation; we perceive them in context. 
Moreover, meaning is (at least in part) derived from the actual differentiation 
of categories -  by differentiating between social groups. Rather than being a 
circular argument, this points to the idea that stereotypes are dependent upon 
both the context in which they occur, and the (naive) theories held by the 
perceiver (see Brown & Turner, 2002; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). 
Categorization, and stereotyping, serves a function (Tajfel, 1981).
Stereotypes are reality (or at least data) based, and they reflect meaningful 
group-based distinctions between the target and the perceiver.
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Children perceive differences between themselves and adults; girls/boys 
perceive differences between themselves and boys/girls. They reflect “real” 
or observable differences; they have observed these differences before; they 
come to expect these differences; these differences guide their behaviour; 
these differences are meaningful to them.
In a similar vein, work on social stereotyping has dealt with the notion that 
the outcomes of the process of stereotyping are subject to value judgements 
(as opposed to the stereotyping process itself). Because stereotyping, itself, 
involves the viewpoint of the perceiver, the stereotype (as an outcome) will 
reflect those views of the perceiver. So the stereotype, itself, will be value 
laden. As Oakes, Haslam & Turner (1994) in their discussion of stereotypes 
in the political domain put it: “Depending on who one is and where one is in 
society, reality not only looks different, it is different” (p.204). Thus this 
“reality” reflects the position of the perceiver -  or the stereotyper. This 
suggests that gender stereotypes reflect the views, or the social (and/or 
political) position, of males and females. Males may hold the view that 
women are “weak” either because they believe it to be the case, or because 
holding this view serves to maintain (and perpetuate) a male position of 
superiority. Similarly, women may see men as “useless around the house” 
either because women actually enjoy doing housework, or because they truly 
believe that men’s domestic skills are sadly lacking.
In summary, the process of social categorization in general (and stereotyping 
in particular) is seen as part of normal cognitive processing. It is neither an
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“error” (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Jones, 1982), nor an unfortunate product 
of limited information processing capacity (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978). In contrast, it is both adaptive and 
a reflection of our active engagement with the social world (e.g., Oakes, 
Turner & Haslam, 1991). Rather than viewing stereotypes as fixed constructs 
(e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991), this approach explicitly considers stereotypes as 
flexible and context-dependent because of their relationship to social reality. 
They are a reflection of the social world in action and of the particular 
vantage point of the perceiver (as a member of a social group). As Tajfel 
(1981, p.147) claimed, “stereotypes can become social only when they are 
shared”. Stereotypes provide information about social groups by members of 
other social groups. Thus the process of social stereotyping necessarily 
incorporates the notion of social categorization. This view also provides the 
crucial link between external differences (e.g., sex differences, status 
differences etc.) and how these can be reflected, and represented, within the 
person.
Effects of Categorization
Perhaps the two most fundamental outcomes of the categorization process 
are perceptual distortions (such as the accentuation of similarity and 
difference), and the discrimination (both evaluative and behavioural) that is 
displayed in favour of own group members. Each has important 
consequences for perceptions of social identity, and for the social influence 
process.
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The accentuation of intergroup differences and intragroup similarities has 
been well documented. Again, work by Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel, 1969; 
Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) demonstrated that the mere addition of a category 
label to stimuli in a line estimation task, was enough to produce exaggeration 
of perceived within-category similarities and between-category differences. 
Subjects were presented with series of lines which varied in length by a 
constant amount. By labelling the lines in the first half as “A” and the second 
half as “B”, subjects estimated greater differences between lines of different 
categories, and minimised the differences between lines belonging to the 
same category. Tajfel, Sheikh & Gardner (1964) replicated these effects in a 
study of racial groups involving Indians and Canadians.
Using a variety of paradigms, Wilder and colleagues have presented a 
consistent program of research demonstrating these accentuation effects. 
Allen & Wilder (1979) used subjects’ ostensible preferences for artists (Klee 
or Kandinsky) and showed that not only did subjects expect to share similar 
beliefs about art with fellow Klee (or Kandinsky) advocates, but that they 
expected to share similar ideas about things unrelated to art, such as political 
beliefs. Wilder & Allen (1978) demonstrated that, given a choice, subjects 
preferred to view information that would accentuate differences between 
their group and another, and minimize differences within their group. Wilder 
(1981) also reports the findings of a study whereby subjects demonstrated 
better (or even false) recall of information that minimized differences 
between ingroup members, and maximized differences between their group 
and another.
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Further accentuation effects have been demonstrated using racial categories 
(Hewstone, Hantzi & Johnston, 1991; Taylor et al., 1978), as well as gender 
categories (Frable & Bern, 1985; Jackson & Hymes, 1985), and even sexual 
preference (Walker & Antaki, 1986).
However, accentuation effects need not necessarily be considered an 
automatic outcome of the categorization process. Work by McGarty and 
colleagues (McGarty & Penny, 1988; McGarty & Turner, 1992) has shown 
how these effects can vary according to the appropriateness and 
meaningfulness of the categorization.
The second outcome of the categorization process, ingroup bias, has 
probably received the most attention. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, Tajfel and colleagues were surprised by how little was required for 
subjects to show favouritism toward other members of their own group. Most 
notable were the lengths to which subjects went to do this i.e., they would 
sacrifice an absolute gain for their own group (maximum ingroup profit and 
maximum joint profit) in favour of a relative ingroup gain: of “beating” the 
outgroup by a larger amount. Billig & Tajfel (1973) showed that this 
discrimination occurred by merely introducing the notion of “group” to the 
situation. In conditions where the “group” notion was not explicit, intergroup 
discrimination (or ingroup bias) was less profound. More recently, Perdue, 
Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler (1990) have demonstrated that the mere use of a
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collective pronoun (such as “we”, “us”, “ours” etc.) is enough to elicit 
ingroup bias.
Findings such as these prompted an abundance of research aimed at reducing 
the incidents of categorization in order to reduce the effects of ingroup bias. 
This was because of its link to prejudice and inequality. Underlying this 
work has been the assumption that intergroup discrimination is necessarily 
bad, the expression of which is the various forms of prejudice and 
discrimination.
However, as Hewstone, Rubin & Willis (2002) point out, the vast majority of 
social psychological research into ingroup bias has been concerned with far 
milder forms of bias. Thus we have seen the emergence of implicit measures 
(including response latencies and memory tasks) of ingroup bias, along with 
an examination of their relationship to explicit measures (typically self-report 
measures of stereotyping and prejudice). The typically weak relationship that 
has been found between these two measures has been explained either in 
terms of the psychometric properties of the measures (Mackie & Smith,
1998) or because the measures tap different constructs (Dovidio, Kawakami, 
Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997). However, it is also plausible that the 
very expression of bias (in terms of discrimination) actually requires a 
stronger basis than does ingroup bias in terms of mere preferences. The point 
here is that the expression of ingroup bias as a consequence of the 
categorization process does not necessarily lead to negative behavioural 
expressions of that bias, particularly in extreme forms.
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This idea is not new. While advocating the psychological primacy of the 
ingroup, Allport (1954) claimed that a preference for familiarity (expressed 
as liking of the ingroup) does not necessarily imply negativity or antagonism 
toward outgroups. This line of inquiry has been taken up in Brewer’s (1991) 
optimal distinctiveness model of social identity, whereby group identification 
is seen as resulting from two opposing needs -  one for inclusion with others 
and one for differentiation from others. Provided distinctiveness between the 
ingroup and outgroup is achieved, and maintained, attitudes toward 
outgroups may vary. The important point is the distinction between the 
groups. More recent research in this vein has focused on identifying the 
conditions likely to bring about the change from ingroup favouritism to 
outgroup hostility or antagonism (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears & Manstead, 1998).
Similarly, work concerning ethnic prejudice in children has questioned the 
distinction between ingroup preference and outgroup dislike or hostility 
(Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, Fuligni, 2001; Nesdale, 2001). Social Identity 
Development Theory (Nesdale, 2004; Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths & Durkin, 
2003) provides a comprehensive explanation of this and is discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter.
Categorization and Social Identity
We have seen that a consequence of the categorization process is that people 
demonstrate behaviour consistent with being a group member. An important
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feature of this is that people identify as a group member. Here an important 
psychological transformation takes place -  from thinking about the self in 
terms of individual (or personal) identity to considering oneself in terms of a 
social identity. People no longer categorize themselves as individuals, but as 
members of a social group. This process is known as depersonalisation. It 
refers to the psychological shift from thinking about the self as an individual 
(and different from other individuals) to thinking about the self as a group 
member (and therefore similar to other (in)group members). It involves a 
cognitive redefinition of the self “from unique attributes and individual 
differences to shared social category memberships and associated 
stereotypes” (Turner, 1984, p.528).
This idea was first explicated in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,
1979, 1986) and expounded in self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1986). Collectively, this view 
has become known as the social identity approach, or the social identity 
perspective; an approach that is now being recognized as ideally suited for 
integrating developmental and social psychology (Bennett & Sani, 2004). A 
brief summary of each of the two theories will be presented, before going 
into greater detail of the influence process itself.
Social Identity Theory
The minimal groups experiments, described earlier, provided the impetus for 
the development of social identity theory. An explanation was needed for the 
unambiguous findings of discrimination between groups that occurred simply
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as a result of categorizing people into one group or another. The idea that 
subjects in these experiments had created a social identity for themselves 
became the basis of this explanation.
Social identity was defined by Tajfel as “that part of an individual’s self- 
concept which derives from his (or her) knowledge of his (or her) 
membership of a social group (or groups), together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p.255). 
Identifying as a group member involves a psychological connection with the 
group. Thus the internalisation of the social categorization (Turner, 1975) is 
fundamental to this process.
This can also be described as a sense of “belongingness” to the group. Tajfel 
considered this sense of belongingness to be the critical factor in mediating 
intergroup behaviour, rather than merely the perception of similarity to other 
group members. It was possible that the discrimination observed in the 
minimal groups experiments could have simply been the result of subjects 
perceiving themselves as similar (in some objective manner) to the other 
members of their group. TajfeTs hypothesis was confirmed in a subsequent 
study by Billig & Tajfel (1973) and later replicated by Allen and Wilder 
(1975). It was the categorization process, not the perception of similarity, 
that motivated participants to consider the situation, and their role in that 
situation, in a meaningful way. Thus the intergroup discrimination that 
occurred (as demonstrated in the allocation task) was an expression of this 
socially-based, and socially-constructed, meaning. Participants defined
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themselves (and other group members) in accordance with these social 
identities. Their social identity as a group member was, in that context, their 
self-definition.
In an attempt to further explain the shift to group-based behaviour, or the 
psychological distinction between self-perception as an individual or as a 
group member, Tajfel (1974, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggested the 
idea of a bipolar continuum:
“At one extreme ... is the interaction between two or more 
individuals which is fully determined by their interpersonal 
relationships and individual characteristics and not at all affected 
by various social groups or categories to which they respectively 
belong. The other extreme consists of interactions between two or 
more individuals (or groups of individuals) which are fully 
determined by their respective memberships of various social 
groups or categories, and not at all affected by the interindividual 
personal relationships between the people involved.”
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.34).
It is the shift along this continuum that accounts for displays of attitudes and 
behaviours consistent with one’s group memberships. There is a qualitative 
change, or “psychological discontinuity” (Tajfel 1978b, 1978c, 1981), from 
acting purely as an individual, to acting as a member of a group. When one’s 
social identity (or group membership) becomes salient, the attitudes, norms 
and values of the group become one’s own.
An important (although often misinterpreted) consequence of this qualitative 
change toward social identity is that group members strive for a positive self-
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image for their group. This is achieved via the positive differentiation of 
one’s own group from other groups, on dimensions that are valued by the 
ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, this does not automatically, or 
necessarily, result in displays of prejudice or discrimination toward 
outgroups (as suggested by Hinkle & Brown, 1990), nor the desire for 
increased levels of (individual) self-esteem (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1990). As 
Turner (1999) points out, ingroup bias is merely one of the available 
strategies that individuals, or groups, may utilize in the search for positive 
social identity.
Rather, positive social identity can be achieved via one of three basic 
strategies (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These are (i) individual mobility (where 
group members either dis-identify with, or actually leave, their group in 
favour of another); (ii) social creativity (where group members redefine the 
comparative situation); and social competition (involving a direct challenge 
to the outgroup on dimensions relevant to the intergroup relationship). It is 
this final strategy, only, that pertains to ingroup bias, and can be used to 
explain the minimal group findings.
In the laboratory setting created by Tajfel (Tajfel et al., 1971), neither 
individual mobility, nor social creativity strategies were available. Thus the 
only way to differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup (the 
overestimators and underestimators, or the Klee and Kandinsky preferrers) 
was to make allocations that would differentiate between the groups. In other 
situations, this strategy can take the form of conflict or even social change.
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Political groups may mount a challenge or even demand a leader’s (or 
another party’s) resignation. Countries may make threatening demands, or 
even embark on full-scale war. Children may take away their toys, or simply 
refuse to participate in the game.
Furthermore, Tajfel and Turner (1979) outlined variables that may influence 
the expression of social competition or ingroup favouritism. These include (i) 
the degree to which individuals identify with their group; (ii) the relevance of 
the intergroup comparison to the social context; (iii) the relevance of the 
comparative dimension to the intergroup relationship; and (iv) the nature of 
the social structure in which the intergroup relationship is situated. It would 
not make sense to compare one’s own group to all available groups, nor 
would it be relevant to make comparisons on every available dimension. 
Because our intergroup relationships need to be psychologically meaningful, 
it follows that they would necessarily vary in psychologically meaningful 
ways.
Social identity theory thus represented the first major attempt to explain how 
people came to behave as members of a group. It sought to validate group- 
based behaviour in a way that was neither irrational (LeBon, 1895) nor 
lacking in psychological reality (Allport, 1924). However, the interpersonal- 
intergroup continuum remained vague, and the causal processes of group 
behaviour remained ambiguous. It was these issues that were elaborated 
further by Turner and colleagues (Turner et al., 1987) leading to the 
formulation of self-categorization theory.
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Self-Categorization Theory
The two extremes of Tajfel’s interpersonal-intergroup continuum were 
largely defined by the presence or absence of social categorization. Acting in 
terms of social, or individual, identity was seen as a function of one’s 
membership, or lack thereof, to particular social groups. In this way, Tajfel’s 
conceptualisation of social identity was seen to reflect group affiliations 
(Oakes et al., 1994). Being a member of a group (even a “minimal group”) 
was sufficient to produce group-based affiliations, and group-based 
behaviour.
In contrast, Turner (1982, 1984) saw group affiliations as reflections of 
social identity. Instead of reflecting social groups, group-based behaviour 
was seen as an outcome of one’s social categorizations. Social identity was 
seen as the causal factor.
Expounding on this idea, Turner (1982) distinguished between social identity 
(described by social identity theory) and personal identity (comprising 
unique, individual attributes and idiosyncrasies). Again the critical causal 
process was seen as categorization. Categorizing in terms of social identity 
produced social- (or group-) based behaviour; categorizing in terms of 
personal identity produced personal (or individual) based behaviour. The 
determining factor (distinguishing between one’s social and personal 
identity) was the categorization of the self.
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Self-categorization was thus the cognitive mechanism that explained the shift 
between personal and social identity (Turner, 1984). Self-categorization in 
personal terms explained personal behaviour, just as social identity theory 
had used social categorization to explain group-based behaviour. The critical 
addition had been the emphasis on the self in this process. Indeed the 
inclusion of self-definition within the categorization process provided the 
explanation that had been lacking in social identity theory.
Hence the move along the interpersonal-intergroup continuum involves a 
psychological shift from personal identity to social identity. Within this 
continuum exists an infinite number of possible self-definitions, with each of 
these being more, or less, inclusive. One’s personal or social identity can 
therefore operate to the relative exclusion of the other (Turner, 1984).
Thus Turner had applied the same principles of accentuation (of similarities 
and differences) that are found in the categorization process generally, to the 
self. Hence self-perception, or self-categorization, in terms of social, or 
personal, identity, produces the same effects of categorization observed 
earlier. That is, by categorizing the self in terms of a social identity, 
interclass differences (between one’s ingroup and an outgroup) and intraclass 
similarities (between oneself and other ingroup members) are maximized. 
Similarly, self-categorization in terms of one’s personal identity maximizes 
perceived differences between oneself and other individuals, whilst 
simultaneously minimizing intraindividual (within oneself) inconsistencies.
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According to self-categorization theory, determining which self-category will 
be used, or made salient, depends upon an interaction of factors pertaining to 
the self (the perceiver) and to the environment (or that which is perceived).
So it is both aspects of the individual and aspects of the environment (or the 
combination of internal and external factors) that determine the salience of 
any given categorization (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; 
Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991; Turner, 1985). In doing this, Turner and 
colleagues elaborated on two of Bruner’s (1957) concepts -  the notion of 
“perceiver readiness” and the notion of category “fit”.
The first of these, perceiver readiness (also referred to as “accessibility”) 
refers to the past experiences, current expectancies and future goals that an 
individual bring to any given situation. Oakes (1987) describes how this 
“perceptual readiness” impacts upon the accessibility of social categories. A 
personal history of discrimination makes the social category of Asian, or 
single mother, or Jew, more likely to be activated. Given the task of 
dissecting a beetle in the laboratory, however, would more likely result in the 
above people perceiving themselves as “students”. For some people, 
however, the realities of war, constant deprivation, or even job demands, 
make some categories chronically accessible.
The second factor responsible for determining which category will be made 
salient is the notion of category fit, or the degree to which a given stimulus 
(or stimuli) can be meaningfully grouped into a particular social category. 
This has been described in terms of two components: normative and
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comparative fit (Oakes, 1987). A particular category is normatively fitting if 
the observed behaviour (for example) is consistent with what would be 
expected for that category. Cheering, shouting, even dancing, would be 
acceptable (indeed normatively fitting) whilst attending the latest Linkin 
Park concert. Rock concert goers are expected to behave in this way. Thus 
cheering, shouting and dancing behaviours are consistent with the “concert 
goer” category. This same behaviour (even by the same people) would no 
longer be appropriate when attending the funeral of one of their friends who 
had died as a result of an ecstasy overdose at the after-concert rave. In the 
funeral situation, an alternative set of behaviours would be normatively 
fitting, such as sadness, contemplation, even crying. Thus normative fit can 
be seen to vary as a function of the social context.
In contrast, comparative fit refers to the degree to which a given 
categorization is appropriate, compared to other (potentially appropriate) 
categories. This follows the principle of meta-contrast (Turner, 1985; Turner 
et al., 1987). That is, a stimulus will be perceived as more fitting to a 
particular category (or a person to a social category) to the extent that the 
intracategory differences (between that stimulus and another, or between that 
person and another) are less than the intercategory differences (between that 
category and another). Shouting and cheering teenagers will be more likely 
classified as rock concert attendees than as funeral goers. Should the 
behaviours become less distinct (or as the cheering or crying subsides), they 
are more likely to be classified according to the broader social category, 
teenagers. This is particularly likely when the differences between them and
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their parents (or adults) become more apparent. Thus comparative fit 
involves a continual process of judging relative similarities and differences 
between people.
Both normative and comparative fit are therefore the result of, and 
responsive to, the dynamic nature of the social context in which they are 
found. Together with the perceptual readiness of the perceiver, these factors 
combine to determine both the salience of social categories, and the meaning 
afforded to them. The increased salience of ingroup-outgroup distinctions 
leads to an enhanced perception of similarities within, and differences 
between, groups (McGarty & Penny, 1988). The increasing salience of one’s 
social identity leads to a process of depersonalisation, where people perceive 
themselves more in terms of social stereotypes, and less in terms of personal 
attributes. Indeed the application of social categorization to the self-concept 
is one of self-stereotyping.
Thus self-categorization theory has provided a meaningful framework from 
which to investigate numerous social psychological phenomena. In the next 
section, we will see how this approach has been applied to the domain of 
social influence, which is of relevance here because the modelling of 
another’s behaviour, a modelling paradigm being central in the following 
empirical chapters, is one of the most compelling forms of influence.
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Self-Categorization and Social Influence
In 1955, Deutsch and Gerard proposed a dual process model of social 
influence which distinguished between “normative” and “informational” 
influence. Normative influence, or conforming to the positive expectations of 
others, incorporates the notions of conformity, compliance and obedience. 
Normative influence is motivated by the desire to please others, to “fit in”, or 
simply to avoid the disapproval of others.
Informational influence, on the other hand, is used to refer to actual belief 
change. This is where one truly accepts information from another, or others, 
as true evidence about reality. Implicit in this notion, is that there exists some 
form of external reality. Informational influence, therefore, is motivated by 
the desire for accurate information. It is when this accurate information has 
been obtained, and internalized, that true influence is said to have occurred. 
As such, informational influence has been applied more often to personal, or 
private, influence, whereas normative influence was more often applied to 
the types of influence exerted by groups. Thus we see another example of the 
recurrent individual versus group theme: social influence exerted by groups 
(and exhibited whilst part of a group) is a type of quasi-influence; for 
influence to be real, it must occur within the individual.
Turner (1991) proposed parallels between Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) 
model and Festinger’s (1954) theory of social comparison processes, in 
which people make evaluations by comparing themselves to similar others 
(given the relative unavailability of “objective” physical reality tests). Both
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theories, however, rely on the two-process model outlined above. In 
Festinger’s model, for example, there exists a need to compare oneself with 
others, a need that involves the acceptance of others. When comparing 
oneself to others would result in their disapproval, a person might adjust their 
behaviour publicly (in the form of normative influence) even though their 
private thoughts might remain unchanged (informational influence has not 
occurred). Thus the distinction between private and public behaviour, 
between real or non-authentic influence, and individual and group-led beliefs 
have dominated this area of research.
Distinctions between different types of influence, however, are notably 
absent in self-categorization theory. Rather, the influence process is 
conceived as a unitary one, in which information is validated through 
socially shared, and socially agreed upon, norms. “Arguments have 
informational validity and others’ positions are socially valued to the degree 
that they represent the shared responses of the ingroup as a whole” (Turner, 
1991, p.172). It is our self-categories that determine both informational 
validity and relevant social comparisons. The process of categorizing 
ourselves as similar to (or different from) other people leads us to believe 
that we would share similar (or different) beliefs to (or from) those people. 
Hence social influence can be seen as a product of psychological group 
formation. Again it is categorization (of the self) that is ultimately 
responsible for influence.
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Though not the original aim of self-categorization theory, this 
conceptualisation of influence can be extended to the domain of children. 
However, if we merely take the view that categorizing oneself as similar to 
others (for example, if girls see themselves as similar to other girls) leads to 
the expectation that girls should behave similarly to other girls, we have only 
considered part of the story. Indeed this is the argument used by Harris 
(1995, 1998) in her similarity-based account (or Group Socialization Theory) 
of peer influence. (See discussion earlier in this chapter.)
As discussed earlier, similarity itself varies along with the frame of 
reference. Self-categorization theory recognizes that similarity is both 
context-dependent and determined by the person. This latter component is 
comprised of the person’s expectations and background theories (described 
earlier) and is, itself a function of the person’s categorization of him/herself 
at that time. Since the categorization of the self incorporates both individual 
and group self-conceptions, there is no longer the need to differentiate 
between public and private, individual and group, real and “not real” 
influence. Self-categorization as a member of a particular group, or as a 
unique individual, determines who will be seen as similar, or different, and 
the validity of the information provided by them. The influence process thus 
has many components, although it remains a single process.
Continuing the application of this approach to children, we can see the 
possibility that children might define themselves in a number of ways. They 
may regard themselves as children, as boys (or girls), as members of their
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family (the Johnsons or the Billington-Smythes), or even as “tadpoles” (in 
their learn-to-swim class). This self-definition will be affected by both the 
current situation and the children’s own expectations about these 
categorizations, or self-definitions. Since these self-definitions are in fact 
cognitive self-definitions, it would be expected that the child’s level of 
cognitive ability would play an important role in this. These speculations will 
be addressed in the following empirical chapters of this thesis. Before 
pursuing this, however, it is necessary to look at one area of children’s social 
development, namely the development of ethnic prejudice, that has been 
informed by the same theories and ideas that have been presented thus far. 
Specifically, Social Identity Development Theory draws upon the social 
identity approach in outlining an age-related explanation of children’s ethnic 
preferences and prejudices.
Social Identity Development Theory
Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT; Nesdale, 2004; Nesdale et al., 
2003) proposes four stages through which children pass in developing 
prejudicial attitudes and behaviours. Unlike other developmental stage 
theories, it does not suggest that all children pass through all four stages. In 
contrast, SIDT provides a description of the sequence of events, and the 
necessary elements, that lead to the development of prejudice “in those 
children who come to hold such attitudes” (Nesdale, 2004 p.229, his 
emphasis).
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Before three years of age, children are said to be in the “undifferentiated” 
phase, although they gradually learn to discriminate on the dimensions of 
such things as age and gender. At around three years old, “ethnic awareness” 
emerges, particularly for children living in multiracial societies. At around 
this age, children can accurately identify different skin colours (e.g., Clark & 
Clark, 1939) which, combined with the social significance it is given (e.g., 
Katz, 1976), is incorporated into (meaningful) social categories. A critical 
component of this second phase is the child’s development of “ethnic self- 
identification”. In order to develop prejudiced beliefs (against members of 
other racial/ethnic groups) the child must first define him/herself as 
belonging to one of those groups. This generally occurs in children from the 
ethnically dominant group between three and six to seven years of age 
(Aboud, 1988).
Ethnic awareness is necessary for “ethnic preference” (the third phase) to 
occur. Consistent with the social identity approach, this self-categorization 
(as a member of a particular ethnic group) leads to a preference for members 
of that group. SIDT, however, emphasizes that the child’s focus is entirely on 
the ingroup. Preference for ingroup members at this stage does not involve 
dislike for outgroup members; it is merely a focus on oneself (as a member 
of a given category). Nesdale (2004) proposes that all children reach ethnic 
self-awareness at some time or another. It is the fourth phase, “ethnic 
prejudice”, to which only some children progress, and this progression 
depends upon certain elements.
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As with gender constancy (see Chapter 3), the development of prejudice 
entails the cognitive concept of constancy, in this case ethnic constancy, i.e., 
the understanding that ethnic group membership does not change with age or 
despite superficial changes in appearance. In addition, social conditions 
include the degree to which children identify with their ethnic group, and the 
relationship between the child’s ethnic ingroup and another ethnic outgroup. 
In particular, prejudice is more likely to develop in situations where there is 
conflict between those groups (Nesdale, 2004).
Importantly SIDT differs from the dominant theory in prejudice development 
(socio-cognitive theory; Aboud, 1988) in its rejection of age-related increases 
(from 4 years of age) and decreases (from around 7 years of age) in 
prejudice, and in its recognition of the role of social forces. Analogous to the 
social-cognitive account of gender development (refer to Chapter 3),
Aboud’s socio-cognitive theory is highly reliant on a traditional cognitive 
account of development. The alternative approach to gender development 
presented in this thesis more closely resembles the SIDT account of ethnic 
development.
Accounts of gender development and the development of prejudice differ, 
however, in that the notion of gender dislike (or prejudice) is not considered 
problematic in the same way as ethnic prejudice. Although segregation along 
gender lines is widespread (see Chapters 3 and 4) and attempts to reduce it, 
at least in early childhood, tend to be shortlived (e.g., Schofield, 1981), 
gender segregation is largely considered part of “normal” gender
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development. Similarly, the age-related account of ethnic/prejudice 
development is not an appropriate one for gender development. Nonetheless, 
SIDT highlights the application of social psychological approaches (in 
particular the social identity approach) to an area of social development in 
children that has previously largely ignored the social component.
The empirical work in the following chapters represents an initial application 
of these social psychological principles to the domain of gender 
development. Becoming aware of oneself and others as a boy/girl involves an 
awareness of membership to a particular social category. The studies 
presented aim to examine how this particular social category functions, 
whether it differs from other social categories (such as age), and what are 
some of the implications of belonging to one of those social categories (male 
as opposed to female).
Rejecting the individualistic focus of the dominant theories of gender 
development, the studies presented in this thesis will examine the acquisition 
of gender understanding as a social category. Important processes in this 
investigation include the imitation of observed others, and the attention paid 
to information presented. How children utilize these processes and 
incorporate this into their developing sense of selves will now be addressed.
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Chapter 7
Study 1
Thus far we have looked at the process of childhood socialization, 
particularly focusing on gender socialization. Imitation (or modelling) has 
been a central theme of this thesis, as it is an important component of all 
theories of social learning and development. By modelling others, children 
learn how to behave in the world. Modelling allows children a way of 
practising particular skills. The enactment of these behaviours also provides 
a context in which children can observe the consequences of their own 
behaviours, which may in fact differ from the consequences others receive 
for the same behaviours. Children who imitate their parents packing away 
toys, for example, may receive a great deal of praise for their efforts. 
However an attempt to imitate their parents having a dinner party with the 
best china and stemware would more likely elicit extremely negative 
(perhaps bordering on panicky) responses.
In addition, by imitating the behaviour of others, a child learns that the same 
behaviour can invoke different responses depending on whether the child, 
themself, is a boy or a girl. To complicate matters further, the responses they 
receive can differ even further depending upon whether the person 
responding to the child’s behaviour is male or female. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, boys and girls are treated differently from birth (Reingold & 
Cook, 1975), throughout infancy (Roopnarine, 1986) and into early 
childhood (Fagot, 1974; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1983). Put simply, boys and
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girls are not socialized in the same way. It is therefore suggested that 
learning about gender is not experienced in the same way by boys and by 
girls.
Given its importance in the socialization process, modelling is a major focus 
of the first experiment, using a modelling paradigm (after Bussey and 
Bandura, 1984). The present experiment aimed to replicate and extend 
Bussey and Bandura’s (1984) findings of sex-linked modelling behaviours.
In the first of two studies, they had children watch videos of same-sex teams 
of adult male and female models. They then gave the children the 
opportunity to enact the behaviours they had seen on the video. Although no 
social context had been provided for the behaviours, children demonstrated a 
strong preference for imitating the same-sex adult model team. This occurred 
despite the children showing equal recall for the behaviours performed by 
both the male and the female models. That is, boys and girls remembered the 
actions of both the male and the female models (running counter to our 
earlier-expressed idea that boys may pay less attention than girls to activities 
of the opposite sex). Yet when the children were asked to choose behaviours 
to adopt for themselves, the boys chose to imitate the men and the girls chose 
to imitate the women, completely in line with findings of a preference for 
same-sex activities, displayed by both boys and girls (e.g., Maccoby & 
Jacklin, 1987; Powlishta, Serbin & Möller, 1993).
The first aim of the current study, therefore, was to test whether children still 
display these preferences for sex-linked behaviours. Given the increased
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emphasis since the original study on non-gendered play and education in 
early childhood settings (e.g., Yellond, 1998) and the expression of this by 
early childhood teachers (e.g., Cahill & Adams, 1997) since the original 
study, it is possible that these preferences may have diminished in the two 
decades since Bussey and Bandura's original study.
In addition to investigating children’s imitation of adult models, a second 
aim of the present study was to investigate children’s sex-linked modelling 
with peers, or other children. This would not only determine the robustness 
of sex-linked modelling, but the addition of child models poses a direct test 
of Harris’ (1995, 1998) assertions that children are more influential models 
than are adults.
Despite the arguments presented in Chapter 6 concerning similarity-based 
accounts of influence, and the recognition that the present investigation is in 
no way an attempt to measure lasting influence, the present comparison 
nonetheless represents a preparatory attempt to compare different sources of 
influence. Modelling, or imitating, behaviours has an important role in the 
learning process. It is also an observable, and relatively unambiguous, 
measure of this process. Hence the present study involves direct behavioural 
measures. Rather than relying on interview techniques that assess children’s 
knowledge of societal stereotypes or their attitudes toward gender roles, 
modelled behaviour is an explicit measure of what children actually do. This 
measure avoids the potential problems of demand characteristics, or of the
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child participants simply misunderstanding the experimental questions or 
task.
Also tested by Bussey and Bandura (1984) was the possibility that children’s 
levels of gender constancy (the belief that gender remains constant even 
when external cues, such as clothing, change) may influence the behavioural 
choices that children make. According to cognitive-developmental theory, 
the attainment of gender constancy, a measure of cognitive ability, is 
necessary for gender-linked behaviour to occur. As stated in Chapter 3, this 
prediction has received mixed support, even from cognitive-developmental 
theorists themselves (see Martin, Ruble & Szkrybaio, 2002). Nevertheless, 
the issue of cognitive constancy remains important enough to warrant at least 
an initial investigation of the role of this construct.
Although Bussey and Bandura (1984) found that gender constancy was not a 
prerequisite for gender-linked imitation, the possibility remains that this type 
of understanding may function differently when models are other children 
rather than adults. In other words, the development of gender constancy 
involves children’ knowledge that they, themselves, will remain male, or 
female, throughout their lives: boys will become men, and girls will become 
women. In developing that understanding, however, children who have not 
reached gender constancy may apply their misunderstanding to other 
children they may see as, potentially, able to change sex. Adults, on the other 
hand, may be understood to have already developed a permanent gender 
identity. Put another way, wo/men have already become adults and remained
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fe/male in the process. Since children (girls or boys) have not reached 
adulthood yet, the permanency of their gender is not yet observable and, if 
the participant has not yet achieved gender constancy, they may be under the 
impression that the child models could change sex at some later date. For 
such children the certainty of adult models’ sex may make them a more 
compelling model than same-age (potentially opposite-sex) models.
Finally, children’s behavioural preferences could also reflect parental 
teaching, or simply exposure to gender-related activities in the home setting. 
Despite claims that homes have become less traditionally gender- 
stereotypical over time (e.g., Sullivan, 2004), there is much evidence to 
suggest that women still perform most of the unpaid labour within the 
household (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer & Robinson, 2000; Coltrane, 2000). For 
this gender-based division of labour to have any impact on children, 
however, assumes that children use adults (specifically parents) as 
appropriate conveyors of sex-role norms and sex-typed behaviour. Not only 
has this field of inquiry produced mixed results (see reviews by Block, 1983; 
Huston, 1983; Lytton & Romney, 1991; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), much of 
this research has dealt with children older than preschool age (e.g., Burns & 
Homel, 1986; Serbin, Powlishta & Gulko, 1993). In order to draw any 
conclusions regarding parental influence, therefore, it was necessary to 
obtain measures of gender-typed behaviours to which young children are 
exposed.
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Measures of parents’ attitudes or beliefs about gender roles, however, would 
be inadequate in this instance for a number of reasons. First, correlations 
between attitudes and behaviours are often quite low, especially when there 
is low correspondence between the two (see Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). For 
example, the correlation between parental attitudes toward sex-appropriate 
clothes (for either themselves or their children) or toward which parent 
should drive the car most often, and the actual demonstration of either of 
these behaviours may be quite high, but the correlation between general 
attitudes to gender roles and any specific gender-related behaviour would 
almost certainly be much lower.
Secondly, these low correlations (between attitudes and behaviours) have 
been found to occur with adults. It could not be expected that three- and four- 
year olds would be capable of drawing inferences about their parents’ 
attitudes from the behaviours the parents display. This way of thinking would 
be difficult enough for young children, but would be even more difficult if 
the parents’ attitudes did not align with their behaviours.
Our final rationale for obtaining a measure of parental gender-typed 
behaviours is that since the primary measure in this study is behavioural, it 
was considered important to obtain a measure of actual behaviours 
performed by the parents. This should make it easier to draw conclusions 
with regard to the actual imitation of behaviours. In particular, we wished to 
see if children are exposed to gender-stereotypical behaviour in the home and 
if this is related to the children’s own gender-stereotyped behaviour.
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Thus the present study compared children’s modelling of adult and child 
models and obtained a measure of the sex-typed behaviour to which they 
were exposed in the home environment. It also examined whether this 
behaviour was affected by the attention paid to these models.
As previously discussed (refer to Chapter 5), the attention paid to models 
provides important information for children’s imitative behaviours. If, for 
example, children imitate same-sex models more than opposite-sex ones, this 
does not tell us whether children simply ignored the information provided by 
the opposite sex in the first instance, or if they paid attention to all the 
information provided. The former suggests a relatively straightforward 
process involving identifying self and others (models) as male (or female), 
then finding it appropriate to imitate the behaviour of the person similar to 
themselves (the same-category examplar). If, however, the latter is the case, 
it implies a more complex process involving consciously choosing an 
appropriate behaviour from a wider stimulus array. It also implies that some 
behaviours are consciously rejected as being inappropriate behaviours to 
enact.
In line with Bussey and Bandura (1984), it was predicted that both boys and 
girls would imitate same-sex models more than opposite-sex models. 
Although Bussey and Bandura found greater same-sex modelling by boys 
than by girls, this would not be expected if boys and girls use gender 
categories in the same way. With respect to modelling of adults and children,
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an extrapolation of Harris’ (1998) argument would predict more modelling of 
child models than of adult models, while social developmental theories 
would predict no difference between these.
We would not predict children’s levels of gender constancy to affect their 
level of modelling, although we would expect the age of the child to have an 
effect. It is anticipated that older children would have had more exposure to 
gender socialization pressures and that this would manifest itself in greater 
demonstration of same-sex modelling.
Finally, there are two possible findings concerning the impact of parents’ 
gender stereotyped behaviours in the home and the children’s sex-linked 
modelling on an unrelated task. Harris (1995, 1998) would predict no 
relationship between the two, while the more conventional social-learning 
approach would predict a positive relationship (see Lytton & Romney, 1991 
for a review of the debate).
In all conditions of the present study, modelled behaviour was tested by 
asking each child to re-enact behaviours they had seen performed by male 
and female models. Memory for male and female behaviours, as measured 
on a recall task, was also tested to determine whether children paid 
differential attention to the male and female models.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 32 girls and 30 boys attending one of three university 
childcare centres in Canberra, Australia. Parents of the children also 
participated by filling in a questionnaire about their gender-linked behaviours 
in the home. Children ranged in age from 39 to 68 months, with a mean age 
of 53.98 months (s.d. = 6.48 mths).
Design
The study involved a 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 2 (sex of model: male, 
female) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) mixed model design. Both age of 
model and sex of participant were between-subject factors, while sex of 
model was a within-subject factor. Participants (boys and girls) watched one 
of four videos in which the behaviours performed by the male and female 
models (either adults or children) were counterbalanced.
Materials
Videos were used to depict teams of male and female models performing 
different behaviour sequences: all the males performed one set of behaviours 
while all the females performed another set. Two versions of the video 
(male/female) involved adult models, and two (male/female) involved child 
models, with behaviours counterbalanced across both adult and child 
conditions. The adult models were three men and three women who were 
doctoral students at the Australian National University, Canberra. The child
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models were seven- and eight-year old children (three girls and three boys), 
all of whom attended a Canberra primary school.
At the start of the video, all the men and women (or boys and girls) actors 
were seated in a row. One by one (male followed by female, followed by 
male etc., or female followed by male, followed by female in the 
counterbalanced version), each actor performed the following sequence of 
behaviours. In the first order, all of one sex team chose a black Mickey 
Mouse cap and placed it on their head with the Mickey Mouse symbol 
toward the front. They then said, “forward march”, and marched toward a 
table at the front of the room with a large wooden box with a koala on top. 
They made the koala jump from the box saying, “Jump, jump”, opened the 
box, took out a sticker and said, “Bingo”. They turned and put the sticker at 
the top of a sheet of cardboard (which had been hung on a side wall) saying, 
“Up there”, then returned to the table, turned the koala to face the door and 
said, “Look at the door”. They took off their caps saying, “Off with thinking 
caps”, placed the cap inside the box and said, “In there”. They then walked 
back to their chair, sat down and said, “There”. In all, fourteen separate 
behaviours were enacted.
In the second version, all of the opposite-sex team chose a red Mickey 
Mouse cap which they wore with the Mickey Mouse symbol toward the 
back. They said, “Get set, go” and marched toward the box. They made the 
koala fly from the box saying, “Fly, fly”, opened the box and took out a 
sticker saying, “A stickeroo”. They placed their sticker at the bottom of the
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cardboard saying, “Down there”, returned to the table and lay the koala down 
saying, “Go to sleep”. They took off their caps saying, “No more thinking 
caps” and placed them on top of the box saying, “On top”. They then 
returned to their seats saying, “That’s it”. Again, fourteen separate 
behaviours were enacted. The male and female behaviours were then 
reversed in the second version of the videos.
Procedure
After being introduced to the experimenter in a classroom situation, each 
participant was individually brought into the testing room, which was a 
separate room at each childcare centre. Each child was asked if s/he would 
like to watch a video and play a game, and whether he or she would mind 
being videotaped whilst doing so. The child was then seated in front of the 
television and the experimenter sat next to the child to watch the video.
At the start of the video, the children were invited to play a game called 
“Find the Surprise”, but were first instructed to watch the other people in the 
video to find out how it was played. After watching the entire video, each 
child was asked by the experimenter if he or she would like to play the game 
they had just seen. The experimenter reminded each child to first choose a 
thinking cap, the only prompt provided at this stage of the study. Each 
child’s performance was videotaped on a video-recorder that had been set up 
in the room prior to the commencement of the task. The video-recorder was 
not turned on until each child had given their verbal consent. (All parents had
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previously consented to this procedure when permitting their child/ren to 
participate.)
Memory/ Manipulation Check
Following filming of the opportunity for imitative behaviour, each child was 
asked to recall the behaviour of the male and female models. For each of the 
fourteen behaviours, the experimenter provided participants with specific 
prompts such as, “Which hat did the men (boys)/women (girls) choose?” The 
order of questions (male followed by female, or female followed by male) 
was counterbalanced across participants. Responses were recorded on a 
checklist by the experimenter.
Gender Constancy
Slaby and Frey’s (1975) gender constancy interview was then administered. 
This consists of nine questions concerned with gender identity, two questions 
about gender stability, and three relating to gender consistency. Questions 
were presented in either traditional or reverse order, and this was 
counterbalanced across participants.
The present study also included two attribution questions from Siegal and 
Robinson (1987) (one concerning games, and one concerning clothes) for 
each participant. The order of these was also counterbalanced. An example of 
these questions (for girls) is:
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A grown-up asked a little girl called Michelle, who was four 
years old, whether she would be a girl or a boy if she wore 
boys’ clothes. Michelle said that she would be a boy if she 
wore boys’ clothes.
Did Michelle say this because she really truly believed it was 
right? Or was she pretending just to please the grown-up?
At the end of each session, children were thanked for their participation and 
allowed to choose a sticker to take home.
Parent Questionnaires
Upon the return of consent forms allowing their child(ren) to participate in 
the study, parents were given a two-page questionnaire to complete. Due to 
time constraints, most parents took these home to complete. They could then 
either be returned to the childcare centre, or sent directly to the experimenter 
in reply-paid envelopes that were provided. Both alternatives ensured 
anonymity for the respondents.
Household Tasks:
Parents were asked how many hours per week they and their partner (if 
applicable) spent on eight typical household tasks. These eight tasks had 
been pilot tested for traditional gender stereotypicality. Four of these tasks 
were judged to be traditionally female (cooking the evening meal, washing 
clothes, vacuuming, and cleaning the bathroom). The remaining four tasks 
(putting out garbage bins, mowing the lawn, washing the car, and doing 
household repairs) were considered traditionally male.
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Childcare Responsibilities:
Parents were also asked how many times a week they, and their partner, if 
applicable, performed the following childcare tasks. These were dropping the 
child at childcare, picking up the child from childcare, bathing child(ren), 
feeding child(ren), and putting child(ren) to bed.
Scoring -  Modelling Behaviour
Videos of 39 participants were analyzed by an independent rater, using four 
categories (1 = same-sex behaviour; 2 = opposite-sex behaviour; 3 = other 
i.e., new, or random, behaviour; 4 = nothing i.e., no behaviour performed). 
Using Cronbach’s alpha, reliability coefficients for each of the fourteen 
behaviours ranged from 0.71 to 1.000. In an attempt to reach perfect 
agreement, both raters re-analyzed the videos. Where behaviours could not 
be decided (e.g., due to poor tape quality), one of the two raters’ scores was 
randomly chosen. This eliminated inter-rater disagreement on any of the 
behaviours.
Scoring -  Parent Questionnaires
Parents were asked how many hours a week they and their partners spent on 
eight common household tasks. Scores of l ’s and 0’s were allocated to each 
partner for each task, based on the distribution of time spent on each task. It 
was not possible to use a simple hourly measure due to the variability in time 
required by each task. For example, cooking the evening meal requires time 
spent every night whereas putting out the bins need only be done once a
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week. If both partners spent an equal amount of time on a particular task, 
both were given a score of 1 for that task.
Traditional and non-traditional household task scores were then calculated 
for each parent. If a female scored a “1” on a task that was traditionally 
female e.g., cleaning the bathroom, it was used in calculating the traditional 
task score. Similarly, if she scored a “1” on washing the car, a traditional 
male task, this contributed to her non-traditional task score. Thus for both 
males and females, maximum traditional and non-traditional task scores were 
4. Given the nature of the point allocation, it was possible for both males and 
females to obtain the maximum score on both traditional and non-traditional 
tasks if they both spent an equal amount of time on all tasks. It should be 
noted here that this score is not a measure of time spent on tasks and cannot 
be used to determine whether mothers or fathers spent more time on 
household tasks. It is, as stated, a measure of traditional (i.e., gender 
stereotypical) household tasks performed by mothers and fathers.
Scores for both parents were then combined to form a household score. This 
was achieved by summing both male and female traditional scores 
(maximum combined score of 8) and subtracting the nontraditional scores.
Modelling Behaviour
Results
A checklist of the behaviours was used to score each child’s performance. 
Each of the fourteen behaviours was coded into one of four categories
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described above (i.e., 1 = same-sex behaviour; 2 = opposite-sex behaviour; 3 
= other i.e., new, or random, behaviour; 4 = nothing i.e., no behaviour 
performed). After recoding the data to take account of sex of participant and 
order of video presentation, the total number of behaviours in each of the 
four categories (i.e., same-sex, opposite-sex, other and nothing) was 
recorded. This final category was not used in the analyses, however, since it 
was of no theoretical interest and provided no additional information to what 
was provided by the other categories.
The first question of interest was whether children imitated same-sex models 
more than they imitated models of the opposite sex, and, secondly, if this 
were true for both adult and child models. The addition of category 3 (the 
possibility of performing a new, or random, behaviour), however, added a 
previously unconsidered dimension to the possible findings. It allowed for 
the possibility that children would not imitate either behaviour, but would 
create a new response.
The data were therefore analyzed using a 3 (modelled behaviours: same-sex, 
opposite-sex, new behaviour) x 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 2 (sex of 
participant: boy, girl) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
modelled behaviour.
There was no difference in the overall amount of modelling by boys and 
girls. (Total number of behaviours performed: girls M = 6.34, boys M = 
6.00.) Importantly for the hypotheses of the study, although there were no
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significant differences between boys and girls, all children imitated same-sex 
models significantly more than they imitated opposite-sex models, t(60) = 
4.196, p<  0.001.
A significant main effect for modelled behaviour, F(l,58) = 35.216, p < 
0.001, was found, indicating greater performance of same-sex modelling than 
either opposite-sex modelling or random behaviour. This was qualified by 
significant modelling by sex, F(l,58) = 4.117, p = 0.047, and modelling by 
age of model, F(l,58) = 5.766, p = 0.02, interactions. No three-way 
interaction was found. The patterns of modelling of the two-way interactions 
are shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
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Figure 7.1: Number of Modelled Behaviours by 
Boys and Girls as a Function of Sex of Model
Modelling Behaviour x Sex of Model
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, girls imitated same-sex models more than boys, 
Ms = 3.781 and 2.833 girls and boys respectively, t(60) = 1.572, p = 0.021. It
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also appeared that girls imitated opposite-sex models slightly less than boys, 
but this difference did not reach significance, Ms = 1.50 and 1.667 girls and 
boys respectively, t(60) = 0.406, p = 0.686. Similarly, the difference in boys’ 
and girls’ performance of new behaviours was not significantly different 
from each other, M’s = 1.063 and 1.50 girls and boys respectively, t(60) = 
1.649, p = 0.104.2
Modelling Behaviour x Age of Model
4.5 -r
2 .2 2.5
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- Child Models
Figure 7.2: Number of Modelled Behaviours as a 
Function of Age of Model
There was a main effect for age of model. Children performed more of the 
behaviours performed by the adult models than by the child models, F(l,58)
= 5.766, p = 0.020. They also displayed more same-sex modelling of adults 
(M = 3.887) than of children (M = 2.727), t(60) = 1.948, p = 0.056. Children 
also appeared more likely to invent new behaviours after watching a video of
2 All pairwise comparisons were evaluated with a Bonferroni correction for the specific set 
of comparisons being reported.
130
other children (M = 1.521) than after watching a video of adults (M = 1.042), 
although this difference did not reach statistical significance, t(60) = -1.834, 
p = 0.072.
To examine more closely one of our specific foci of interest, we looked 
separately at the patterns of modelling of adult and child behaviour. Given 
our interest in how both boys and girls responded to both adult and child 
models, planned comparisons between these means were conducted.
Imitation of Adult Models
Figure 7.3 shows the patterns of boys’ and girls’ responses to adult models.
2  o 3
Same-sex Opposite-sex
Behaviour Performed
Figure 7.3: Number of Modelled Behaviours by 
Boys and Girls 
- Adult Models
When examined separately, both girls (t(15) = 2.879, p = 0.011) and boys 
(t(14) = 2.101, p = 0.054) imitated same-sex adult models significantly more 
than opposite sex models. (Girls: Ms = 4.375, 1.625, 0.75, same-sex,
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opposite-sex and new behaviours respectively. Boys: Ms = 3.40, 1.533, 
1.333, same-sex, opposite-sex and new behaviours respectively.) However, 
the linear decrease in behaviours from category 1 (same-sex imitation) 
through category 2 (opposite-sex imitation) to category 3 (new behaviours) 
was evident only for girls. Whilst girls’ performance of opposite-sex 
behaviours compared with new behaviours bordered on significance, (t( 15) = 
2.049, p = 0.058), boys were no more likely to perform opposite-sex 
behaviours than new ones, t(14) = 0.336, p = 0.742. Thus they were no more 
likely to imitate a woman than to invent entirely new behaviours.
Imitation of Child Models
Figure 7.4 shows the patterns of responding to child models by boys and 
girls.
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Figure 7.4: Number of Modelled Behaviours by 
Boys and Girls 
- Child Models
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While girls’ same-sex modelling (M_= 3.185) was significantly greater than 
their opposite-sex modelling (M = 1.375, t(15) = 2.722, p = 0.016), the 
amount of opposite-sex modelling did not differ from their performance of 
new behaviours (M = 1.375, t(15) = 0). It is also worth noting that girls’ 
performance of both these last two categories was quite low: few girls 
imitated opposite-sex models or performed a new behaviour. Strikingly 
however, the amount of behaviours in each category did not differ for boys 
(Ms = 2.667, 1.80, 1.667, same-sex, opposite-sex and new behaviours 
respectively). They were no more likely to imitate same-sex child models 
than they were to imitate opposite-sex child models, or to perform a 
completely new or random behaviour. From the data, it appears that girls 
may be more strongly influenced than boys by other children, while boys’ 
gender modelling may be based more strongly on adult models.
To assess the role of age and gender constancy on modelling behaviours, the 
above analyses were performed again to include these variables.
Gender Constancy
First, gender constancy was determined by comparing each child’s score 
using the traditional Slaby and Frey (1975) scoring method with a revised 
score incorporating Siegal and Robinson’s (1987) attribution measures. The 
Slaby and Frey measure had four categories: 0 = no responses correct, 1 = 
gender identity only, 2 = gender identity + gender stability, 3 = gender 
identity + gender stability + gender consistency. Due to the increased 
conceptual difficulty of the attribution measures (children were required to
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infer reasons for a hypothetical child’s responses), those children who 
answered these questions correctly were regarded as having attained 
complete gender constancy, despite possibly having given incorrect 
responses on some of the previous measures. Thus the new gender constancy 
measure retained the four categories, with the highest level (category 3) 
including those children with incorrect gender stability or gender consistency 
responses but with correct responses to the attribution measures. An 
additional eighteen children were thus considered gender constant according 
to the new criterion.
A median split was then used to divide participants into high and low gender 
constancy. In effect, this divided those children now considered to have 
attained full gender constancy from those who had not (i.e., high gender 
constancy = category 3, low gender constancy = categories 0, 1 and 2).
The data were then analyzed with a 3 (modelled behaviours: same-sex, 
opposite-sex, new behaviour) x 2 (age of model: adults, children) x 2 (sex of 
participant: boy, girl) x 2 (gender constancy: high, low) mixed model 
ANOVA.
Results reflected those of the previous analysis. A significant main effect for 
modelled behaviour, F(l,54) = 33.135, p < 0.001 was qualified by significant 
modelled behaviour x sex, F(l,54) = 4.099, p = 0.048, and modelled 
behaviour x age of model, F(l,54) = 5.376, p = 0.024, interactions.
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The interaction between modelled behaviour and gender constancy 
approached significance, F(l,54) = 3.654, p = 0.061, and warranted closer 
investigation.
♦ High Gender 
Constancy
«  - Low Gender 
Constancy
sex
Behaviour Performed
Figure 7.5: Number of Modelled Behaviours as a 
Function of Sex of Model and Gender Constancy
Figure 7.5 shows how this effect is driven by children with high gender 
constancy performing significantly more same-sex modelling (M = 3.943) 
than either opposite-sex modelling (M = 1.240, t(34) = 4.969, p < 0.001) or 
new behaviours (M = 1.319, t(34) = 5.287, p < 0.001). For children with low 
gender constancy, there was no difference between same- (M = 2.536) and 
opposite-sex modelling (M = 2.030, t(26) = 0.859, p = 0.398), although both 
were performed significantly more than new behaviours (M = 1.220) (same- 
sex vs new behaviour: t(26) = 2.637, p = 0.014; opposite-sex vs new 
behaviour: t(26) = 2.077, p = 0.048).
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Age of Participants
To further investigate the possibility of a developmental increase in imitation 
of models, even at this young age, a median split was used to divide older 
from younger participants. The median age was 55 months. The data were 
then analysed via a 3 (modelled behaviours: same-sex, opposite-sex, new 
behaviour) x 2 (age of model: adults, children) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, 
girl) x 2 (age of participant: older, younger) mixed model ANOVA.
Again the strong main effect for modelling emerged, F(l,54) = 28.226, p < 
0.001, although the modelling behaviour x sex and modelling behaviour x 
age of model interactions did not reach significance (F(l,54) = 3.551, p = 
0.065, and F(l,54) = 3.141, p = 0.082, respectively). Of particular interest, 
however, was the significant modelling behaviour x age of participant 
interaction, F(l,54) = 4.049, p = 0.049.
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Figure 7.6: Number of Modelled Behaviours as a 
Function of Sex of Model and Age of Participant
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Again the significant, and important, difference pertained to the imitation of 
same-sex models (see Figure 7.6). Older children (M = 3.863) performed 
same-sex modelling significantly more than younger children (M = 2.546), 
t(60) = 2.166, p = 0.034. Older children also performed same-sex modelling 
(M = 3.863) significantly more than opposite-sex (M = 1.596, t(34) = 4.076, 
p < 0.000) and new behaviours (M = 1.196, t(34) = 5.306, p < 0.001). By 
contrast, younger children performed same-sex modelling (M = 2.546), 
opposite-sex modelling (M = 1.726) and new behaviours (M = 1.342) 
equally. (Same-sex vs opposite-sex: t(26) = 1.703, p = 0.100; opposite-sex vs 
new behaviour: t(26) = 0.424, p = 0.675.)
This pattern of results mirrors that for gender constancy, and is consistent 
with Bussey and Bandura (1984) who found no effect for gender constancy 
over and above that for age. Since gender constancy is a measure of 
cognitive ability, it is not surprising that this increases with age.
To verify this, the data were again re-analyzed using both age and gender 
constancy in the same model, but with age as a covariate.' Thus a 3 
(modelled behaviours: same-sex, opposite-sex, new behaviour) x 2 (age of 
model: adults, children) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (gender 
constancy: high, low) mixed model ANCOVA, with age of participant as the 
covariate, was performed. As predicted, the modelled behaviour x gender 
constancy interaction was no longer significant, F(l,53) = 2.682, p = 0.107.
3 This analysis used the actual age of the children as a continuous variable, which is 
necessary for ANCOVA.
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In summary, there was clear evidence of children’s same-sex imitation 
which, unlike Bussey and Bandura (1984), did not differ for boys and girls. 
Importantly for the present study and for Harris’ (1995, 1998) contention 
concerning the prime importance of peers, children did not differ 
significantly in their modelling of adult and child models. Moreover, these 
results were replicated when participants’ age and gender constancy were 
included.
Memory/Manipulation Check
For this task, children were specifically asked what actions the male or 
female models had performed. Responses were classified according to the 
four categories used for modelling behaviours (i.e., same-sex, opposite-sex, 
new, and nothing/don’t know). These were also recoded to take account of 
sex of participant and video presentation.
The data were summed in order to produce the following: (i) correct recall of 
same-sex models’ behaviour; (ii) correct recall of opposite-sex models’ 
behaviour; (iii) incorrect recall of same-sex models’ behaviour by 
misattributing opposite-sex models’ behaviour; (iv) incorrect recall of 
opposite-sex models’ behaviour by misattributing same-sex models’ 
behaviour; (v) incorrect recall of same-sex models’ behaviour by substituting 
an unseen response; (vi) incorrect recall of opposite-sex models’ behaviour 
by substituting an unseen response; (vii) no recall at all. As with the
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modelling data, the last response (i.e., no behaviour/don’t know) was omitted 
in order to examine actual responses only.
The first memory question to be addressed compared children’s accurate 
recall of same- and opposite-sex models. The first analysis of the memory 
data reflected that used in the modelling data, and a 2 (sex of participant: 
boy, girl) x 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 6 (memory for models: same-sex 
correct, opposite-sex correct, same-sex incorrect by opposite-sex, opposite- 
sex incorrect by same-sex, same-sex incorrect by other, opposite-sex 
incorrect by other) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
memory for models, was performed.
A strong main effect for memory, F(l,58) = 75.034, p < 0.001, was qualified 
by a significant memory x age of model interaction, F(l,58) = 9.044, p = 
0.004. (See Figure 7. 7.)
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Figure 7.7: Memory for Behaviours of Adult and 
Child Models
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Key for Memory for Models
1 = Same-sex behaviour correct
2 = Opposite-sex behaviour correct
3 = Same-sex incorrect by opposite-sex
4 = Opposite-sex incorrect by same-sex
5 = Same-sex incorrect by other
6 = Opposite-sex incorrect by other
Clearly children’s correct recall of adult models’ behaviour (M = 6.125) was 
superior to their correct recall of those same behaviours when performed by 
child models (M = 3.646), and this was true of both same- (t(60) = 4.284, p < 
0.001) and opposite-sex models, t(60) = 3.802, p < 0.001. Children’s 
incorrect responses also differed between adult and child models, but none of 
these differences reached significance. It is worth noting that a comparison of 
total memory scores for adults and children (derived by simply summing all 
the memory responses under investigation) showed a significant difference 
for memory of adult and child models, t(60) = 4.112, p < 0.001: children 
responded more to questions about adult models than about child models (see 
Figure 7.7).
Of particular interest was the finding that, despite showing slightly higher 
correct recall of same- than opposite-sex models, for both adult and child 
models, these differences were not significant. Similarly, there was no 
difference in incorrect recall of same- and opposite-sex models by 
misattribution or by providing a new response. (See Table 7.1 for means and 
significance values.) It appears that children’s recall of behaviours was 
unaffected by the sex of the model enacting those behaviours.
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Table 7.1: Paired Comparisons for Memory for Models
Adult Models
Same-sex Opposite Sex t(30) p-value
Correct 6.125 5.752 0.941 0.354
Incorrect by 
misattribution
0.775 0.902 -0.538 0.595
Incorrect by 
other
1.579 1.767 -0.733 0.469
Child Mode s
Same-sex Opposite-sex 1(30) p-value
Correct 3.646 3.552 0.333 0.742
Incorrect by 
misattribution
1.198 1.258 -0.263 0.794
Incorrect by 
other
1.552 1.521 0.141 0.889
In contrast, children’s recall of behaviours, or more specifically, their correct 
recall of behaviours, was affected by the age of the models enacting those 
behaviours, with more correct recall of adult behaviours.
Memory for models may also have been affected by participants’ age and 
level of gender constancy. As with modelled behaviours, the memory data 
was also re-analyzed in separate ANOVAs incorporating high and low 
gender constant children, and older and younger participants. Thus a 2 (sex 
of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 6 (memory for 
models: same-sex correct, opposite-sex correct, same-sex incorrect by 
opposite-sex, opposite-sex incorrect by same-sex, same-sex incorrect by 
other, opposite-sex incorrect by other) x 2 (gender constancy: high, low) 
mixed model ANOVA was performed. This was followed by a 2 (sex of 
participant: boy, girl) x 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 6 (memory for 
models: same-sex correct, opposite-sex correct, same-sex incorrect by 
opposite-sex, opposite-sex incorrect by same-sex, same-sex incorrect by
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other, opposite-sex incorrect by other) x 2 (age of participant: younger, 
older) mixed model ANOVA.
No effects were found for either age or gender constancy. In both analyses, 
the highly significant main effect for memory qualified by the highly 
significant memory x age of model interaction was replicated. (See Table 
7.2.) Interpretation of these findings remain consistent with those presented 
above, with children showing greater imitation of same-sex models than 
opposite-sex models, and with this modelling being greater for same-sex 
adults than same-sex children.
Table 7.2: Anova Results for Memory for Models
Gender Constancy included Age included
F (1,54) p-value F (1,54) p-value
Main effect 
for memory
73.139 0.000 74.388 0.000
Memory x 
Age of model 
Interaction
8.109 0.006 8.545 0.005
Household Information and Parental Responsibilities 
Parent data was only obtained for 26 participants. A further five single 
parents were excluded from the analyses since they would presumably be 
responsible for both “male” and “female” caregiving tasks.
Household scores vary from 0 to 8, with high scores representing highly 
traditional households and low scores representing non-traditional
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households. Although no household scored 0 (extremely non-traditional) or 8 
(extremely traditional), the gender stereotypicality of the families varied 
quite evenly between 1 (quite non-traditional) and 7 (quite traditional), with a 
mean household score of 4.095 and a standard deviation of 1.729.
As with the household tasks, 0’s and l ’s were allocated to each partner based 
on the proportion of time spent by each parent on each of the five childcare 
tasks. These scores were then simply added to form a childcare score for 
each partner. Thus the maximum score for either parent was 5. Again, 
maximum scores were possible for both partners if they spent an equal 
amount of time on all tasks, it was found that mothers had significantly more 
childcare responsibilities than did fathers, t(20) = 2.425, p = 0.025.
Using only those children for whom parent data was available, a median split 
was used to divide high from low gender-stereotypical households. 
Households scoring 4 or less were considered low gender-stereotypical, 
while those scoring 5 and above were considered high gender-stereotypical. 
A 3 (modelled behaviour: same-sex, opposite-sex, new behaviour) x 2 age of 
model (adults, children) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (household 
stereotypicality: high, low) mixed model ANOVA was then conducted.
No effects for household stereotypicality were found. The only effect to 
reach statistical significance was a main effect for modelled behaviour, 
F(l,13) = 7.947, p = 0.014. Children imitated same-sex models (M = 3.325) 
significantly more than they imitated opposite-sex models (M = 0.900), t(13)
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= 3.05, p = 0.028, and significantly more than their performance of new 
behaviours (M = 1.462), t(13) = 2.818, p = 0.043. These latter two 
behaviours did not differ statistically from each other, t(13) = 0.938, p = 
1.00 .
To investigate whether level of household stereotypicality had an effect on 
children’s recall of behaviours, a 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (age of 
model: adult, child) x 2 household stereotypicality: high, low) x 6 (memory 
for models: same-sex correct, opposite-sex correct, same-sex incorrect by 
opposite-sex, opposite-sex incorrect by same-sex, same-sex incorrect by 
other, opposite-sex incorrect by other) mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted.
Again no effects for household stereotypicality were found. Mirroring the 
memory results presented previously, significant main effects for memory, 
F(l,13) = 28.576, p < 0.001, and for age of model, F(l,13) = 5.047, p = 
0.043, were found. Children correctly recalled the behaviours of same-sex 
(M = 5.113) and opposite-sex models (M = 4.306) equally, t(13) = 1.50, p = 
1.00, which was much greater than their incorrect recall of any type. With 
respect to age of model, children recalled behaviours performed by adult 
models (M = 2.854) more than when those behaviours were performed by 
child models (M = 2.15).
Given the low number of participants for which parent data was obtained, 
together with the high proportion of boys to girls in this subset (12:2),
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alternative analyses were conducted using this household data. Because we 
were interested in how boys and girls respond to models, a series of t-tests 
with sex of child as the between participants comparison was conducted on 
the following variables: female same-sex household task score, female 
opposite-sex household task score, male same-sex household task score, 
male opposite-sex household task score, female childcare responsibility 
score, and male childcare responsibility score.
Table 7.3: Means for Household Scores for Boys and Girls
Boys Girls 1(19) U
Mothers’ same-sex 
household score
3.250 3.556 -0.794 0.437
Mothers’ opposite- 
sex household score
0.667 1.333 -1.614 0.123
Fathers’ same-sex 
household score
2.667 3.222 -1.116 0.278
Fathers’ opposite- 
sex household score
1.417 1.000 0.901 0.379
Mothers’ childcare 
responsibility score
3.667 4.556 -1.923 0.070
Fathers’ childcare 
responsibility score
2.667 3.111 -0.600 0.555
As can be seen in Table 7.3, none of these comparisons was significant. It 
appears there were no differences in the household structures of boys and 
girls. Due to the small sample size, and subsequent lack of power, a less 
stringent critical level of 0.10 was applied. All differences were not 
significant, except for women’s childcare responsibility, t(19) = -1.923, p = 
0.070: Mothers had a slightly greater share of childcare responsibilities with 
daughters than with sons.
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To gain a clearer picture of the level of stereotypicality of the households, 
paired t-tests were conducted between male and female parents’ same- and 
opposite-sex household task scores, and between their levels of childcare 
responsibility.
All of these reached significance. Mothers had higher same- than opposite- 
sex household task scores, t(20) = 10.346, p < 0.001, as did fathers, t(20) = 
5.000, p < 0.001. Furthermore, mothers had higher levels of childcare 
responsibility than fathers, t(20) = 2.425, p = 0.025. Households were thus 
quite stereotypical with respect to who performed household tasks and with 
mothers bearing greater responsibility for childcare than fathers.
Discussion
Consistent with Bussey and Bandura (1984), children showed a strong 
preference for imitating same-sex models. The present study extended 
previous work with adult models and showed that this preference for same- 
sex imitation was also true for child models. Given the choice between male 
and female behaviours, children consistently chose to enact those behaviours 
performed by people of their own sex. It should be remembered that these 
behaviours occurred in the absence of any explicitly gendered social context, 
and that the behaviours were counter-balanced as to their presentation by a 
male or a female team of models. Thus there was no obvious reason for 
children to choose one set of behaviours over another. The only feature that 
distinguished one set of behaviours from the other was the sex of the actors 
performing them.
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Bussey and Bandura’s (1984) finding of greater same-sex modelling by boys 
than by girls was not replicated in this study. In the present study, both boys 
and girls were equally likely to imitate same-sex models, and to do so 
whether those models were adults or children.
Contrary to predictions derived from Harris (1995, 1998), children imitated 
same-sex models more when those models were adults than when they were 
children. There was also a difference the pattern of modelling of the different 
age models: when child participants saw adult models, they were much more 
likely to imitate same-sex adults than they were to imitate opposite-sex 
adults or to perform a new behaviour. When imitating child models, while 
participants were still more likely to imitate same-sex than opposite-sex 
models, their imitation of opposite-sex child models was just as likely as 
their performance of a new behaviour. This would suggest that children 
imitate the (gender-related) behaviours of adults because it is appropriate to 
do so. Perhaps the children were more certain of what was required because 
they were adults performing the actions. Perhaps the children have more 
experience imitating adults -  at least with respect to gender-related activities. 
This latter possibility is unlikely, however, given the amount, and intensity, 
of reinforcement provided by peers for gender-stereotypical behaviour -  even 
at the age of three and four years (see Huston, 1983).
The questions concerning differential imitation of adult and child models 
remain partially as a result of the design of the present study. It should be
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remembered that the conclusions presented here rely on a between groups 
comparison with respect to the age of the models. Studies 2 and 3 seek to 
elucidate this issue by both removing gender from the situation (Study 2), 
and including both age and gender as within subjects comparisons (Study 3). 
Later studies will also employ a variation on the modelling task as, overall, 
the amount of behaviour performed was relatively low in the present study.
Specifically, what differed in the present study was boys’ and girls’ imitation 
of same-sex models compared to their imitation of opposite-sex models and 
their tendency to perform new, or random, behaviours. When faced with 
adult models, girls imitated same-sex models more than they imitated 
opposite-sex models, which was, in turn, more than their performance of new 
behaviours. Boys also imitated same-sex models the most, but importantly 
they imitated opposite-sex models and performed new behaviours equally. 
When the behaviours were performed by child models, girls imitated same- 
sex models more, but imitated opposite-sex models and performed new 
behaviours equally. Boys imitated same-sex models, opposite-sex models 
and performed new behaviours equally.
Clearly children behaved, first and foremost, in response to gender 
categories. As evidenced by the gender constancy questionnaire administered 
subsequent to the modelling and memory tasks, all children were able to 
correctly identify males and females. They then chose to enact the 
behaviours performed by people similar to themselves i.e., members of their 
own sex. With respect to age, however, it could not be argued that the
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children saw themselves as more similar to the other children, and hence 
decided to imitate them to a greater extent. Indeed the current findings 
indicate the reverse. Children imitated the adult models to a much greater 
extent than the child models. In the course of their daily lives, children 
imitate adults constantly, although this occurs in relevant contexts. They 
imitate parents and caregivers, who are teaching and directing them. 
However, children also imitate other children. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
much of the play of preschoolers occurs in unstructured free-play sessions 
with other children. These situations are characterized by turn-taking and the 
development of play themes and rules. As distinct from the parallel play of 
younger children, preschoolers’ social interactions are quite sophisticated. 
These complex exchanges rely on a mutual understanding between the 
children of the (often newly-created) game, or of the roles they are enacting. 
In effect, children have considerable experience at imitating other children.
What makes the current findings particularly remarkable is that the 
behaviours performed could best be described as behaviours more typically 
performed by children. Selecting toy hats, marching around and playing with 
stuffed toys could not be described as “adult behaviour”. If indeed children 
are exposed to adults behaving like this, as in the preschool setting, they are 
equally exposed to children behaving the same way. Thus in no way could it 
be claimed that it was more appropriate to imitate the adults than the 
children. Not only did children imitate adults more than children, they 
imitated same-sex adults more.
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Mediating these effects was the age of the participant and their level of 
gender constancy. In particular, same-sex modelling was stronger for older 
participants and for those with a higher level of gender constancy. Younger 
participants, and those at lower levels of gender constancy, did not 
demonstrate the same differentiation between same- and opposite-sex 
modelling and performing new behaviours. That the effects of gender 
constancy do not differ from those of age are noteworthy for two reasons.
First, it demonstrates that gender constancy per se is not an essential 
prerequisite for same-sex modelling to occur. Consistent with Bussey and 
Bandura (1984), gender constancy did not predict modelling over and above 
that of age. Although level of gender constancy, and age, was associated with 
higher levels of modelling overall, neither had any effect on gender- 
differential modelling. Rather than a measure of gender constancy predicting 
same-sex imitation, selectively attending to/ imitating same-sex models 
“requires cognitive skills in categorization and judgement of similarity of self 
to others” (Bussey and Bandura, 1984, p.1296).
This second point suggests that it is an awareness of categories, not gender 
constancy or age (for example), that predicts category-related behaviour. The 
ability to identify oneself as part of a category, or to self-stereotype as a 
category member, predicts behaviour consistent with other category 
members (e.g., work by Tajfel and Turner, detailed in Chapter 6). Older 
children may not only be better able to perform these categorical judgements, 
they may simply be more practiced at the tasks.
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In addition to examining children’s actual behaviour, an important 
component of the present study was determining if children were paying 
equal, or differential, attention to models. This was measured by asking 
children what behaviours were performed by the male and the female 
models.
The fact that no sex differences were found indicates that children were 
paying equal attention to male and female models. Their correct recall of 
both males and females was equivalent whether the models were adults or 
children. Thus children paid equal attention to both sexes, as evidenced by 
their recall scores, yet chose to enact mainly behaviours performed by 
members of their own sex. This suggests that children were not differentially 
processing gender-related information. This finding presents problems for 
both a cognitive-developmental theory of gender development, and gender- 
schema theory.
Cognitive-developmental approaches assume that children are motivated by 
the very things that produce rewards. Since children are rewarded for gender- 
appropriate behaviour, they should be motivated to seek out gender-related 
information -  and hence should pay greater attention to same- than opposite- 
sex models.
Similarly, gender-schema theory assumes a child’s gendered sense of self 
(their gender schema) itself will motivate the learning of gender-related
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information. Highly gender-schematic children will be more likely to 
remember gender-related information and hence greater memory for same- 
sex models would have been displayed. Children’s equal recall of both sex 
models fails to support either of these approaches.
The age of the models, however, did have an impact on children’s recall. 
Their correct recall of the actions of men and women was much greater than 
their correct recall of those actions performed by boys and girls. This 
suggests that either (i) children recognize adults as more appropriate 
conveyors of sex role information than other children, or (ii) they paid more 
attention to whatever adults were doing because adults are more likely than 
children to display a positive evaluative response to “correct” copying of 
their behaviour. Either way, the results suggest that children did not simply 
show a preference for behaving like other children because they saw other 
children as similar to themselves, as suggested by Harris (1995, 1998). 
Similarity and its role in identification is more complex than this. If children 
were acting in accordance with their similarity to others, and it is argued they 
were, then that similarity was in terms of gender categories, rather than age 
categories.
Since the only way children could be classified with adults in this instance is 
in terms of gender, the very fact that they paid greater attention to, and later 
imitated, adults suggests that same-sex adults are perceived as highly 
appropriate conveyors of ingroup norms with respect to gender categories. 
However, since no condition in the present study required children to choose
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between adults and children directly, interpretations in this vein must be 
limited. This will be addressed in Studies 2 and 3.
Finally the level of gender-stereotypicality to which children were exposed in 
the home had no effect on either modelling behaviour or on children’s 
memory for those behaviours. By and large, both modelling and memory 
results for children for whom parent data was available mirrored the previous 
results involving all children in the present study.
Results of parental reports alone indicated that the households of boys and 
girls did not differ in terms of their gender stereotypicality. Although 
households varied along these lines, this was not a function of whether the 
children were boys or girls.
Comparisons between mothers and fathers showed that mothers performed a 
much greater amount of stereotypically female tasks than typically male 
tasks, and fathers performed more typically masculine than feminine tasks. In 
addition, mothers held a greater share of responsibilities for childcare tasks 
than fathers, with the possibility of an even greater responsibility for these 
tasks with daughters than with sons. This finding is consistent with Bianchi 
et al., (2000) and Coltrane (2000) as well as earlier research (e.g., Rapoport, 
Rapoport & Strelitz, 1977).
In summary, both boys and girls displayed equally strong preferences for 
imitating same-sex models, with an increased amount of imitation when the
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models were adults than when the models were children. Girls were more 
likely to imitate men than perform an unseen behaviour, but were equally 
likely to perform a new behaviour as to imitate boys. Boys were no more 
likely to imitate women or girls than to perform a new behaviour. Indeed 
boys only displayed same-sex imitation with men, not with boys.
As suggested by Bussey and Bandura (1984), this can be interpreted as a 
recognition of power and status by boys. Under no circumstances did boys 
imitate females (either women or girls), despite paying equal attention to 
men and women, and to boys and girls (as indicated by their recall scores). 
Where girls showed a willingness to imitate men, boys were not willing to 
imitate women. This issue will be elaborated in Studies 5 and 6. The issue
the age of model, however, will be investigated further in Study 2.
Chapter 8
Study 2
In Study 1, boys and girls differed in their modelling of adult and child 
models: children showed a strong preference for imitating same-sex models, 
and this preference was greater when the models were adults than when the 
models were children. Indeed boys showed no preference for same-sex 
modelling at all with child models. However, in all cases, despite the 
behaviour they chose to imitate, both boys and girls demonstrated equal 
memory for behaviours performed by the models, whether the models were 
male or female, or adults or children. This suggests that when a preference 
for modelling one sex is apparent, it is the result of choice at the behavioural 
level, rather than of children being differentially aware of, or knowledgeable 
about, same-sex behaviour.
Although Study 1 provided no evidence for Harris’ (1995, 1998) claims of 
the superiority of peer influence (i.e., that children should be influenced by 
other children rather than adults based on their similarity to, and hence their 
preference for, other children), a criticism of the first study was the inclusion 
of age of model only as a between-group variable: participants were not 
given the choice to model adults or children.
The first aim of the present experiment, therefore, was to directly compare 
children’s modelling of, and attention paid to, adults and other children. In 
order to make this age of model comparison explicit, it was decided to
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remove gender from the design. Thus child participants were shown videos 
of adult and child models, only of their own sex.
An additional reason for eliminating the variable of sex in this study is that 
the amount of overall modelling in Study 1 was relatively low, compared to 
the number of actions the participants were shown and hence given the 
opportunity to imitate. Presumably, this was due to the difficulty of the task: 
child participants viewed the entire behaviour sequences and were then asked 
to perform the actions they saw without any prompts from the experimenter. 
Although this appeared to be the procedure used by Bussey and Bandura 
(1984), subsequent communication with the first author revealed that they 
had used a more age-appropriate version of the task where the video was 
shown in segments, after each of which children were invited to “play the 
game”. Hence it was decided to simplify both the design and the modelling 
task for this study.
In Study 1 participants also demonstrated equal memory for behaviours, 
regardless of the sex of the person performing the behaviours. However, they 
recalled the behaviours of adult models better than those of child models: 
children were able to recall the behaviours of the men and women, boys and 
girls equally, though not of the adults and children. This measure of 
memory/attention is important since it allows us to distinguish between 
whether children actively seek out gender-related information in the first 
place, or whether they attend to all available information equally, and then 
choose one set of behaviours in preference to another. The results of Study 1
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suggest that boys and girls do pay attention to the actions of both males and 
females, but that they see the behaviour of the same-sex model as most 
appropriate to enact. Given the importance of this variable, the same memory 
measure as used in the first study was included in the present study.
Finally, it is possible that the differences in boys’ and girls’ imitation (or, 
more specifically, who they did not imitate) is linked to gender differences in 
the perceptions of status of males and females. This point was brought out in 
Bussey and Bandura’s (1984) second study which contained a “power” 
condition in which they manipulated whether the male or female models had 
power over resources in a video shown before the “game”.
The propensity of both boys and girls to model same-sex behaviour was 
attenuated by a display of power from the opposite-sex team, but this was 
only significant for boys (whose same-sex modelling was significantly 
greater than girls’ in the control condition). It is suggested that girls’ less 
dramatic adoption of same-sex models in the control condition may be a 
result of their having no prohibition against doing “boy things”, in contrast to 
boys’ socialization to avoid all taint of feminine behaviour. Girls’ failure to 
be as strongly moved as boys by displays of opposite-sex behaviour was 
suggested to be a product of their acceptance of the stereotype of power 
being appropriate for males. Social identity theory would emphasize that the 
stereotype of male power is a reflection of social reality. A 1991 United 
Nations publication reported that “women constitute half the world’s 
population, perform nearly two-thirds of its work hours, receive one-tenth of
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the world’s income, and own less than one-hundredth of the world’s property 
(1991, p.3). Even young children have an awareness of this disparity (e.g., 
Serbin, Powlishta & Gulko, 1994).
Similarly, it is possible that the greater imitation of adults than of children in 
Study 1 of this thesis reflected the children’s awareness of status differences 
with respect to age. That is, adults hold more power, and are of higher status, 
than children. Perhaps children’s greater imitation of them reflected an 
awareness of this power and authority.
Status can therefore be used to indicate appropriate behaviour, or whose 
behaviour one should adopt. Under certain circumstances it may be 
appropriate to imitate the higher status person (or group). A new worker will 
do what the experienced workers do in order to perform their job effectively. 
Alternatively, a member of a low status group may simply “do as s/he is 
told” by a member of the higher status group.
Either of these options is independent of a person’s satisfaction with low 
status group membership: it may simply be the sensible thing to do. Children 
are frequently required to follow adult instructions. However, does this make 
children want to be like adults?
The final aim of the present study, therefore, seeks to explore the issue of 
gender differences in the adoption of adult, compared to child, modelled 
behaviour. The introduction of a measure of children’s liking for (or
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satisfaction with) their category membership is an attempt to determine 
whether children’s imitation of adults is an expression of their desire to be 
like them, or recognition of the status (or power) of adults over children.
Method
Participants
Participants in this study were 17 boys and 17 girls attending a university- 
based childcare centre in Canberra. Their ages ranged from 41 months to 64 
months, with a mean age of 54.21 months (s.d. = 7.07).
Design
The design of this study was similar to Study 1. Participants (boys and girls) 
watched one of two videos (in which the behaviour sequences were 
counterbalanced) where the adult and child models were the same sex as 
themselves. The models in the videos were those from the previous study.
Procedure
As with Study 1, participants were tested individually. The experimental 
room was set up in a manner identical to that in the first study. That is, there 
were two small chairs where the experimenter and the child participant could 
view a television screen. There was also a table at the side on which two 
coloured Mickey Mouse hats had been placed. At the front of the room there 
was another table with a box with a koala on top. There was also a sheet of 
black cardboard on a side wall.
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Because of the plan to conduct a larger study (Study 3) involving four 
behavioural sequences (with two age groups and two sexes of models), two 
new behaviour scripts were introduced in this study. Again two versions of 
the video were used, with behaviours counterbalanced across the adult and 
child models. It should be remembered that in the current study each video 
consisted only of males or only of females, such that boy participants viewed 
boys and men, and girl participants viewed girls and women.
In the video all the adults and children were seated in a row. One by one 
(adult followed by child followed by adult etc.), each actor performed the 
following behaviours. In the first version, all the adult models chose a green 
Mickey Mouse cap and placed it on their head with the Mickey Mouse 
symbol toward the back. They then said, “ready now”, and marched toward 
the table with a large wooden box with a koala on top. They made the koala 
hop along the table saying, “Hop, hop”, opened the box, took out a sticker 
and said, “Surprise”. They turned and put the sticker on the right side of a 
sheet of cardboard saying, “On the right”, then returned to the table, lay the 
koala on top of the box and said, “Lie down”. They took off their caps 
saying, “Finish with thinking caps”, placed the cap in front of the box and 
said, “In front”. They then walked back to their chair, sat down and said, “All 
done”.
The child models in this version all chose a white Mickey Mouse cap which 
they wore with the Mickey Mouse symbol toward the front. They said, “Left 
right, left right,” and marched toward the box. They made the koala slide
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along the table saying, “Slide, slide”, opened the box and took out a sticker 
saying, “Wow”. They placed their sticker on the left side of the cardboard 
saying, “On the left”, returned to the table and sat the koala in front of the 
box saying, “Sit there”. They took off their caps saying, “Thinking caps 
away” and placed them behind the box saying, “At the back”. They then 
returned to their seats saying, “The end”. In both sequences, a total of 
fourteen separate behaviours were enacted.
After watching the video, children were again given the opportunity to model 
the behaviours they had seen in the video. Due to the difficulty of the 
spontaneous modelling task in Study 1 (as evidenced by the low rate of 
actual behaviours performed), the task was modified in this study. An edited 
version of the video was used, showing the first five actions of one adult and 
one child model. The sequence of fourteen behaviours was divided into five 
segments, with a break in the video to allow the participant to perform the 
preceding five actions. Because the sticker placement in this video was on 
the left or the right, all children were asked if they knew which side was left 
and which was right. If they were unsure, the experimenter pointed to the left 
and the right side of the large sheet of paper immediately prior to the children 
placing their sticker there. Behaviours were again recorded on a checklist by 
the experimenter.
Following this, the same memory task used in the previous study was 
administered. This task consisted of a series of twenty-eight individual 
questions about what the adult or child actors did. For example, “What did
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the lady(girl)/ man(boy) make the koala do when they took it off the box?” 
The order of these questions (adult -  child/ child - adult) was also 
counterbalanced.
Finally, the experimenter showed each participant a five-point scale 
consisting of faces with expressions ranging from happy to sad. The 
experimenter then explained how each face represented how you might feel 
about something, i.e., “very sad”, “a little bit sad”, “neither sad, nor happy, 
just OK”, “a little bit happy”, and “very happy”. Participants were then asked 
to point to the face on the scale that best described (i) how they felt about 
being a child, and (ii) how much they would like to be a grown-up. These 
were recorded on separate sheets.
At the end of each session, children were thanked for their participation, 
allowed to choose a sticker to take home, and returned to the group play area.
Modelled Behaviour
Results
Modelled behaviours were recorded on a checklist, as in the previous study. 
Although the video sequence contained fourteen separate behaviours 
performed by each set of models, this number was reduced to twelve for 
coding purposes. Firstly, since the experimenter always clarified the sticker 
placement (as on the left or on the right) with each participant, the verbal 
statement “On the left” or “On the right” became redundant. Secondly, no 
participant said either “Finish with thinking caps” or “Thinking caps away”,
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so this behaviour was also omitted. Hence the remaining twelve behaviours 
were coded into one of four categories (1 = adult behaviour; 2 = child 
behaviour; 3 = new behaviour; and 4 = no behaviour performed).
The data was recoded for order of behaviour sequence, and the total number 
of behaviours in each of the four categories was summed. Due to the change 
in procedure from Study 1, the number of category 4 responses (i.e., where 
no behaviour was performed) was much lower (20% of all modelling 
responses). Because of this, and consistent with the previous modelling 
study, this category was omitted from analyses. Thus a 3 (modelled 
behaviour: child, adult, new) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) mixed model 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on modelled behaviour, was performed.
A highly significant main effect was found for modelled behaviour, F(l,32)
= 90.990, p < 0.001. Multiple comparisons, using Bonferroni adjustment of a 
= 0.05, indicated that children (both boys and girls) modelled other children 
(M = 5.50) significantly more than they modelled adults (M = 3.382), t(33) = 
3.021, p = 0.015. This, in turn, was significantly greater than their 
performance of new behaviours (M = 0.706), t(33) = 4.857, p < 0.001. 
Presumably due to the change in procedure for the modelling task, children’s 
performance of a new behaviour was extremely low in this study (M =
0.706).
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Children Adults Random
Age of Models
Figure 8.1: Number of Modeled Behaviours by 
Boys and Girls
Importantly, no sex differences were found. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the 
pattern of modelling by boys and girls was statistically identical.
Age of Participants
As with Study 1, a median split was used to divide older from younger 
participants. The median age was 54 months. A 3 (modelled behaviours: 
children, adults, new) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (age of 
participant: older, younger) mixed model ANOVA was conducted.
The strong main effect for modelled behaviours remained, F(l,30) = 87.575, 
p < 0.001. In addition, there was a main effect for age of participant, F(l,30)
= 4.864, p = 0.035. This difference was accounted for by imitation of child 
models: Older children (M = 6.167) imitated child models more than younger 
children (M = 4.840), though this difference did not reach statistical 
significance, t(32) = 1.853, p = 0.073. With adult models, however, there was
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no difference between older (M = 3.125) and younger (M = 3.62) 
participants, t(32) = 0.651, p = 0.519.
Memory for Modelled Behaviour
Questions about child behaviours and about adult behaviours were each 
classified into four categories: correct, incorrect by substituting the opposite 
behaviour, new response, and don’t know. Again the responses were recoded 
to take account of the sex of participant and the order of video presentation.
The responses were then summed to give scores for the following: (i) correct 
recall of child models, (ii) correct recall of adult models, (iii) incorrect recall 
of child models by misattributing adult behaviour, (iv) incorrect recall of 
adult models by misattributing child behaviour, (v) incorrect recall of child 
behaviour by substituting an unseen response, (vi) incorrect recall of adult 
behaviour by substituting an unseen response. Consistent with previous 
analyses, “don’t know” responses were again omitted from analyses. The 
data were then subjected to a 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 6 (memory for 
models: child models correct, adult models correct, child models incorrect by 
adult behaviour, adult models incorrect by child behaviour, child models 
incorrect by other, adult models incorrect by other) mixed model ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on memory for models.
A highly significant main effect for memory, F(l,32) = 170.349, p < 0.001, 
merely revealed that participants’ (both boys’ and girls’) correct recall of 
behaviours was significantly greater than their incorrect recall by substituting
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the opposite models’ behaviour, which was again significantly greater than 
their incorrect recall by providing a new response. (Again all comparisons 
were conducted using a Bonferroni adjustment.) Although no sex differences 
were found on any of these recall measures, boys’ and girls’ responses are 
depicted separately in Figure 8.2 given the importance of sex of participant 
to the hypotheses of the study.
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Figure 8.2: Memory for Models by Boys and Girls
Girls and boys correctly recalled both child (M = 5.177) and adult models’ 
behaviour (M = 5.088) equally well, t(33) = 0.177, p = 1.00. Their tendency 
to incorrectly misattribute the other models’ behaviour was equally likely 
when asked about child (M = 2.353) and adult (M = 2.382) models, t(33) = 
0.061, p = 1.00. Further, both boys and girls were equally likely to give a 
new response to questions about child (M = 0.647) or adult (M = 0.529) 
models, t(33) = 0.624, p = 1.00. It is worth noting, however, that the number 
of responses of this latter type was extremely low, indicating that children’s 
responses consisted primarily of seen behaviours.
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Age of participant was also investigated in a 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 
6 (memory for models: child models correct; adult models correct; child 
models incorrect by adult behaviours; adult models incorrect by child 
behaviours; child models incorrect by other; adult models incorrect by other) 
x 2 (age of participant: older, younger) mixed model ANOVA. No effect for 
age of participant was found. Only the main effect for memory was 
replicated, F(l,30) = 169.302, p < 0.001. In sum, age of model had no effect 
of participants’ recall of their behaviour.
Liking Measures
Participants were also asked to rate how much they liked being a child and 
how much they looked forward to being a grown-up. Scores ranged from 1 to 
5, with high scores indicating a high degree of liking and low scores 
indicating less liking.
A 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (liking: child, adult) mixed model 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on liking, revealed significant main effects 
for liking, F(l,31) = 4.097, p = 0.052, and for sex, F(l,31) = 6.983, p =
0.013. Children reported liking being a child (M = 4.636) significantly more 
than they looked forward to being an adult (M = 4.00). It should be noted, 
however, that both of these scores are quite high, indicating that children 
both like being children and look forward to being adults.
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The main effect for sex indicated that boys reported higher liking levels 
overall (M = 4.588) than girls (M = 4.031). Although these scores are again 
quite high, this sex difference is intriguing.
Discussion
In this study, both boys and girls demonstrated a clear preference for 
imitating same-sex child models over same-sex adult models. Children were 
much more likely to imitate other children of the same sex than they were to 
imitate adults of the same sex, and this was more likely than their tendency 
to perform an unseen behaviour. This finding was unaffected by the sex of 
the participant: both girls and boys performed equal amounts of modelling.
The age of the participant was found to have an effect, but only in the sense 
that older children performed more behaviours than did younger children. 
This is not surprising as older children are both more able to, and more 
practiced at, performing actions exhibited by other people.
Despite the strong preference for age-related imitation shown in the 
modelling task, memory for adult and child models was equivalent. Both 
girls and boys equally correctly recalled the behaviours performed by all 
models. This was much greater than their tendency to misattribute 
behaviours to either the adult or child models, which, in turn, was greater 
than their tendency to provide new responses. As was the case with gender 
categories in Study 1, children paid equal attention to models in both 
categories, yet they chose to behave in accordance with the category most
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relevant to themselves. In this study that category was age, and children 
modelled the behaviours of other children.
In contrast to Study 1, the results of the present study lend support to Harris’ 
(1995) assertions. In a more explicit test of her claims, and removing gender 
as a possible confound, child participants did imitate children more than they 
imitated adults. However, the fact that at times they imitated children more 
(the present study), and at times they imitated adults more (Study 1), 
supports the idea of flexible, or variable, self-categorization processes 
(discussed in Chapter 6) at work in these young pre-school children. The 
removal of gender from the design of the present study changed the context 
from that of the first study. In the first study, the only available 
categorization was sex. Children overwhelmingly chose to imitate people 
(both adults and children) of the same sex as themselves. They also happened 
to imitate adults more than children, but this was secondary to their imitation, 
and their self-categorization according to sex.
However, in the present study, when age was the only cue to behaviour, 
children imitated same-age people. Yet the be tween-groups comparison in 
the first study showed that when both sex and age were available as 
categories to make salient, child participants did, in fact, follow adults more. 
Although they demonstrated a clear preference for same-sex modelling, this 
modelling was greater for same-sex adults than for same-sex children. 
Specifically, when children saw either adults or children, those seeing adults 
copied more of the models’ behaviours than those children who saw child
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models. However, in the present study where children saw both adult and 
child models, they chose to copy more of the child models’ behaviours.
Perhaps when they saw only adults, they thought it was important to copy 
them. Indeed children frequently have to do what adults say and do -  
especially at kindergarten. Importantly, however, they did not always imitate 
adults more -  as was the case in the present study.
In the first study, the important categorization was sex. All video 
presentations, and therefore all behaviour choices, were explicitly between 
males and females (either all adults or ail children). In this study, however, 
the intergroup context was different: this time the categorization was 
explicitly one of adults versus children with the sex of the models held 
constant. All behaviour choices in this study were between children and 
adults, since all video presentations involved models of the same sex as the 
participants. When age was the only available category (and therefore the 
choice was between adults and children), the comparative and normative fit 
of that category made it relevant for child participants to self-categorize as 
children, which after all, they were.
Importantly, while it would have been possible to see themselves as males 
and females, this no longer appeared to be the salient identity for them. Had 
it been salient, they would have demonstrated equal modelling of adults and 
children. Rather, the context of the present study made salient children’s 
identity as children.
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Of course the question remains as to what choices children would make 
when more options are made available to them, such as when age and sex 
choices are available simultaneously. This will be addressed in Studies 3 and 
4.
Finally, measures of liking showed that children preferred being a child to 
what they thought it would be like to be an adult. Although no overt 
measures of similarity were recorded, because it was assumed that no child 
thought he or she was an adult, it is suggested that this liking measure 
indicated children’s satisfaction with their child category membership. 
Children simply reported liking being a child.
However an intriguing sex difference emerged on this measure. Boys 
reported higher levels of liking than did girls. Boys reported liking being a 
child (a boy) more than girls reported liking being a child (a girl). 
Furthermore, boys reported looking forward to being an adult (a man) more 
than girls reported looking forward to being an adult (a woman).
These findings are consistent with the idea of children’s awareness of status 
differences (e.g., Serbin, Powlishta & Gulko, 1994). If children (both boys 
and girls) recognize males as being of higher status than females, it is not 
surprising that boys report higher levels of liking their (higher status) 
category than do girls.
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If this is taken as a measure of satisfaction, boys report higher levels of 
overall satisfaction/ happiness than girls, suggesting that gender may play a 
role in overall satisfaction levels of both boys and girls. Although this point 
needs further investigation, there is some evidence that boys are happier 
being boys, and may continue to be so when they are men, than girls are 
happy being girls (and this may continue when they are women). The 
tendency for women to outnumber men in the prevalence of unipolar 
depression, for example, is well documented (e.g., Kuehner, 2003; Piccinelli 
& Wilkinson, 2000; Winkler et al., 2004). Hence, level of satisfaction with 
gender category membership as adults will be further addressed in Studies 5 
and 6. At this stage, however, it is tentatively suggested that, even at this 
young age, boys are becoming aware that the world is a better place in which 
to be male than to be female.
172
Chapter 9
Studies 3 and 4
Study 3
Thus far we have seen that children appear to pay uniform attention to all 
information made available to them, but that they actively choose to imitate 
the information provided by one social category over another. In Study 1, 
children watched a video where different behaviours were performed by girls 
and boys, or by women and men. Although both girls and boys were able to 
recall the behaviours of both females and males, girls chose to perform the 
behaviours shown by females, while boys chose to perform the behaviours 
demonstrated by males. An additional, and somewhat unexpected, finding 
was that both girls’ and boys’ imitation of same-sex adults was greater than 
their imitation of same-sex children.
In Study 2, when gender was not an available category and age was the only 
dimension on which models differed, children showed a strong preference 
for imitating the behaviours of child models rather than those of adults. In 
that study, the children were again able to recall the information provided by 
both groups equally well.
It was then suggested that these changes in children’s imitative behaviour 
consistent with the relevant categorizations in each of the studies was 
indicative of self-categorical processes operating in these young children. 
When sex was the most salient category (Study 1), children arguably self-
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categorized according to their sex category membership. Their choice of 
behaviours mirrored this: girls imitated females and boys imitated males. 
When age was the salient category (Study 2), the children presumably self- 
categorized along age lines, and consequently imitated the other children.
One of the unanswered questions from Study 1, however, arose from the 
design of that study. It will be remembered that children were always shown 
male and female models, but that these models were either children or adults. 
Hence the question remains as to who children would choose to imitate if 
both age and gender categories were made available at the same time.
Moreover, we wished to determine whether children would still pay attention 
to all the available categories, or whether they would begin to narrow their 
attention as a result of the increased information presented. Given that 
preschool children are generally unable to make use of attentional strategies 
for either the storage or retrieval of information (refer to Chapter 5), it is 
unlikely that they will be able to remember all the information presented and 
hence would be more likely to focus on a limited array of behaviours. This 
prediction, however, is highly speculative as this study remains largely 
exploratory.
In an attempt to answer the questions raised, the present study was designed 
to have both age and sex categories as within-subject variables in the same 
study. Hence child participants would view boys, girls, men and women all 
exhibiting a different sequence of behaviours. Thus it would be possible to
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directly compare, rather than simply infer, how children use age and gender 
information when presented with both types simultaneously, and to 
determine if one takes precedence over the other.
It was hypothesized that a combination of both age and gender categories 
would produce the highest levels of imitation. This is consistent with a 
“crossed categorization” paradigm whereby two social categorizations are 
made simultaneously salient (see Crisp & Hewstone, 1999). In this situation, 
people can be seen as sharing more than one common category, and the more 
shared category memberships, the more similar people should perceive each 
other to be. As has been discussed previously, however, (refer to Chapter 6) 
the perception of similarity, and difference, is not sufficient to motivate 
imitation; nor is the mere existence of rewards, and punishments (see 
Chapters 2 and 4). Motivation for imitation, it has been suggested, involves a 
shared psychology of group memberships. In Studies 1 and 2, we inferred, 
and results were consistent with the idea, that the perception of shared age or 
gender categories was sufficient to produce imitation consistent with these 
shared category memberships. Thus it is hypothesized that, in the present 
study, boys should imitate boys (same age and same gender) the most, and 
girls should imitate girls (same age and same gender) the most. Similarly, 
boys should imitate women (opposite age and opposite gender) the least, and 
girls should imitate men (opposite age and opposite gender) the least.
Results of the previous studies would also suggest that children should 
demonstrate equal recall for all behaviours presented. However, given the
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increase in the number of options presented, it is possible that children will 
narrow their attention and that their focus will be determined according to the 
degree of fit between the categories presented and the children’s membership 
of those categories. That is, boys may demonstrate greater memory for the 
boys’ behaviour, and girls may demonstrate greater memory for the girls’ 
behaviour, due to the greater levels of fit between the children and these 
categories. This, too, is consistent with a crossed categorization approach. 
Crisp & Farr (2004), for example, found an increase in recall of positive 
information, and decreased recall of negative information, when participants 
shared an additional categorization. Thus the present study will examine the 
importance of age and gender categories for children, and attempt to 
determine if this differs for boys and girls.
Study 2 also found that both girls and boys reported high levels of happiness/ 
satisfaction with being a child and this level of happiness was higher for boys 
than for girls. Consequently, the present study will further explore this issue 
by utilizing both age and gender categories in measures of liking. In line with 
the reasoning for imitation presented above, it is anticipated that children 
should report highest levels of liking when the combination of age and 
gender categories is most similar to themselves. Thus, consistent with a 
social identity approach in which people are motivated to evaluate members 
of their own group positively, boys should report liking boys most, and girls 
should like girls most. With crossed categorizations, these evaluations should 
be intensified. For example, Crisp, Hewstone & Rubin (2001) found greater 
discrimination of double outgroups, compared to single, or partial,
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outgroups, as well as greater demonstration of ingroup bias toward double 
ingroups. Hence children should like members of their own groups, but with 
multiple category availability (including sex), this should differ for boys and 
girls.
Finally, a person may like something or someone, but actually want to be 
something or someone else. Again deriving hypotheses based on social 
identity theory, members of low status groups may express liking for their 
ingroup but want to engage in social mobility (as discussed in Chapter 6) in 
order to view themselves most positively. With respect to age and gender 
categories, it is possible that the expressed desire to be part of the outgroup 
may reflect the status differences between males and females, and between 
adults and children. Although the previous study does not support the idea, it 
is theoretically consistent that children may actually want to be adults, and 
females may actually want to be males, even though they may realize that 
this is not actually possible. The present study will therefore examine 
children’s desire to join the age and gender outgroups.
Method
Participants
Participants were 19 girls and 20 boys from four childcare centres in 
Melbourne. The mean age of participants was 55.36 months (53.26 for girls 
and 57.35 for boys) with a standard deviation of 6.27 months. Ages ranged 
from 44 to 73 months.
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Design
This study was a 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 2 (sex of model: male, 
female) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) mixed model design. In the present 
study age of model was a within-participant factor, whereas it was a 
between-participant factor in Study 1. The models and the behavioural 
sequences were the same as those in the previous studies. All children were 
shown the same video.
Procedure
Children were again tested individually in a separate area of each childcare 
centre. All children were shown the same video consisting of all four 
behaviour sequences that had been used in Studies 1 and 2. That is, the men 
performed the sequence of behaviours wearing the red hat, the women 
performed the sequence of behaviours wearing the green hat, the boys wore 
the black hat, and the girls wore the white hat. The order of presentation in 
the video was a woman followed by a man, followed by a boy, followed by a 
girl, followed by a woman etc. Due to filming and editing demands, there 
was only one version of the video in this study.
As with the previous studies, children were then asked to “play the game”, 
during which the experimenter recorded all behaviours performed. Given the 
increased level of modelling displayed in Study 2, compared to Study 1, 
together with the increased number of possibilities presented in the present 
study, the modified modelling task introduced in Study 2 was used. That is,
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after a complete viewing of the video with all four categories and 
behavioural sequences, the children were shown a segment of the video 
where one man, one woman, one boy and one girl actor performed only one 
or two of the actions. They were then given the opportunity to perform those 
behaviours, before viewing another edited section and being given the 
opportunity to perform the behaviours from that section. In all, the video 
sequence was divided into five segments.
In addition, if the child’s actions were unclear, the experimenter specifically 
asked the child about them. For example, “Are you wearing the Mickey 
Mouse picture to the front or the back?” Actions were recorded on a 
checklist of behaviours, as with Studies 1 and 2.
Due to the sheer size of the task, a modified version of the memory task was 
also used. Rather than allowing for free recall, as had been the case in the 
previous studies, children were given a forced choice format. Use of the 
original format would have meant that the children needed to recall, 
unprompted, the actions of the men, women, boys and girls from a choice of 
four possible behaviours in each instance. Pilot testing with the four options 
showed that this task was too difficult for this age group. As a compromise, 
two options were always given to each child. This included the correct 
response and a randomly selected incorrect response e.g., “When the girls put 
their stickers on the cardboard, did they put them on the left or at the top?”
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The specific nature of the questions also meant that a reduced number was 
asked. This avoided having two responses referring to what was essentially 
the same behaviour. For example, instead of asking children whether the 
models made the koala hop or slide along the table, and then whether the 
models said, “Hop hop,” or “Slide, slide”, this behaviour was counted as one 
single item. Hence a total of 32 memory questions was asked of the 
participants, eight pertaining to each of the models. Again the order of 
presentation of these was counterbalanced across participants.
Following from Study 2, a measure of liking was also recorded. After the 
modelling and memory tasks were completed, children were shown four 
pictures, consisting of one man, one woman, one girl, and one boy from the 
video. They were then asked, “Which one of these do you like best?” The 
picture of the one they selected was then taken away, and the question 
repeated until all four pictures had been selected in order from most to least 
liked.
Following this, all four pictures were again placed in front of the child, and 
s/he was asked, “If you could be any of these, which would you be?” Only 
one response was allowed for this question.
Children were then thanked for their participation, allowed to choose a 
sticker to take home, and returned to the group play area.
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Results
Modelled Behaviour
A checklist was again used to record the modelled behaviours. Unlike the 
previous modelling studies, all possible behaviour sequences appeared in one 
video presentation in this study. Hence the eight behaviours were coded into 
one of six categories: 1 = men’s behaviour, 2 = women’s behaviour, 3 = 
boys’ behaviour, 4 = girls’ behaviour, 5 = new behaviour, and 6 = no 
behaviour performed. As recoding for order of video presentation was not 
necessary, the behaviours were simply summed and subjected to a 5 
(modelled behaviour: men, women, boys, girls, new) x 2 (sex of participant: 
boy, girl) mixed model ANOVA.
No significant effects emerged on any of these measures. Importantly, the 
means for all behaviours were extremely low (Ms = 1.207, 1.250, 1.387, 
2.191, 0.746 for men, women, boys, girls and new behaviour respectively). It 
should be noted, however, that the greatest imitation (though not statistically 
significant) was of girl models by both boys and girls. Investigation of the 
data also revealed an anomaly with the final response. Of the 29 participants 
who provided a response, 24 of these said, “The end”, which was the final 
saying of the girl models who were the last to perform in the video. This is 
consistent with the idea of a recency effect in children’s choice of 
behaviours: children simply repeated the last thing they saw.
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Memory for Modelled Behaviour
With the increased number of behavioural options available to children, the 
memory data in this study were first coded simply as either correct or 
incorrect for each of the four sets of models (i.e., men, women, boys, girls). 
The data were thus analysed via a 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 
(memory: correct, incorrect) x 2 (sex of model: male, female) x 2 (age of 
model: adult, child) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
memory, sex of model and age of model.
In addition to the highly significant main effect for memory (F(l,37) = 
20.737, p < 0.001) and the sex of models by memory interaction (F(l,37) = 
22.857, p < 0.001), two three-way interactions were found. These were the 
sex of models x memory x sex of participant (F(l,37) = 4.367, p = 0.044) and 
the age of models x sex of models x memory (F(l,37) = 13.278, p = 0.001).
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the sex of models by memory x sex of participant 
three-way interaction.
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Figure 9.1: Correct Memory For Models
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Figure 9.2: Incorrect Memory for Models
Boys correctly recalled the behaviour of the male models (M = 4.15) better 
than girls did (M = 3.605), and this pattern was reversed for female models: 
girls correctly recalled the behaviour of female models (M = 5.316) better 
than the boys did (M = 4.90). Similarly, boys’ incorrect recall of female 
behaviour (M = 2.875) was higher than that of the girls (M = 2.316), while 
girls’ incorrect recall of male behaviour (M = 4.053) was higher than that of
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boys (M = 3.475). Interestingly, both boys and girls correctly recalled more 
behaviours of the female models than of the male models. Similarly, they 
recalled fewer behaviours of the female models incorrectly than of the male 
models.
The age of models x sex of models x memory three-way interaction is 
depicted in Figures 9.3 and 9.4.
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Figure 9.3: Memory for Male Models
As shown in Figure 9.3, children correctly recalled the behaviours performed 
by the adult male models (men; M = 4.454) better than they correctly 
recalled the behaviours of the child male models (boys; M = 3.301). This 
pattern was reversed for incorrect recall of behaviours. Children provided 
more incorrect responses about child male models (boys; M = 4.445) than 
they did for adult male models (men; M = 3.083).
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Figure 9.4: Memory for Female Models
For female models however (see Figure 9.4), children’s correct recall of both 
adult (women; M = 4.847) and child (girl; M = 5.368) models was much 
higher than their incorrect recall of either of these (Ms = 2.764 and 2.426, 
women and girls respectively).
Overall, children correctly recalled the behaviours performed by the girls (M 
= 5.359), followed by the women (M = 4.846), followed by the men (M = 
4.462), followed by the boys (M = 3.308). Children’s incorrect recall was 
greatest for the boys (M = 4.436), followed by the men (M = 3.077), 
followed by the women (M = 2.769), followed by the girls (M = 2.436). In 
other words, all children correctly recalled the behaviours performed by the 
girl models best, and tended to incorrectly recall the girl models’ behaviours 
the least. This, too, is consistent with the idea of a recency effect in memory 
since girls were the last models to be seen on the video.
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Liking Measures
Participants’ responses indicated who they liked best (of men, women, boys 
and girls) and who they liked least. This data were then coded by category in 
order to conduct a 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) x 2 (age of target picture: 
adult, child) x 2 (sex of target picture: male, female) mixed model ANOVA 
with repeated measures on age of target picture and sex of target picture.4
There was a main effect for age of target, F(l,37) = 9.758, p = 0.003 along 
with a sex of participant x age of target interaction, F(l,37) = 4.337, p = 
0.044 and a sex of participant x sex of target interaction, F(l,37) = 25.53, p < 
0.001. These interactions can be seen in Figures 9.5 and 9.6. It should be 
noted that a lower score here represents greater liking for a target since a 
rating of 1 was given to the most preferred target while a rating of 4 was the 
least preferred.
4 We recognize that there are some violations of assumptions for ANOVA. Alternative 
analyses were conducted yielding similar results, e.g., Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test which 
tested the pairs of rank orders for boys and girls. A chi-square analysis of expected rank 
orders was not conducted since the number of rank orders that emerged was too large 
compared to the total number of participants.
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Figure 9.5: Children s Liking of Models as a 
Function of Age of Target Model
As shown in Figure 9.5, girl participants showed a greater preference for 
child targets (M = 2.00) than adult targets (M = 3.00), t(18) = 7.246, p < 
0.001. Boy participants did not differ in their preferences according to age of 
target (Ms = 2.60 and 2.40, adults and children respectively).
Figure 9.6, however, shows how both boys’ and girls’ preferences were 
influenced by the sex of the target. Boys preferred male targets (M = 2.075) 
to female targets (M = 2.925), t(19) = 6.589, p < 0.001, and girls preferred 
female targets (M = 2.026) to male targets (M = 2.974), t(18) = 7.128, p < 
0 .001 .
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Figure 9.6: Children's Liking of Models as a 
Function of Sex of Target Model
Taken together, the liking measures show that boys’ preference ratings were 
influenced only by the sex of the target and not by the age of the target.
Girls’ ratings, on the other hand, were influenced by both the age and the sex 
of the target. This was confirmed by examining the frequencies of who was 
liked best by boys and girls. O f the nineteen girl participants, fifteen reported 
liking girls the most while two liked women the most. Of the twenty boy 
participants, nine liked boys the most and seven liked men the most.
“ Want To Be” (Desire) Measure
Children were simply asked to choose one of the four categories (men, 
women, boys, girls) they would belong to if  they could. This was analysed 
using a Mann-Whitney U test comparing boys’ and girls’ ratings.
There was a significant effect for sex, U = 58.0, Nj = 20, N2 = 19, p < 0.001. 
Boys and girls differed significantly in their preference of who they would be
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if they could choose any category: boys wanted to be boys (n = 14) and girls 
wanted to be girls (n = 16).
Comparison of Liking and Wanting
Girls’ and boys’ ratings for who they liked best and who they wanted to be 
were compared using a Pearson’s chi-square distribution. These were 
marginally significant for both boys -  12.44, df = 6, p = 0.053) and for 
girls (x 2 = 9.381, df = 4, p = 0.052), indicating a relationship between these 
two measures for both boys and girls.
Discussion
The main purpose of the present study was to examine who children would 
imitate, and who they would pay attention to, when presented with age and 
gender categories simultaneously. Unfortunately, the results were 
inconclusive with respect to modelled behaviour. The low numbers of 
behaviours performed, despite the simplified modelling task employed, 
suggests that the complexity of the task was simply too great for children of 
this age i.e., three and four years old, and that when children did perform a 
behaviour, it was more likely to be the last behaviour they observed. Unlike 
Studies 1 and 2 in which only two behavioural sequences were presented 
(hence providing a context in which children could choose one of the two 
behaviours to perform) the present study consisted of four behavioural 
sequences. The difficulty of the task could be a result of either the increased 
number of behavioural options, or the crossed categorization effect of the 
task. In the previous studies, dichotomous categorizations were used: Study 1
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used gender categorizations where models were either male or female; Study 
2 used age categories, such that models were either adults or children. In the 
present study, models were both male and adult (men), male and child 
(boys), female and adult (women) and female and child (girls). It is 
suggested that the complexity of these categorizations made the task 
especially hard for preschool children.
Children fared better on the memory task than the modelling task in the 
present study, although this may have been due to the nature of the memory 
task. Children were given a forced choice format consisting of only two 
options (the correct response and a randomly selected alternative response). 
Results indicated that children’s recall of adult models was superior to that of 
child models, as was their recall of female models compared to that of male 
models. It is also possible that these results may be reflective of a recency 
effect in memory. Children were most likely to correctly recall the 
behaviours of girls (and least likely to incorrectly recall their behaviours) and 
it was the team of girl models who appeared last in the video (remembering 
that in this study only one version of the video, and hence one order of 
models -  women, men, boys, girls -  was shown).
Of course these claims could be verified if there had been more than one 
version of the video, which was not possible here. Overall, however, it 
appears that the task was simply too difficult for children of this age. They 
were unable to pay attention to, recall, and choose between four behavioural 
options, in a context in which no category was more salient than another.
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As such, we are unable to reliably infer either the behavioural choices, or the 
memory, of the child participants when presented with both age and gender 
categories simultaneously. We may therefore need to rely upon inferences 
drawn from the previous studies in this thesis when making inferences about 
age and/or gender preferences. Following in this vein, however, Study 4 will 
continue to explore children’s age and gender preferences by varying 
category salience with a reduced number of options presented to participants.
The second aim of the present study was to further explore the issue of 
liking, which arose in Study 2. Results indicated that sex was an important 
factor in determining both who children liked and who they would prefer to 
be. Boys equally liked boys and men best, and women and girls, equally, 
least. Given the choice of who they would be, if they could be, boys 
overwhelmingly chose to be a boy. No boy chose to be a woman, and only 
one boy chose to be a girl.
Girls, in comparison, overwhelmingly liked girls the most, with no liking for 
men and equal(-ly low) liking for boys and women. Girls, too, 
overwhelmingly chose to be a girl when given the choice to be anyone. No 
girl chose to be a boy while only one chose to be a woman, in contrast to two 
choosing to be men.
In terms of children’s satisfaction with their category membership, therefore, 
both boys and girls not only knew that they were boys or girls (refer to Study
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1), but they were happy being either a girl or a boy. Given the choice 
between being a man, a woman, a boy or a girl, boys clearly wanted to 
remain being boys and girls wanted to remain girls.
Perhaps the most telling results, however, lie in the measures of whom the 
children liked least. Boys’ dislike of girls and women was equivalent, as was 
their lack of desire to be either of these. Age made little difference to the 
boys here: both their liking and their desires were determined along gender 
lines.
For girls, however, both age and gender categories were used to decide who 
they liked, and who they disliked, as well as who they wanted to be and who 
they didn’t want to be. Girls liked other girls and wanted to be girls.
However, while they clearly liked men the least, some did show a desire to 
be a man. Girls’ desire to be anything other than a girl, however, was 
extremely low. They didn’t particularly like, nor did they want to be, a boy, a 
man, or a woman. Age appears to have been as important as gender in 
determining girls’ preferences.
Overall, the results of the present study, whilst inconclusive in themselves, 
nevertheless remain consistent with those of the previous studies. Children 
did delineate between age and gender categories when recalling behaviours. 
Similarly, the results of the liking measures demonstrated boys’ tendency to 
delineate primarily along gender lines whereas girls’choices were more 
likely to involve both age and gender categories.
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The differential use of age and gender categories by boys and girls, along 
with the attention children pay to these categories and the choices they make 
concerning behavioural enactment, is examined more closely in the 
following study.
Study 4
It was suggested that children’s preference for same-sex imitation in Study 1, 
and their preference for same-age imitation in Study 2, reflects children’s 
capacity to self-categorize according to either gender or age. Specifically, 
these self-categorical processes were said to reflect changes in the context in 
which these categories (either gender or age) were presented, and changes in 
the salience of the categories in these contexts.
In Study 1 children were shown male and female models who were either 
adults or children. While child participants demonstrated a strong preference 
for same-sex imitation in both conditions, this same-sex imitation was 
greater with the adult models than with the child models. In Study 2, where 
children only saw models who were the same sex as themselves (thereby 
eliminating any reason for categorization along gender lines), they imitated 
the child models (same-age imitation) to a greater extent than they imitated 
adult models.
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It was suggested that the contextual changes in the first two studies made it 
appropriate for children to act (that is, to imitate) in accordance with their 
membership of the particular salient category: boys imitated males, and girls 
imitated females in the first study, whereas all children imitated children, in 
preference to adults, in the second study.
In both studies, however, the children paid equal attention to all the available 
information, since they recalled all possible behaviours equally. Their choice 
of which of the available repertoires of behaviours to adopt therefore was, it 
has been suggested, based on their self-categorization as a member of one of 
those categories in preference to another. The childrens’ self-categorization 
as either a child, or as a member of one of the sexes, involved their similarity 
to, and their identification with, that particular category. This occurred in a 
context which made those particular categories salient: the first study showed 
males and females performing different sequences of behaviours, while the 
second study showed adults and children performing different sequences of 
behaviours.
This element of behavioural choice was also examined in Study 3, however 
the difficulty of the task in that study meant that no reliable conclusions 
could be drawn. At least with the particular task used, pre-school children 
appeared unable to choose from four behavioural choices presented 
simultaneously. Hence their choice of behaviours appeared to be primarily 
determined by whichever action they saw last. This was the case for both the 
behavioural (imitation) and memory (recall) tasks.
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Bearing this in mind, the present study was also designed to examine self- 
categorical processes in young children when faced with a choice of more 
than one category at a time. In order to do this effectively, however, it was 
necessary to simplify the task by reducing the number of options available to 
the children. Given the clear findings of Studies 1 and 2, it was decided to 
present children with a choice of two (rather than four) behavioural options.
Following the results of the previous studies, and based on the assumption 
that children are able to self-categorize according to either age or gender, it 
follows that they would be able to identify with, and therefore imitate, either 
same-sex people (regardless of age) or same-age people (regardless of sex) 
depending on which category (age or sex) was salient at the time.
In order to test these ideas experimentally, it was decided to manipulate both 
age and gender salience. Hence we decided to present children with exactly 
the same information, but to vary the context in which that information was 
given. By manipulating the salience of different categories, the context of the 
information would differ. Specifically, if age were made salient, it was 
hypothesized that children would imitate other children (in preference to 
adults, and regardless of sex), but when gender was made salient, girls would 
imitate females (in preference to males, and regardless of age) and boys 
would imitate males (in preference to females, and regardless of age).
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All the while, however, children would be expected to pay equal attention to, 
and therefore be able to recall, both sets of information equally. This is 
because the behavioural choice concerning which behaviour to adopt is, it is 
suggested, indeed a choice. Thus it was hypothesized that children would 
continue to pay attention to all the information provided to them (by both 
groups: either male and female, or adults and children), but that they would 
only enact the behaviours of one of the groups (either the males or the 
females, or the adults or the children), depending on the salience of those 
groups, and the children’s self-categorizations with those groups.
Studies 2 and 3 also explored the ideas of satisfaction with category 
membership. In Study 2 children reported liking being a child in preference 
to wanting to be an adult. In Study 3 girls reported liking being girls and 
boys reported liking being boys. It was assumed in these studies, however, 
that children identified with those categories, although no explicit measures 
of identification were used. For this reason, and because of the importance of 
identification in the self-categorization process, it was decided to ask 
children, explicitly, about their category membership in the present study.
For example, if age were the salient category, children would be expected to 
see themselves as a child, and not as an adult. Similarly, if gender was the 
salient category, boys should see themselves as male, and girls should see 
themselves as female.
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Method
Participants
32 girls and 32 boys from four childcare centres in Canberra and Melbourne 
participated in this study. The mean age of participants was 50.5 months 
(50.75 for girls and 50.25 for boys) with a standard deviation of 7.64 months. 
Ages ranged from 40 months to 66 months.
Design
A 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) by 2 (category salience: age, gender) 
independent groups factorial design was used. Participants watched one of 
four videos depicting same-sex adult and opposite-sex child models. (Two 
videos were counterbalanced versions.) The models and behaviour sequences 
were the same as those used in previous studies.
Procedure
Children were again tested individually in a separate area of the childcare 
centre. Before watching the video, they were asked about activities that 
children and grownups (age salience condition) or males and females (gender 
salience condition) like to do. Specifically they were asked, “What are some 
of the things that children/ ladies and girls like to do?” followed by, “What 
are some of the things that grownups/ boys and men like to do?” They were 
then given a sorting task. Children were shown a series of twenty laminated 
colour pictures, presented one at a time, which they were asked to sort into 
two piles: either children and adults (age salience condition) or males and
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females (gender salience condition). Sixteen of the items were used in both 
conditions. The intact piles of sorted pictures were then set aside for use later 
in the experiment.
Children were then asked to watch a video and told that they would be asked 
to play the game, just like the people in the video, at the end.
For girl participants, the video showed adult female (women) and male child 
(boy) models performing behaviours identical to those used in Study 2. For 
boy participants the models were adult males (men) and female children 
(girls). Counterbalanced versions of each video were also used.
As with the previous modelling studies, children were then asked to play the 
game, during which the experimenter recorded all behaviours performed. The 
simplified modelling task from Study 2 was again used. That is, after 
watching the entire video, participants were shown an edited segment of two 
or three behaviours at a time, before being given their turn to perform those 
behaviours. Again the experimenter asked the child about their actions if they 
appeared unclear. These actions were also recorded on a behaviour checklist.
After the modelling task, the modified memory task used in Study 3 was 
administered. As with that study, children were given a forced choice format. 
This time, however, both options that appeared on the video were given as 
the choices. Due to the editing requirements of these videos, the final 
utterance when the models returned to their chair (i.e., “All done”/ “The
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end”) was deleted. Hence a total of 16 memory questions was asked of the 
participants, eight pertaining to each of the models. Again the order of 
presentation of these questions was counterbalanced across participants.
Finally, participants were again shown the piles of pictures they had created 
earlier, and asked, “If I had a picture of you, which pile would it go in.
Would it go in the boy pile or the girl pile (children or grownups pile)?”
Children were then thanked for their participation, allowed to choose a 
sticker to take home, and returned to the group play area.
Results
Modelled Behaviour
As with all previous studies, modelled behaviours were recorded on a 
checklist by the experimenter. The eight behaviours were coded as either 1 = 
same-category behaviour; 2 = opposite-category behaviour; 3 = new 
behaviour; or 4 = no behaviour performed.
The data were then recoded for order of video presentation (and hence 
behavioural sequence) and the number of behaviours in each of the four 
categories was summed. A 2 (category salience: age, gender) x 3 (modelled 
behaviour: same-category, opposite-category, new behaviour x 2 (sex of 
participant: boy, girl) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
modelled behaviour was performed.
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Most importantly, there was no effect for sex of participant: boys and girls 
responded equally to the age and gender salience manipulations. Moreover, 
they exhibited equal amounts of modelling consistent with these 
manipulations. Only a main effect for modelling emerged, F(l,60) = 
127.174, p < 0.001. As shown in Figure 9.5, children imitated models of the 
same category as themselves (M = 3.672) significantly more than they 
imitated models of the opposite category (M = 2.734), t(61) = 2.57, p = 
0.038. Imitation of both same- and opposite-category modelling occurred 
significantly more than performance of a new (or unseen) behaviour (M = 
0.625), t(61) = 11.285, p < 0.001, and t(61) = 9.674, p < 0.001 (same 
category vs new behaviour and opposite category vs new behaviour 
respectively). All differences were significant using Bonferroni adjustment. 
Importantly there was no effect for category: children responded equally to 
age and gender category manipulations.
Same Opposite
Category of Behaviours
Figure 9.5: Modelled Behaviours
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Memory for Modelled Behaviour
Memory for models was recorded as either correct or incorrect according to 
same- or opposite-category membership. A  2 (category salience: age, gender) 
x 2 (memory for same category: correct, incorrect) x 2 (memory for opposite 
category: correct, incorrect) x 2 (sex of participant: boy, girl) mixed model 
ANOVA was performed, where both category salience and sex of participant 
were between-subject factors and memory for same category and memory for 
opposite category were within-subject factors.
A  main effect for memory for opposite-category, F(l,60) = 107.302, p < 
0.001 was qualified by a memory for same-category x memory for opposite- 
category interaction, F(l,60) = 4.811, p = 0.032.
7
— ♦ — same category 
- *  - opposite category
incorrectcorrect
Response
Figure 9.6:Memory for Behaviours
Figure 9.6 shows how children’s correct recall o f same- and opposite- 
category behaviours was greater than their incorrect recall of either. Again 
there was no effect for category salience, or for sex of participant.
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Manipulation Check/ Similarity Measure
Following the memory questions, children were shown the piles of pictures 
they had sorted earlier (according to either age or gender) and asked which 
pile they belonged in. In the gender salience condition, all sixteen boys and 
sixteen girls correctly placed themselves into the male or female pile. In the 
age salience condition, thirty children placed themselves in the child pile 
while two children included themselves with the pictures of adults.
Discussion
The results for this study were startlingly clear. Depending on whether age or 
gender was made salient, children imitated models of their ingroup on the 
salient dimension. That is, when age was made salient, girls chose to imitate 
the children (who in this case were boys) rather than the adults (who were 
women). When gender was salient, the girls imitated the women rather than 
the boys. Similarly, boys imitated men in the gender salient condition, and 
they imitated girls in the age salient condition. This last finding is 
particularly interesting given boys’ resistance to imitating females, 
demonstrated in Study 1 (see also Bussey & Bandura, 1984; Fagot, 1985b; 
Lamb & Roopnarine, 1979; Maccoby, 1980).
Consistent with Studies 1 to 3, no sex differences were found in children’s 
memory for behaviours. Boys and girls did not differ in the attention they 
paid to, or their memory for, the behaviours of models of either category. 
Similarly, there were no differences according to the salience of either 
gender or age. Indeed children correctly remembered almost all behaviours in
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all conditions. Despite the salience manipulation occurring prior to children 
viewing the behaviours, they nevertheless paid attention to both sets of 
models and were able to recall the behaviours of each. It appears that 
children then chose to perform the behaviours in accordance with the self­
categorization that had arisen from the salience manipulation.
These psychological processes, specifically self-categorizations, and 
behaviours borne as a result of these have been demonstrated on numerous 
occasions with adults (refer to Chapter 6). There have also been several 
demonstrations of this with children in middle childhood, generally between 
five and twelve years of age (e.g., Bennett, Sani, Hopkins, Agostini & 
Malucchi, 2000; Powlishta, 1995; Yee & Brown, 1994). As detailed in 
Chapter 6, self-categorizations (themselves determined by perceiver 
readiness, along with normative and comparative fit) can explain different 
behaviours by the same person. In the current study the age and gender 
manipulations helped make the children perceptually ready for information 
consistent with those categories. These manipulations also provided a 
framework for the behaviours. Not only did children begin to think of 
themselves as either children (in the age salience conditions) or as boys or 
girls (in the gender salience conditions), the behaviours they saw in the video 
could be appropriately divided along these lines.
It is suggested that central to imitating behaviours consistent with this 
categorical division was the children’s self-definitions as members of one of 
these categories. Whilst we had no explicit measures of this in the present
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study, the results are consistent with such an assertion. In some conditions it 
made sense for children to self-categorize as children; in others it made sense 
to self-categorize as either boys or girls. With respect to the categories of age 
and gender, the three- and four-year olds in the current study behaved in 
accordance with whichever one was the most appropriate at the time.
It is argued that the salience manipulations in the present study provided a 
context for the participants’ behaviour. The sorting task provided a way of 
dividing their world -  into males and females, or into adults and children. 
This mirrored situations that young children face every day. Boys and girls 
are provided with, for example, different clothes to wear and different toys to 
play with. They are even shown different ways to behave: girls should be 
quiet and polite whereas boys are allowed to play loudly and more 
boisterously. Similarly, there are different expectations, and permissible 
behaviours, for children and adults. This can be illustrated with the responses 
of children in the current study when asked what children and grownups like 
to do. Some of the things that children liked to do were “play with toys” and 
“eat lollies”. Among the things grownups “like” to do were “driving”, “cook 
the dinner”, “drink wine” and “clean things”. Young children are well aware 
of these differences, and that they may be expected to change their behaviour 
according to the social context. A girl may be expected to be quieter and less 
active than her brother, but noisier and more active than her parents.
Perhaps the most important implication of the results of the current study, 
however, concerns the importance of gender per se to three- and four-year
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olds. Taken together, the results of Studies 1 to 4 would suggest that there is 
nothing inherently important about gender that is responsible for the strong 
display of gender-typed preferences, such as boys’ and girls’ preferences for 
toys, dress, playmates etc. that were outlined in Chapter 4. Rather, we 
suggest that this gender divide is, firstly, partially due to the important role 
that gender is given by others, and secondly that young children are sensitive, 
and responsive, to this. The current series of studies has shown that children 
could, and did, behave in accordance with the relevant categorizations of 
gender or age. Moreover, in the present study children behaved in accordance 
with whichever of these categories was salient at the time, despite being 
presented with the exact same information (i.e., the behaviour sequences in 
the video presentation) in the different conditions.
Remarkably in the present study children exhibited an equal amount of 
category-appropriate behaviour in the different contexts. Boys imitated just 
as many behaviours of men, when gender was salient, as they did of girls 
when age was salient. Importantly, there were no gender differences 
exhibited. Both the boys and the girls were equally sensitive to the change in 
context indicating that a different behaviour was appropriate. The change in 
context provided a different meaning for those behaviours. Wearing a red hat 
was male behaviour in one context, but child behaviour in another.
Behaviour that had previously been devoid of context was made contextually 
meaningful. Hence the exact same behaviour was interpreted differently, 
depending upon the social context in which it was presented.
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Clearly then, young children are capable of adapting their (imitative) 
behaviours in ways that reflect variations in the contexts in which those 
behaviours occur. All the while, however, they appear to pay attention to all 
the information provided to them. These findings are of particular 
importance to gender-relevant information, given the role that attention to 
such information is afforded in theories of gender development (see Chapters 
4 and 5). What remains to be explored, however, are the changes (if any) that 
occur in attentional processes throughout a person’s life. In the following 
studies we shift our focus from children to adults to investigate the role of 
memory for behaviours, activities and people in varying contexts.
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Chapter 10
Study 5
Until now, all the empirical studies in this thesis have involved child 
participants. Study 1 examined, and demonstrated, children’s preference for 
same-sex imitation of both adult and child models. Although they were given 
no indication that gender was of any consequence in the situation, the child 
participants clearly used gender as an available cue for categorization, which 
they subsequently used as a guide to their own modelling behaviour. As was 
demonstrated in the first study, three- and four-year-old children were aware 
of their own, as well as others’ gender category membership. They then used 
this information to guide their behaviour in an ambiguous situation.
Similarly, in Study 2, child participants used age as a guide to categorization 
and to their subsequent behaviour. In that study two behaviour sequences 
were performed by adult and child models who were the same sex as the 
participants. Child participants demonstrated a preference for imitating the 
behaviours of the children in the video.
Study 4, however, showed that children were indeed able to categorize along 
either age or gender lines, even when presented with exactly the same 
behavioural information. The child participants’ self-categorization as either 
a child, or as a boy or a girl, depended on whether age or gender was the 
salient categorical dimension at the time. Their imitation of either same-age
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or same-gender models varied according to the particular dimension of 
salience.
Children’s imitation of behaviours in all of these studies was seen to reflect a 
deliberate choice. When questioned about the actions performed by all the 
models (males and females, or adults and children), children remembered the 
actions of both sets of models equally. Thus it does not appear to be the case, 
as cognitive-developmental theory suggests for example, that girls or boys 
simply recognize themselves as girls or boys, then seek out information from 
other girls or boys/ women or men in order to act in ways that are consistent 
with their self-definition, ignoring non-self-relevant information. Rather, it 
would appear that no social information is irrelevant.
However, it does not appear to be the case that males and females continue to 
pay equal attention to male and female actors throughout their lives. The 
importance of gender-relevant information and the salience of gender in 
varying contexts, for example, have been offered as explanations for gender 
differences in cognitive ability. (See Hyde, 1990, for a review, and Hyde, 
1981, 1996, where she claims that tasks of cognitive ability show greater 
within-gender differences than between-gender differences.)
Specifically, gender differences in cognitive ability have been shown to vary 
depending on the context in which the tasks are performed (see also 
Crawford, Chaffin & Fitton, 1995). Zanna and Pack (1975), for example, 
showed that women’s performance on an anagram task varied in line with
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Stereotypie expectations of the male partner. Similarly Steele’s work on 
stereotype threat (Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004; Steele, 1997; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995) has demonstrated varying performance levels on cognitive 
tasks as a result of threatening particular social identities. Based on their 
work, Shih, Pittinsky and Ambady (1999) varied the salience of Asian- 
American women’s identities as either Asian or as women. When their Asian 
identity was salient, they scored higher than a control group on a maths task, 
but when their female identity was salient they scored poorer on the same 
maths task.
Similarly, Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn & Twenge (1998) found that 
women, but not men, scored considerably worse on a mathematics test when 
they were wearing swimsuits than when they were wearing sweaters. 
Although the authors argue this is a result of self-objectification as women 
which “consumes mental resources” (p.280), we would argue that wearing 
swimsuits makes women’s identity as women blatantly salient, and that 
participants consequently acted in a way that was consistent with the female 
stereotype.
Of particular importance to the focus on attention given in this thesis is 
research that has focussed specifically on gender differences in memory 
across different contexts. Herrman, Crawford and Holdsworth (1992) gave 
participants identical lists to memorize which were recalled differentially 
depending on the gender label attached to that list. Male recall was highest
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when the list was labelled a “hardware store list”, whilst females recalled the 
“grocery list” better.
McGivern, Huston, Byrd, King, Siegle and Reilly (1997) tested gender 
differences in memory for male- and female-oriented stimuli in ten- to 
fifteen-year-olds and adults. Consistent with their predictions, while male 
stimuli were recalled equally well by males and females (as in our studies 
with young children), they found that females recalled significantly more 
female-oriented and neutral stimuli than did males (which we did not find). 
Although the authors claim that these differences reflect underlying gender 
differences in information processing strategies, with males relying on 
heuristic devices to filter and organize information and females processing 
information comprehensively, our results suggest otherwise. However, 
McGivern and colleagues’ study does demonstrate that older females do pay 
more attention to, and therefore remember, information about both sexes, 
whereas older males appear to focus, if not more on what males are doing, 
then at least less on what females are doing.
The first study of this thesis showed that four-year-olds remembered 
information about their own and the opposite sex equally -  whether that 
information was provided by other children or by adults. Thus if males and 
females do use different strategies for remembering gender-related 
information, this does not appear to be due to an inherent cognitive 
difference between males and females. If this were the case, the four-year-old 
boys and girls in the first study would not have recalled all information
210
equally. Perhaps, as with adults, memory for gender-related information may 
vary as a result of the context in which it is provided and the specific 
demands of the task.
Given that the children in the first study demonstrated superior recall for 
information provided by adults, perhaps the age of the actors is an important 
cue for children’s recall. This may also be the case with adults: perhaps age 
is equally, or more, important than gender as a cue to attend to, and 
subsequently recall, specific information.
The present study was therefore designed to investigate these issues. 
Specifically, we wanted to see, firstly, if men and women attend to male and 
female adults equally, and secondly if men and women attend to male and 
female children equally. Some research suggests, for example, that teachers 
pay more attention to boys than to girls in a mixed-sex class (e.g., Croll, 
1985; Fagot, 1973; Serbin, O’Leary, Kent & Tonick, 1973). Finally, we 
wished to investigate if the attention paid to the criterion of age differs for 
adults, as it did for children.
Method
Participants
Participants were 33 female and 31 male Australian university students, 
some of whom participated for course credit. The mean age of participants 
was 20.84 years.
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Design
The study involved a 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 2 (sex of model: male, 
female) x 2 (sex of participant: male, female) mixed model design.
Procedure
Participants were brought into the laboratory in small groups of 
approximately four students. They were instructed to watch a video and told 
they would be required to answer questions about it at the end. No deception 
was involved. Participants watched one of the four videos that were shown to 
the child participants in Study 1. Two of the videos consisted of adult actors, 
and two consisted of child actors, counterbalanced for sex of the models and 
sequences of behaviours.
After viewing the video, a questionnaire booklet was distributed to each 
participant. This consisted of open-ended questions about what the male and 
female models in the video did. For example, “What colour hat did the men 
choose?” In total, there were 28 questions: fourteen about male models and 
fourteen about female models, counterbalanced for order of presentation. The 
instructions on the first page told participants to answer the questions in the 
order presented and not to refer back to their previous answers. This was 
designed to mirror the unprompted questioning of the children in the first 
study. The booklet was therefore of small dimensions in order to minimize 
the number of questions appearing on each page.
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Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were told of the aims of 
the study in the context of the research program, including a brief description 
of the results of the previous studies.
Results
This study was only concerned with adults’ memory for behaviours. 
Responses were classified, and summed, according to the categories used in 
the previous studies with child participants. That is, after recoding for sex of 
participant and behavioural sequence in the video presentation, the following 
categories were produced: (i) correct recall of same-sex models’ behaviour; 
(ii) correct recall of opposite-sex models’ behaviour; (iii) incorrect recall of 
same-sex models’ behaviour by misattributing opposite-sex models’ 
behaviour; (iv) incorrect recall of opposite-sex models’ behaviour by 
misattributing same-sex models’ behaviour; (v) incorrect recall of same-sex 
models’ behaviour by substituting an unseen response; (vi) incorrect recall of 
opposite-sex models’ behaviour by substituting an unseen response; (vii) no 
recall at all. As with the previous studies, the last response (no answer) was 
excluded from analysis.
Since the aim of this study was to examine adults’ responses in the same 
manner as those of the children in Study 1, the data were analysed via a 2 
(sex of participant: male, female) x 2 (age of model: adult, child) x 6 
(memory for models: same-sex correct, opposite-sex correct, same-sex 
incorrect by opposite-sex, opposite-sex incorrect by same-sex, same-sex
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incorrect by other, opposite-sex incorrect by other) mixed model ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on memory for models.
Firstly, there was no effect for age of model. Adults attended to, and were 
able to recall equally well, behaviours performed by both children and adults.
The only effect to reach statistical significance was a highly significant main 
effect for memory, F(l,60) = 481.192, p < 0.001. Adult participants showed 
an equally high degree of correct recall for both same- (M = 10.177) and 
opposite-sex behaviours (M = 10.109), t(62) = 0.234, p = 1.00. The high 
rates of correct responses were significantly greater than the rate of incorrect 
responses of any type (see Figure 10.1).
Recall of Models
Figure 10.1: Memory for Modelled Behaviour
Key for Memory for Models
1 = Same-sex behaviour correct
2 = Opposite-sex behaviour correct
3 = Same-sex incorrect by opposite-sex
4 = Opposite-sex incorrect by same-sex
5 = Same-sex incorrect by other
6 = Opposite-sex incorrect by other
214
The memory x sex interaction, however, bordered on significance, F(l,60) = 
38.194, p = 0.057 and, given the importance of sex differences in this study, 
as well as the thesis overall, warranted further investigation. As such, 
planned comparisons between the means of the different types of responses 
were conducted. Although females’ correct recall of both same- (M =
10.767) and opposite-sex models’ behaviour (M = 10.658) was greater than 
those of males (Ms = 9.588 and 9.560, same-sex and opposite-sex 
respectively), neither of these reached statistical significance. However, the 
correct recall of opposite-sex models approached significance, t(62) = -1.879, 
P = 0.065: there was a tendency for women to correctly recall more 
behaviours of the boys and the men, than there was of men to recall the 
behaviours of the girls and the women.5
Additionally, there was a significant sex difference in the incorrect recall of 
same-sex models by substituting an “other” (unseen) response, (Ms = 1.542 
and 0.697, males and females respectively) t(62) = 2.440, p = 0.018. Men’s 
propensity to provide a new response when they could not correctly recall 
male behaviour was much greater than women’s propensity to do so when 
recalling female behaviour.
The data were then considered in terms of male-oriented stimuli (male 
models) and female-oriented stimuli (female models) in line with McGivern 
et al. (1997). Although females’ memory for both male- (M = 10.658) and 
female-oriented stimuli (M = 10.767) was greater than males’ memory for
It is possible that with more participants (and participants less sensitised to issues of 
gender discrimination than psychology students) this may have reached significance.
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either of these (Ms = 9.588 and 9.560, male- and female-oriented stimuli 
respectively), none of these differences reached statistical significance.
In sum, there were some marginal differences in the way men and women 
recalled information based on gender, but no differences in the way men and 
women recalled that same information when it differed according to age.
Discussion
This study was designed to parallel the memory component of Study 1. Thus, 
by providing adult participants with exactly the same information as the child 
participants in the first study, we wished to examine whether adults would 
demonstrate equal, or differential, attention to male and female, adult and 
child models.
Unlike child participants, adults showed no difference in their recall of the 
behaviours of adult and child models. The adult participants in the present 
study showed equal, indeed quite high, memory for the behaviours 
performed by both adult and child models.
However, there was a trend regarding sex differences in the adult 
participants’ recall. There was a trend for women to remember more male 
behaviour than for men to remember female behaviour. This trend was 
replicated when the data were reinterpreted in terms of female-oriented 
stimuli (or more precisely, female performing the stimuli) and male-oriented 
stimuli (male performing the stimuli), in line with McGivern et. al (1997).
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There was a tendency for women to pay more attention than men to both 
females and males.
Of course the present study used behaviours that were specifically non­
stereotypical with regard to gender. There is some evidence to suggest that 
male attention to females relies more on the stereotypicality of the female’s 
actions, or stereotypical beliefs about women (e.g., Furnham & Singh, 1986), 
or the attractiveness of the female (Rodin, 1988).
The other interesting sex difference arising from the present study was the 
tendency of males to provide some response to questions when they did not 
recall the correct answer. This was in contrast to females whose tendency to 
do so was negligible: women did not tend to “make up” an answer when they 
did not know it.
In sum, although not statistically significant, there were some differences in 
the way men and women recalled information provided by male and female 
models. Since this difference was not apparent in four-year-olds (refer to 
Study 1), it appears that it is not due to inherent sex differences between 
males and females, and if larger numbers were to make it significant, it 
would be clear that it is acquired some time between preschool age and 
adulthood. Since the trend we found is consistent with the significant sex 
differences in attention and memory found by McGivern et al. (1997), the 
contextual sex differences in memory found by Frederickson et al. (1998) 
and Herrman et al. (1992), and even findings that males show greater recall
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than women of erotic sexual stories (Geer & McGlone, 1990), it is suggested 
that gender-related memory, and attention, is affected by contextual 
constraints and task demands. Thus the idea of gender differences in adult 
recall of events is the focus of the final study of this thesis.
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Chapter 11
Study 6
The attention children pay to categorical information is an important focus of 
this thesis. Studies 1 to 4 demonstrated that, despite children choosing to 
imitate models of one particular sex or age over another, they nevertheless 
were able to recall, equally, the information provided by the models of both 
sexes or ages. With regard to gender-categorical information specifically, it 
was claimed that these findings illustrate that both boys and girls do not 
focus merely on information provided by own-sex models, which they then 
imitate more or less automatically. Rather, we believe that children attend to 
information provided by both sexes, but their choice of behaviours to imitate 
is guided by categorical and contextual relevance and appropriateness.
Study 5 then attempted to investigate adult male and female attention to 
categorical stimuli by presenting adult participants with exactly the same 
modelling video that had been shown to child participants in Study 1, and 
asking them to recall the behaviours. Adult participants’ recall was not 
affected by the age of the model (unlike the child participants in Study 1 who 
showed superior recall of adult, compared to child, models), however there 
was a non-significant trend for men and women to differentially recall 
information according to sex, with women recalling more male behaviour 
than men recalled female behaviour. Given the consistency of this trend with 
other research (e.g., Herrman et al., 1992; McGivern et al., 1997), the present
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study was designed to further explore sex differences in memory for gender­
relevant information.
In contrast to Study 5 which measured the attention adult participants paid to 
stimuli, or their short-term recall of that information, the present study 
focussed on longer-term memory. Since the child studies in this thesis 
revealed no sex differences in attention paid to information provided by 
males and females, we wished to investigate adult male and female recall of 
similar information. In keeping with the emphasis on play-like activities used 
in the previous studies, together with the prevalence and importance of play 
in children’s lives (e.g., Bruner, 1972; Slade, 1995; Vygotsky, 1967), the 
present study looked at adults’ memory for games and childhood activities.
In contrast to all previous studies, however, each of which investigated only 
one specific age group, the current study aimed to compare memory for 
gender-related activities and friends across three age periods. By asking 
participants their recollections about gender-relevant information from three 
specific time periods, we would be able to examine any emerging 
developmental trends.
Specifically we wished to investigate adult males’ and females’ memory for 
gender-related activities in early childhood, middle childhood and 
adolescence. In Studies 1 and 4 of this thesis we found no difference between 
boys’ and girls’ recall of the behaviours they had been shown. Clearly the 
boys and girls in those studies were paying equal attention to the male and
220
female models providing the information. However, the actions the child 
participants chose to enact for themselves (in Study 1) were influenced by 
the sex of the models: girls demonstrated greater imitation of girls and 
women, and boys showed greater imitation of boys and men. The question to 
be investigated in this study is how much men and women remember of the 
information that our studies suggest they paid equal attention to when they 
were young. Specifically, it is possible that boys and girls attend to, and 
remember, information provided by both sexes, imitate only one of these, 
and retain only the enacted information over time, or that they simply forget 
the behaviours of the opposite sex because they were considered less 
important. Although the present study will not be able to discriminate 
between the suggested reasons, it should nonetheless inform us as to whether 
or not the information (to which attention was initially paid) was retained.
Continuing this theme, the present study will also explore memory for 
gendered activities in later childhood and adolescence. Specifically it 
addresses the question of whether gender-relevant information is attended to, 
or at least retained, as boys and girls become adults. Chapter 10 reviewed 
evidence concerning the differential attention that adult males and females 
pay to gender-related stimuli. Irrespective of the behaviours that adult males 
and females exhibit, it does not appear to be the case that adult males and 
females merely remember same-sex stimuli. Rather, and consistent with the 
trends found in Study 5, while males do remember male-relevant stimuli 
better than female-relevant stimuli, females tend to have equal memory for 
both female- and male-relevant stimuli. The focus of the present study on
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early childhood, middle childhood and adolescence represents an attempt to 
examine how this attention to, and memory for, gender-relevant information 
changes over time.
Of course it is recognized that the nature of sex differences changes over 
time. While preferences for same-sex friends and playmates feature 
prominently in early childhood (see Chapters 2 and 4) and into middle 
childhood (Feiring & Lewis, 1991a), this pattern is qualified in adolescence 
(Feiring & Lewis, 1991b; Whiting & Edwards, 1988). While adolescent 
boys’ same-sex friendships become more extensive and adolescent girls’ 
same-sex friendships become more intensive (Buhrmester & Furman, 1987), 
the meaning of relationships with the opposite sex undergoes a dramatic 
change. Whereas mixed-sex interactions in early and middle childhood are 
rare and represent some form of “taboo” (Hartup, 1983), contact with the 
opposite sex in adolescence becomes much more acceptable, largely in 
recognition of the possible future (heterosexual) partnership possibilities they 
provide (Blyth & Foster-Clark, 1987; Buhrmester & Furman, 1987). 
Adolescent males and females are more likely to interact with each other 
during this time than they were at younger ages because heterosexual activity 
becomes part of what it now means to be a successful male or female. It is 
suggested, therefore, that increased interaction with the opposite sex should 
coincide with increased attention being paid to them. Thus when adults are 
asked to recall same- and opposite-sex behaviours we could expect that their 
recall of opposite-sex adolescent behaviours would be better than that of 
opposite-sex childhood behaviours.
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Thus the questions of interest in the current study involve the attention paid 
to (measured by recall of) members of the opposite sex, and the changes that 
occur in this attention over time. Specifically, we wished to investigate recall 
of same- and opposite-sex behaviours during early childhood (i.e., the first 
year of formal schooling, approximately 5 years of age), middle childhood 
(i.e., the final year of primary school, approximately 11 years of age) and 
during adolescence (i.e., the middle of high school, approximately 16 years 
of age).
Given the importance of same-sex friendships during all of these time 
periods, we predicted that memory for same-sex friends and activities would 
be superior to that for opposite-sex friends and activities at all ages. While 
the results of Studies 1 to 4 involving child participants and those of adult 
participants in Study 5, regarding attention paid to same- and opposite-sex 
models, would suggest a decrease in males’ attention to female-relevant 
information from early childhood to adolescence, the increased interaction 
between the sexes during adolescence would suggest otherwise. Thus the 
present study aimed to investigate sex differences in males’ and females’ 
recall of same- and opposite-sex friends and activities, with a specific focus 
in changes over time, both within and between the sexes.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 156 first year psychology students at an Australian 
university. The mean age of participants was 22.23 years (s.d. = 6.93); 47 
participants were male and 109 were female. The study was conducted as 
part of normal laboratory classes on developmental psychology. Student 
participation was voluntary and no deception was involved.
Design
The design was a 2 (sex: male, female) x 3 (age: early childhood, middle 
childhood, adolescence) factorial design with repeated measures on age.
Procedure
Participants formed small groups consisting of four or five people. They 
were then instructed to think about their first year of formal schooling and, in 
turn, describe to the other members of their group something they 
remembered from that time. If they were unable to recall an event, they were 
encouraged by being asked to describe their kindergarten teacher, their 
classroom or the playground at their school. The aim of this activity was to 
bring to life their childhood memories.
After the group discussion, participants individually completed a 
questionnaire on childhood activities. To increase the salience of gender in 
this task, questionnaires were coloured either pink (for females) or blue (for 
males).
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Participants were first asked to list as many games or activities they could 
recall having played in the playground with the other girls/boys. They were 
then asked to take one of these and to describe it in as much detail as 
possible. This description was to include such things as the rules of the game, 
how it was played, and by whom. They then rated (on a 7-point scale: 1 = not 
at all; 7 = extremely) how much they enjoyed playing the girls’/boys’ games. 
They were also asked to list the names of same-sex friends they played with 
at this age.
Participants were then asked to list the names of games or activities the 
boys/girls (i.e., opposite sex) played, along with a detailed description of one 
of these. They were asked if they ever recalled wanting to play the 
boys’/girls’ (i.e., opposite sex’s) games and, using a 7-point scale (1 = not at 
all; 7 = extremely), rated how much they remembered wanting to play the 
opposite-sex children’s games. Additionally, they were asked to list the 
names of opposite-sex friends they played with at this age.
These two series of questions were counterbalanced for order of presentation 
such that half the participants answered questions relating to same-sex games 
and friends followed by opposite-sex questions, and half answered opposite- 
sex before same-sex questions.
Following this, all participants were asked how often at school they played 
with the girls/boys (i.e, opposite sex children), along with how much the girls
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were teased for playing with boys, and how much the boys were teased for 
playing with girls. These responses were measured using a 7-point scale (1 = 
not at all; 7 = extremely often). Participants were then required to list any 
games or activities that were not sex segregated.
The final four questions pertained to the ease/difficulty of remembering the 
boys’ games, girls’ games, boys’ names, and girls’ names. Again a 7-point 
rating scale was used and the order of these four questions was 
counterbalanced across participants.
This two-stage procedure (small group discussion followed by individual 
questionnaire completion) was repeated with participants required to recall 
their final year of primary school and the middle year of high school. For the 
primary-age segment, the questionnaire was identical to that used for 
kindergarten. For high school, questions previously pertaining to games were 
changed to sports played. In addition, participants were asked about other 
leisure activities in which they took part, and whether one or both sexes were 
involved.
After completion of the third questionnaire, participants were told of the 
theoretical arguments and the hypotheses of the study. A brief discussion 
ensued.
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Results
The data are first presented for the three age groups separately i.e., early 
childhood, middle childhood and adolescence. At each stage of analysis, 
students who attended single sex schools during that time were omitted from 
the analysis, which required within-subject comparisons between what the 
boys and the girls did at school. Additionally, participants with missing data 
were excluded only from that particular analysis. This accounts for the 
inconsistency in degrees of freedom throughout this section.
Due to the conceptual differences between dependent measures, these are 
presented separately.6 Except where stated otherwise, 2 (sex of participant) x 
2 (sex of target for dependent measure) analyses of variance with repeated 
measures on the dependent measure were conducted. All multiple 
comparisons throughout this section control for family-wise error rates using 
a Bonferroni adjustment.
Early Childhood
Names of Friends Recalled
There was a significant main effect for sex of names, F(l,151) = 26.376, p < 
0.001 qualified by a significant sex of names x sex of participant interaction, 
F(l,151) = 3.976, p = 0.048. Both men and women recalled the same number 
of same-sex friends they had in kindergarten (Ms = 5.239, 5.486, for males 
and females respectively), but women recalled significantly more opposite
6 Attempts to aggregate measures are dealt with in the following section.
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sex kindergarten friends (M = 4.710) than did men (M= 3.478), t(151) = 
2.17, p = 0.032. This can be seen in Figure 11.1.7
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Same Opposite
Sex of Friends
Figure 11.1: Early Childhood - No of Friends 
Recalled
Number of Games Recalled
As seen in Figure 11.2, there was a significant main effect for games, 
F(l,151) = 64.225, p < 0.001 in that both women and men remembered more 
same-sex (Ms = 4.208, 3.891 females and males respectively) than opposite 
sex kindergarten games (Ms = 2.991, 2.413 females and males respectively).
■♦--M ale 
* — Female
Same Opposite
Sex of Games
Figure 11.2: Early Childhood - No. of Games 
Recalled
7 Because of the importance of gender to the current study, and to the thesis as a whole, all 
figures depict results of males and females separately.
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Number of Descriptions Provided
There was a highly significant main effect for description, F(1,151) = 22.970, 
P < 0.001 indicating that participants provided significantly more detailed 
descriptions about same-sex (Ms = 7.304, 7.122 males and females 
respectively) than opposite-sex games (Ms = 4.696, 4.944 males and females 
respectively at this time. (See Figure 11.3.)
1 ♦ Male 
—m— Fonrolo
Figure 11.3: Early Childhood - Level of 
Description
Enjoyment of Same-Sex Games/ Desire to Play Opposite-Sex Games 
Highly significant main effects for enjoyment, F(l,133) = 140.25, p < 0.001 
and for sex, F(l,133) = 6.868, p = 0.010 were qualified by a highly 
significant enjoyment x sex of participant interaction, F(l,133) = 28.061, p < 
0.001. As seen in Figure 11.4, males enjoyed playing same-sex games (M = 
6.091) significantly more than females did (M = 5.462), t(139) = 2.888, p = 
0.004, while males’ desire to play opposite-sex games (M = 2.523) was 
significantly less than that of females (M = 4.099), t(138) = 4.762, p < 0.001. 
As these were measured on a 7-point rating scale, it appears that both
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females and males quite enjoyed playing their own sex games, but while 
females also expressed a desire (above the mid-point of the scale) to play 
boys’ games, males expressed very little desire to play girls’ game.
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Enjoyment of Same/ Desire to Play 
Opposite Games
Figure 11.4: Early Childhood - Satisfaction with
Games
Amount o f Teasing
There was a highly significant main effect for teasing, F(l,139) = 46.796, p < 
0.001. Both men and women thought that boys were teased more for playing
with girls (Ms = 4.024, 4.091 males and females respectively) than girls were 
teased for playing with boys (Ms = 3.357, 3.061 males and females
respectively). This is depicted in Figure 11.5.
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Sex of Children Teased
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Figure 11.5: Early Childhood - Amount of Teasing
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Frequency of Play with Opposite Sex
A between-group t-test revealed a significant sex difference in the frequency 
of play with members of the opposite sex during this time, t(147) = 2.920, p 
= 0.004. As can be seen in Figure 11.6, girls played with the boys (M = 
4.171) significantly more than boys played with the girls (M = 3.274). This is 
consistent with the results for teasing presented above.
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Number of Games Not Segregated
Again, a between-group t-test revealed a significant sex difference in 
memory for the number of games played that were not segregated by sex, 
t(144) = 2.939, p = 0.004. Consistent with the previous two measures, girls 
played significantly more games in mixed sex groups (M = 2.324) than did 
boys (M = 1.296). This is shown in Figure 11.7. It should be noted, however, 
that both means are quite low, indicating the relatively low frequency of 
mixed-sex play at this age.
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Female
Sex of Participant
Figure 11.7: Early Childhood - No. of Games Not 
Segregated
The following two dependent measures were concerned with the ease or 
difficulty of remembering the friends and games, and were measured on 7- 
point scales.
Memory for Friends
A highly significant main effect for memory for friends, F(l,151) = 26.598, p 
< 0.001 was qualified by a significant memory for friends x sex of participant 
interaction, F(l,151) = 4.384, p = 0.038. Both women and men found it easier 
to recall same-sex (Ms = 4.327, 4.413 females and males respectively) than 
opposite-sex friends (Ms = 3.794, 4.327 females and males respectively). 
Although this effect was stronger for men than for women, particularly with 
regard to opposite-sex friends, this difference only bordered on significance, 
t(151) = -1.924, p = 0.056. This can be seen in Figure 11.8.
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Figure 11.8: Early Childhood - Memory for Friends
Memory for Games
A highly significant main effect for memory for games, F(l,149) = 63.071, p 
< 0.001 was also qualified by a significant memory for games x sex of 
particpant interaction, F(l,149) = 4.962, p = 0.027. Both men and women 
found it easier to remember same-sex (Ms = 4.37, 4.01 males and females 
respectively) than opposite-sex games (Ms = 2.37, 2.886 males and females 
respectively). Although this effect appeared greater for men than for women 
(see Figure 11.9), both of these differences were significant, (Males: t(45) = 
6.107, p < 0.001; females: t(105) = 5.257, p < 0.001).
Same Opposite
Sex of Games
♦
Female
Figure 11.9: Early Childhood - Memory for Games
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Middle Childhood
Names of Friends Recalled
A highly significant, unqualified, main effect for names, F(l,137) = 76.662, p 
< 0.001 was found, indicating that both men and women recalled more same- 
sex (Ms = 7.7368, 7.505 males and females respectively) than opposite-sex 
friends (Ms = 4.6316, 4.6634 males and females respectively) at this age. 
This is shown in Figure 11.10.
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Same Opposite
Sex of Friends
Figure 11.10: Middle Childhood - No. of Friends 
Recalled
Number of Games Recalled
A highly significant main effect for games, F(l,136) = 65.973, p < 0.001 was 
qualified by a highly significant sex of participant x games interaction, 
F(l,136) = 28.904, p < 0.001. Both women and men remembered more same- 
sex (Ms = 3.90, 4.737 females and males respectively) than opposite-sex 
games (Ms = 3.37, 2.132 females and males respectively). However, men 
recalled significantly more same-sex games (t(137) = 2.208, p = 0.029), and 
significantly fewer opposite-sex games than did women (t(136) = 3.717, p < 
0.001). See Figure 11.11.
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Figure 11.11: Middle Childhood - No of Games Recalled
Number of Descriptions Provided
There was a highly significant main effect for descriptions, F(l,136) = 
45.799, p < 0.001 in that both women and men provided more detailed 
descriptions about same-sex (Ms = 7.09, 7.869 females and males 
respectively) than opposite-sex games (Ms = 4.43, 3.132 females and males 
respectively). This is shown in Figure 11.12.
~  - m -  Female
Same Opposite
Sex of Children Playing Games
Figure 11.12: Middle Childhood - Level of 
Description
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Enjoyment of Same-Sex Games/ Desire to Play Opposite-Sex Games 
A  highly significant main effect for enjoyment, F(l,125) = 116.251, p < 
0.001 was qualified by a highly significant enjoyment x sex of participant 
interaction, F(l,125) = 15.67, p < 0.001. Both women and men reported 
enjoying playing their own sex games (Ms = 5.489, 6.162 females and males 
respectively) significantly more than their desire to play opposite-sex games 
(Ms = 3.90, 2.73 females and males respectively): males: t(40) = 10.422, p < 
0.001; females, t(91) = 6.139, p < 0.001. As with memories of early 
childhood, males’ desire to play opposite-sex games was significantly less 
than that of females, t(129) = 3.064, p = 0.003. This can be seen in Figure 
11.13.
Same Opposite
Enjoyment of Same/ Desire to Play 
Opposite Games
Figure 11.13: Middle Childhood - Satisfaction 
with Games
Amount of Teasing
There was a highly significant main effect for teasing, F(l,131) = 18.088, p < 
0.001. As was the case with early childhood, participants considered that 
boys were teased more for playing with girls (Ms = 3.395, 3.663 males and 
females respectively) than girls were for playing with boys (Ms = 3.079, 
3.084 males and females respectively) (see Figure 11.14).
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Figure 11.14: Middle Childhood - Amount of 
Teasing
Frequency of Play with Opposite Sex
A between-group t-test revealed a significant sex difference in the frequency 
of play with children of the opposite sex, t(135) = 2.342, p = 0.021. Figure 
11.15 shows how girls at this age still played with the boys (M = 6.263) 
significantly more than boys played with the girls (M = 3.474).
Female
Sex of Participant
Figure 11.15: Middle Childhood - Frequency of 
Play with Opposite Sex
Number of Games not Segregated
A between-group t-test revealed a significant sex difference in the number of 
games played that were not segregated by sex, t(134) = 2.273, p = 0.025. At
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this age, girls still played significantly more mixed games (M = 2.327) than 
did boys (M = 1.447). As shown in Figure 11.16, this is also consistent with 
the results for the amount of teasing and for frequency of playing opposite- 
sex games presented above.
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Figure 11.16: Middle Childhood - No. of Games 
Not Segregated
Female
Sex of Participant
Again the following two measures refer to the ease/difficulty of recall and 
were measured on 7-point scales.
Memory for Friends
A highly significant unqualified main effect for memory for names, F(l,136) 
= 35.329, p < 0.001 was found. Both women and men found it easier to recall 
same-sex (Ms = 5.59, 5.421 females and males respectively) than opposite- 
sex friends’ names (Ms = 4.59, 4.237 females and males respectively). This 
can be seen in Figure 11.17.
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Figure 11.17: Middle Childhood - Memory for 
Friends
Memory for Games
A highly significant main effect for memory for games, F(l,136) = 108.821, 
P < 0.001 was qualified by a highly significant sex of participant x memory 
for games interaction, F(l,136)= 26.004, p < 0.001. Both women and men 
found it easier to remember same-sex (Ms = 5.15, 6.132 females and males 
respectively) than opposite-sex games (Ms = 4.12, 3.132 females and males 
respectively). Importantly, males found it significantly easier than women to 
recall same-sex games, t(137) = 3.556, p = 0.001, and significantly more 
difficult than women to recall opposite-sex games, t(136) = 2.861, p = 0.005. 
See Figure 11.18.
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Figure 11.18: Middle Childhood - Memory for 
Games
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Adolescence
Names of Friends Recalled
As with the younger ages, this analysis resulted in highly significant main 
effects for names, F(l,103) = 39.375, p < 0.001 and for sex of participant, 
F(l,103) = 7.037, p = 0.009. Both women and men remembered more same- 
sex (Ms = 9.494, 8.0 females and males respectively) than opposite sex 
friends (Ms = 7.025, 4.808 females and males respectively). Moreover, 
women remembered significantly more friends overall (both same-, t(103) = 
1.9, p = 0.06, and opposite-sex, t(103) = 2.532, p = 0.013) than did men. This 
can be seen in Figure 11.19.
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Figure 11.19: Adolescence - No. of Friends 
Recalled
Number of Sports Recalled
There was a highly significant sex of participant x sports interaction,
F(l,103) = 20.596, p < 0.001. While males remembered more same-sex 
sports (M = 3.0) than opposite-sex sports (M = 1.731), females recalled more 
opposite-sex sports (M = 3.342) than same-sex ones (M = 2.317). In other 
words, both women and men remembered more male sports than either 
remembered female sports. The difference in men’s and women’s recall was
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significant for opposite-sex sports, t(103) = 4.115, p < 0.001, but not for 
same-sex sports, t(103) = 1.426, p = 1.157. This can be seen in Figure 11.20.
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Figure 11.20: Adolescence - No. of Sports 
Recalled
Number of Descriptions Provided
A highly significant main effect for descriptions, F(l,103)= 16.489, p <
0.001 was qualified by a significant sex of participant x descriptions 
interaction, F(l,103) = 6.274, p = 0.014. Both men and women provided 
more detailed descriptions about sports played by their same-sex peers (Ms = 
6.115, 4.734 males and females respectively) than those played by their 
opposite-sex peers (Ms = 2.269, 3.823 males and females respectively). 
Although both reached significance, this difference was greater for males, 
t(38) = 4.135, p < 0.001, than for females, t(94) = 2.057, p = 0.042. This is 
shown in Figure 11.21
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Figure 11.21: Adolescence - Level of Description
Same
Satisfaction with Same-Sex Sport/ Desire to Play Opposite-Sex Sport 
A highly significant main effect for enjoyment, F(l,93) = 123.547, p < 0.001 
was qualified by a highly significant sex of participant x enjoyment 
interaction, F(l,93) = 9.189, p = 0.003. While both women and men enjoyed 
playing their own-sex sports, men liked playing male sports (M = 6.04) 
significantly more than women enjoyed playing female sports (M = 4.80), 
t(145) = 3.415, p = 0.001 . Neither sex was particularly interested in playing 
opposite-sex sports, and this was equally true for males (M = 2.44) and 
females (M = 2.743), t(129) = 0.527, p = 0.599 (see Figure 11.22).
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Amount of Teasing
Figure 11.23 shows the highly significant teasing x sex interaction, F(l,102) 
= 9.61, 2 = 0.003. Men considered that adolescent girls were teased more for 
mixing with boys (M = 2.269) than boys were for mixing with girls (M = 
1.923), a difference that bordered on significance, t(29) = 2.009, £ < 0.054, 
while women thought that adolescent boys were teased more for mixing with 
girls (M = 2.18) than girls were for mixing with boys (M = 1.897), t(79) = 
2.923, 2 = 0.005. Since mean scores were all in the l ’s and 2’s (from a 7- 
point scale) it appears that no-one was teased much at this age.
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Figure 11.23: Adolescence - Amount of Teasing
Frequency of Mixing with Opposite Sex
Consistent with the low scores on the above measure of teasing, no 
significant sex difference was found for adolescents’ frequency of mixing 
with the opposite sex. Since both means (5.291, 4.962, females and males 
respectively) were well above the mid-point on the 7-point rating scale, it 
appears that the sexes mixed quite freely at this age.
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Number of Sports not Segregated
No significant sex difference was found between the number of sports played 
that were not segregated by sex. The means for this measure (1.974, 1.455, 
females and males respectively) were quite low, indicating the relative low 
frequency of non-segregated sports played by both sexes.
Number of Other Activities
In contrast to sports, a between-group t-test showed a significant sex 
difference with respect to the number of other sex-segregated activities 
engaged in by adolescents, t(100) = 2.610, p = 0.01. As shown in Figure 
11.24, teenage girls were involved in a significantly greater number of 
activities other than sports with their same-sex peers (M = 3.714) than were 
teenage boys (M = 2.44) at this time.
Female
Sex of Participants
Figure 11.24: Adolescents - Number of Other 
Activities
The following measures again refer to the participants’ ease/difficulty of 
recall.
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Memory for Friends
A highly significant unqualified main effect for memory for names was 
found, F(l,102) = 41.59, p < 0.001. Both women and men found it easier to 
recall same-sex (Ms = 6.346, 6.269 females and males respectively) than 
opposite-sex friends’ names (Ms = 5.564, 4.962 females and males 
respectively). This can be seen in Figure 11.25.
Same Opposite
Sex of Friends
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Figure 11.25: Adolescence - Memory for Friends
Memory for Sports
A highly significant main effect for memory for sports, F(l,99) = 35.775, p < 
0.001 was qualified by a highly significant sex of participant x memory for 
sports interaction, F(l,99) = 33.191, p < 0.001. While men found it easier to 
recall same-sex (M = 6.115) than opposite-sex sports (M = 3.269), t(34) = 
7.199, p < 0.001, women recalled both equally (Ms = 4.973, 4.92 same- and 
opposite-sex respectively), t(93) = 1.815, p = 0.073. Interestingly, the scores 
for women fell in the midpoint of the men’s scores, negating the possible 
explanation that girls simply played fewer sports than boys. This is depicted 
in Figure 11.26.
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Figure 11.26: Adolescence - Memory for Sports
Memory of Participants
Since it could be argued that older participants may have more difficulty than 
younger participants in remembering childhood events, all of the previous 
analyses were repeated excluding all participants thirty years of age and 
older. Of the 38 significant effects found and reported above, only one 
changed. This was the significant teasing x sex interaction for adolescence, 
where the p-value changed from 0.003 to 0.052. Since this was the only 
inconsistency of the entire results, it was decided that this was not enough to 
warrant the omission of any participants. Hence all reported analyses include 
responses from all participants where applicable.
Aggregated Dependent Measures
Given the large number of dependent measures and the number of separate 
analyses presented above, exploratory analyses were conducted in an attempt 
to aggregate variables where possible. Dependent variables were first factor 
analyzed to investigate the degree of intercorrelation between items. 
Reliability ratings were then calculated, using Cronbach’s alpha, on the four
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dependent variables with the highest intercorrelations. These were found to 
be the number of names recalled, the number of games recalled, the 
ease/difficulty of remembering the names, and the ease/difficulty of 
remembering the games. Given the different scales of these variables (the 
first two were open-ended continuous, and the second two were on a 7-point 
scale), z-scores were then computed for all four variables. At this stage any 
subject with missing data was deleted from the analysis. New variables were 
then computed comprising the means of the four transformed variables 
relating to same-sex and those relating to opposite-sex. 2 (memory for: same- 
sex, opposite-sex) x 2 (sex of participant: male, female) analyses of variance 
with repeated measures on memory were then conducted. The results of these 
analyses, by separate age group, are presented next.
Early Childhood
Not surprisingly, the transformations eliminated all main effects. However, a 
significant sex of participant x memory interaction was revealed, F(l,149) = 
6.301, p = 0.013. Figure 11.27 shows how this effect is driven entirely by 
children’s knowledge of the opposite sex. While both men and women 
demonstrated equal knowledge of their own-sex games and friends, women’s 
memory for boys’ activities etc. was significantly greater than the men’s 
memory for girls’ activities, t(149) = 2.428, p = 0.016.
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Figure 11.27: Early Childhood - Memory
Middle Childhood
A highly significant main effect for memory, F(l,136) = 127.633, £ < 0.001 
was qualified by a highly significant sex of participant x memory interaction, 
F(l,136) = 11.214, p = 0.001. Both men and women demonstrated better 
memory for same-sex (Ms = 6.007, 5.54 males and females respectively) 
than for opposite-sex games and friends (Ms = 3.533, 4.198 males and 
females respectively). Males demonstrated better memory (though not 
significantly) than females, for same-sex games and friends, t(137) = 1.64, p 
= 0.103, but significantly poorer memory than females for opposite-sex 
games and friends, t(136) = 2.196, p = 0.03. This is shown in Figure 11.28.
Figure 11.28: Middle Childhood - Memory
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Adolescence
Significant main effects for memory, F(l,98) = 6.256, £ = 0.014 and for sex 
of participant, F(l,98) = 3.928, p = 0.050 were qualified by a highly 
significant sex of participant x memory interaction, F(l,98)= 28.011, p < 
0.001. As shown in Figure 11.29, this effect was driven by the males (lack 
of) knowledge of the opposite sex. While there was no difference between 
men and women in their memory for same-sex friends, sports etc., men’s 
memory for opposite-sex sports and friends was significantly less than that of 
women’s, t(102) = 4.008, p < 0.001.
Taken together, the results of the current analyses provide further support for 
the major hypotheses of the study. That is, females demonstrated an 
awareness of activities and members of the opposite sex that was equal to 
that for their own sex. For males, however, this was not the case. While their 
knowledge of same-sex activities and friends was equal to that of females’ 
knowledge of either sex, males’ knowledge of opposite-sex activities and 
friends was significantly lower.
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Despite the overall consistency in the pattern of findings, the relatively low 
alpha coefficients defining the aggregated variables, together with the overall 
loss of information resulting from the analysis, were considered sufficient 
reason to proceed with the analyses of the dependent variables separately. 
Hence the following analysis maintains the dependent variables as separate 
measures, but combines all age groups to further examine the developmental 
trend evident in the previous analyses.
Names of Friends Recalled
The data were subjected to a 2 (sex of participant: male, female) x 3 (age: 
early childhood, middle childhood, adolescence) x 2 (names of friends: 
same-sex, opposite-sex) analysis of variance with repeated measures on age 
and friends. Significant main effects were found for sex of participant, 
F(l,99) = 4.772, p = 0.031, age, F(l,99) = 58.851, p < 0.001 and names, 
F(l,99) = 87.188, p < 0.001. These two were qualified, however, by a 
significant age x names interaction F(l,99) = 7.285, p = 0.008.
Females, overall, recalled the names of more friends (both same- and 
opposite-sex) than did males. Additionally, at all ages participants 
remembered significantly more same-sex than opposite-sex friends, and the 
overall number of friends recalled increased with each age. Figure 11.30 
shows the increase in same- and opposite-sex friends for the different age 
groups, whilst the difference between recall for same- and opposite-sex 
friends remains.
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Figure 11.30: Names of Friends Recalled by Age Group
Games and Sports Recalled
For this analysis, a 2 (sex of participant: male, female) x 3 (age: early 
childhood, middle childhood, adolescence) x 2 (activities: same-sex, 
opposite-sex) analysis of variance with repeated measures on age and 
activities was conducted. This yielded highly significant main effects for age, 
F(l,99) = 7.777, p = 0.006 and for activities, F(l,99) = 51.813, p < 0.001. 
These were qualified by highly significant age x activities, F(l,99) = 15.858, 
p < 0.001 and sex x activities, F(l,99) = 27.321, p < 0.001 interactions. Of 
particular interest, however, was the highly significant 3-way interaction of 
sex x age x activities, F(l,99) = 8.316, p = 0.005. To gain a clearer picture of 
this interaction, each sex is presented as two separate age x activities 
interactions, as seen in Figures 11.31 and 11.32.
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Figure 11.31: Males - No. of Activities Recalled Presented
by Age
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Figure 11.32: Females - No. of Activities Recalled 
Presented by Age
Of interest was the significant increase in females’ knowledge of opposite- 
sex adolescent sports compared to their own-sex sport, a finding inconsistent 
with their knowledge of games at other age groups, and with males’ 
knowledge of female sports.
Number of Descriptions Provided
Highly significant main effects for age, F(l,99) = 8.914, p = 0.004 and 
descriptions, F(l,99) = 65.507, p < 0.001, along with a highly significant sex 
of participant x description interaction, F(l,99) = 8.857, p = 0.004 were 
found. Figure 11.33 shows how the difference in the number of descriptions 
provided is largely due to males, who provide more descriptions about same-
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sex activities, and fewer descriptions about opposite-sex ones than do 
females. On further investigation, however, this effect is entirely attributable 
to the difference in descriptions provided at adolescence (refer to earlier 2- 
way analyses by age group).
...♦ .....Male
“ H i “  Female
Same Opposite
Sex of Players
Figure 11.33: Desciptions Provided by Sex of 
Participant
Amount of Teasing
This analysis revealed highly significant main effects for teasing, F(l,88) = 
23.669, p < 0.001 and age, F(l,88) = 46.576, p < 0.001 qualified by a highly 
significant teasing x age interaction, F(l,88) = 25.912, p < 0.001. The sex x 
teasing interaction bordered on significance, F(l,88) = 3.778, p = 0.055. 
Figure 11.34 clearly shows how as children get older, the amount of teasing 
for mixed-sex play decreases, although the difference in amount of teasing 
between early and middle childhood is not significant. It also shows that the 
difference between how much girls and boys were teased, is only evident in 
the younger age groups.
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Figure 11.34: Amount of Teasing by Age Group
Memory for Friends
Highly significant main effects for age, F(l,98) = 86.439, p < 0.001 and 
memory for friends, F(l,98) = 66.201, £ < 0.001 were found, along with a 
significant sex x memory for friends interaction, F(l,98) = 5.404, £ = 0.022. 
All age groups differed significantly from each other. In addition, there was a 
slight, though not significant, sex difference in the ease of recall as shown in 
Figure 11.35.
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Figure 11.35: Memory for Friends By Sex of 
Participant
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Memory for Activities
Highly significant main effects were found for age, F(l,94) = 49.402, p < 
0.001 and memory for activities, F(l,94) = 129.778, p < 0.001 along with a 
sex x memory for activities interaction, F(l,94) = 38.680, p < 0.001. These 
were all qualified, however, by a highly significant age x sex x memory for 
activities interaction, F(l,94) = 7.365, p = 0.008. This interaction is best 
explained in terms of separate sex x memory for activities interactions by the 
different age groups (as presented in the previous analyses by age groups).
At all ages, both men and women found it easier to remember same-sex 
games and sports than opposite-sex ones. As they grew older, this difference 
diminished for women but significantly increased for men.
Discussion
This study was concerned with the ways in which men and women 
remembered gender related information from their childhood and 
adolescence. Consistent with previous studies, the focus of the current study 
was on play, specifically games and friends. Questions concerned three time 
periods: early childhood (approximately 5 years of age), middle childhood 
(approximately 11 years of age) and adolescence (approximately 16 years of 
age). It was hypothesized that men and women would show superior recall of 
information regarding same-sex, compared to opposite-sex, friends and 
activities for early and middle childhood, but the predictions regarding 
adolescence was unclear. Furthermore, since our earlier studies with children 
differed from findings concerning adults, it was predicted that the patterns of 
male and female recall would change across time.
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When participants recalled the games they played in early childhood, both 
men and women were able to recall more same-sex games and friends, in 
greater detail, with more enjoyment, and more easily, than opposite-sex ones. 
Sex differences emerged, however, regarding the number of friends recalled, 
and regarding how much participants recalled enjoying playing the games 
with their same-sex friends versus their desire to play games with the 
opposite sex.
Women recalled a greater number of opposite-sex friends in kindergarten 
than did men. Given that both males and females recalled equal numbers of 
same-sex friends, this difference can not be due to there being a greater 
number of girls in kindergarten. Rather, women remembered more boys than 
men remembered girls.
In addition, women remembered having a much stronger desire, than men, to 
play opposite-sex games in kindergarten. Indeed males’ remembered desire 
to play opposite-sex games at age five was quite low. Put simply, while girls 
liked playing girls’ games, they would have been quite happy to play boys’ 
games as well. Boys, however, were quite content to play boys’ games and 
did not particularly want to play girls’ games. This is consistent with the 
findings that boys played very few non-sex-segregated games and that the 
frequency of play with the opposite-sex was quite low, in absolute terms as 
well as in comparison with that of girls. It does appear, therefore, that 
kindergarten was indeed characterized by high levels of same-sex play and
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low levels of mixed-sex play. Moreover, it is suggested that when mixed-sex 
play did occur, it involved a greater number of girls and a relatively small 
number of boys. Thus the majority of boys only played with other boys. The 
robust nature of same-sex play (Harris, 1998; Maccoby, 1998) was clearly 
evident in the present study, as was the greater taboo (Hartup, 1983) of 
mixed-sex play for boys than for girls. This latter contention is also 
supported by the fact that both men and women remembered that boys were 
teased more for mixed-sex play than were girls at this age.
With respect to middle childhood, participants again recalled more same-sex 
friends than opposite-sex ones, along with more detailed descriptions of 
same-sex games, compared to opposite-sex ones. Same-sex information was 
recalled more easily by both men and women, and they reported higher 
levels of enjoyment with same-sex games, compared to their expressed 
desire to play opposite-sex games. As with early childhood, this latter finding 
was stronger for men than for women.
A sex difference also emerged on participants’ ability to recall opposite-sex 
games at this age. While males’ memory for boys’ games was much greater 
than their memory for girls’ games, women recalled both equally.
In other respects, the findings for middle childhood mirrored those of early 
childhood: frequency of mixed-sex play was low, and sanctions for 
transgressing this boundary, such as teasing, were stronger for boys than for
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girls. Girls also continued to express a greater desire to play boys’ games 
than boys did to play to girls’ games.
A different pattern emerged, however, for adolescence. Consistent with 
McGivern et al. (1997), women demonstrated superior recall to men on most 
tasks. Contrary to the earlier age groups, neither males nor females expressed 
much desire to play opposite-sex sports during adolescence. This was not, as 
previously the case, due to the relative infrequency of mixed-sex interactions. 
In contrast, teenage boys and girls mixed quite freely, and teasing each other 
for this was remembered to be quite rare.
With respect to developmental trends, therefore, there was, firstly, an 
increase in the number of friends recalled (both same- and opposite-sex) over 
time. This could be due to people having more friends as they got older, or, 
equally probable, that it was easier to recall more recent friends. This second 
explanation is more likely due to the fact that most of the participants were 
not long out of high school and could more easily remember their friends 
from that time, compared to earlier time periods.
There were also sex differences, over time, in participants’ recall of opposite- 
sex activities. As boys grew older, they paid less attention to, or at least 
demonstrated a decrease in recall of, the activities engaged in by girls. In 
contrast, girls either paid increasing attention to, or at least demonstrated an 
increased recall of, the activities performed by the boys. As stated earlier, the 
present study is unable to distinguish between these two explanations
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(attention to stimuli vs retention of the information). Nonetheless, a clear 
picture emerges in that, while the amount of contact between the sexes 
increased from early childhood to adolescence, as did the social acceptance 
of such contact, this did not result in equivalent levels, by males and females, 
of knowledge of the activities of both sexes. On the contrary, it appears that 
while females’ knowledge of opposite-sex information was greater than that 
of males at all ages, males’ knowledge of opposite-sex information decreased 
with age. This could, of course, be due to the nature of the task (i.e., the 
questions referred to sports played which may have been of particular 
importance to males), or simply because males found same-sex information 
increasingly important over time. For example, it could be the case that 
despite the increased contact with the opposite-sex, and the increasing 
interest girls may provide by way of future (or present) partnership 
possibilities (Blyth & Foster-Clark, 1987; Buhrmester & Furman, 1987), the 
activities that females engage in become increasingly less important to 
males, such that they either do not pay attention to them initially, or they do 
not retain the information over time. Perhaps teenage boys pay attention to 
teenage girls, but not to what the teenage girls are doing.
In sum, the findings of the present study were largely consistent with our 
hypotheses. While males and females were able to better, and more easily, 
recall same- than opposite-sex information, this pattern intensified for males 
but not for females. Females, by contrast, continued to pay attention to (as 
demonstrated in their superior recall of) male-relevant, in addition to female­
relevant, information. Given that these sex differences in attention were not
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evident in the pre-school years (refer to Studies 1 to 4), but are apparent 
adulthood (e.g. McGivern et ah, 1997, and to some extent Study 5), it 
appears that this change in attention occurs during adolescence.
Chapter 12
Summary and Conclusions
This thesis sought to examine young children’s understanding about gender 
in categorical terms. This differed from the dominant developmental 
approaches in which gender has been viewed in more individualistic terms 
and gender development is seen as an undertaking of individual children. 
Echoing recent calls for a closer association between developmental and 
social psychology, we have presented a case for applying social 
psychological theory to an investigation of how children learn about gender. 
Specifically, we drew upon the social identity approach given its unique 
position of integrating the personal and the social self into a single theoretical 
perspective. To view gender as a truly social phenomenon necessitates a 
view of gender development as development of the social self. The 
arguments presented in the opening chapters, and the empirical work 
presented in this thesis, represent an initial step toward this goal.
Deriving from the basic assumption that gender development involves social 
categorical understanding, we examined the process of gender development 
with a specific focus on children’s imitation of observed others, and the 
attention paid to information presented. These two factors, imitation and 
attention, were the key dependent variables in the empirical work of this 
thesis. Beginning in early childhood, and continuing into adulthood with an 
investigation of memory for gender-relevant information, the six empirical 
studies presented evidence of gender differences in imitation of, and
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attention to, models as reflections of the social structural importance given to 
gender, rather than as a result of innate biological sex differences.
This final chapter will present a brief overview of the theoretical assumptions 
and the empirical work presented throughout the thesis. In addition to the 
implications to be drawn from these findings, limitations of the work are 
noted, along with suggested directions for future research.
Review of the Thesis
Beginning in Chapter 2, we explored the socialization process per se from a 
broadly historical perspective. Comparing Locke’s view of the child as a 
blank slate with Rousseau’s idea of the child full of consuming impulses, we 
saw the foundations of many contemporary theories of child development. 
Behaviourist approaches, for example, share similarities with Locke, while 
the psychoanalytic approach explicitly referred to the innate desires of the 
young child. Emanating from all these theories, however, was a recognition 
of the importance of role models in the socialization process. Whether as 
sources of reinforcement, as guides to mold inherent desires, or in controlling 
these innate desires from a position of authority (albeit one that was totally 
enmeshed with the child given the identification processes to be undergone), 
the importance of parents, teachers and other caregivers was seen as essential 
for the child’s development. Regardless of emotional attachment with the 
child, the role of adults in terms of their ability to demonstrate behaviours 
and skills was seen as vital.
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The belief in the primacy of parents, however, has not been shared by all 
theorists. Harris (1995, 1998), for example, proposed the idea that children’s 
peer groups provide the foundation for the transmission of social and cultural 
norms, and the basis for more lasting forms of influence than do parents. 
Analysis of her argument, however, revealed a more similarity-based account 
of influence which, it was argued in Chapter 6, is inadequate given its 
reliance on the notions of similarity and difference as fixed features.
Both of these views (parents vs peers), however, share a recognition that 
much learning occurs via imitation, irrespective of who the child imitates. 
Irrespective of what children observe, they only imitate, or model, some of 
the behaviours that are potentially available to them. The question this thesis 
attempted to address was what factors would determine when one model (or 
group of models’) behaviour would take precedence over another.
The role of modelling in the socialization process was most clearly 
articulated by Bandura (1969, 1977, 1986; Bandura & Walters, 1963) whose 
account of social learning theory acknowledged motivational as well as 
behavioural aspects of modelling, or imitation, and thus clearly recognized 
both social and cognitive aspects of socialization.
Dominating the socialization research, however, were findings that boys and 
girls have different socialization experiences based solely on their sex. 
Beginning at birth and intensifying throughout early childhood mothers and, 
particularly, fathers, provide differential physical and emotional
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environments for their sons and daughters. These differences are reinforced 
by teachers and other caregivers as well as by complete strangers. Despite 
changes in educational and legislative regulations, differential treatment of 
boys and girls continues to be a prominent feature of childrearing, education 
and socialization in general.
This is not to say that boys and girls themselves do not play an active role in 
perpetuating sex segregation. Indeed segregation based on sex is one of the 
most robust features of childhood and was discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Before detailing that, however, Chapter 3 reviewed the dominant theories of 
gender development, each of which, it was shown, placed an overwhelming 
emphasis on gender development as a uniquely individual process undergone 
by boys and girls.
The psychoanalytic approach (Freud, 1924, 1933) typified the emphasis that 
had been placed on gender development as an individual process, as well as 
the prevailing emphasis on parental influence. Freud’s detailed accounts of 
the developmental processes of gender development for boys and girls 
emphasized both the conflictual nature of this process and stressed the 
divergent paths that this process takes because of the child’s sex. Indeed 
departure from these prescribed paths of “normal” development was 
considered deviant and was responsible for inevitable, and irrevocable, 
problems throughout life.
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In stark contrast to this was cognitive-developmental theory which explicitly 
stated that the acquisition of gender knowledge followed the same 
developmental path as the acquisition of all knowledge. Firmly rooted in the 
Piagetian approach to cognitive development, Kohlberg (1966) proposed a 
stage theory of gender development that paralleled the child’s cognitive 
development. Despite later revisions, especially concerning the age at which 
certain abilities are acquired, the critical feature of the cognitive- 
developmental approach remains its emphasis on the child’s cognitive 
abilities, and that an understanding of sex differences is both motivational 
and rewarding to the child.
Social learning theory, in contrast, stressed that behaviour (of both self and 
others) and its consequences lead to the development of “expectancies” 
(Bandura, 1977; Mischel, 1973, 1977, 1979) concerning behavioural 
outcomes. With respect to gender-related behaviour, boys and girls 
experience and observe different behavioural outcomes for males and 
females, and thus develop different expectancies concerning behaviour that is 
appropriate for their gender.
A prominent feature of social learning theory is the acknowledgement of the 
multitude of possible (gender-) influential sources that are available to the 
child. Parents, peers, siblings, teachers and the media are all potential 
providers of gender-relevant information. What determines which of these 
will prevail, involves a level of identification with the person providing that 
information. In social learning theory, this identification incorporates the
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ability to categorize, according to similarities and differences (e.g., males and 
females), and the placement of the self into one of those categories. While 
largely a similarity-based model of influence, this process also involves the 
child’s experience of the evaluative reactions provided by others.
Undoubtedly the most individualistic account of gender development was 
that proposed by gender schema theory (Bern, 1981, 1984; Martin & 
Halverson, 1981). While explicitly recognizing that sex differences abound 
because of the importance they are given in the world at large, the extent to 
which they impact upon an individual child is a function of that child’s own 
level of gender “schematicity”, or the degree to which gender functions as an 
organizing principle for that particular child. The ability to categorize people 
as male and female, and behaviours as male- or female-appropriate, thus 
provides a functional way of organizing the world, to which some children 
will be more inclined than others.
Emerging from the review of these theories was the recognition that none 
were able to provide an adequate account of gender differences as they 
pertain to boys and girls in general, rather than merely individual boys and 
girls, since none of them recognized gender as a truly social variable. It is not 
possible to explain, for example, the greater between-group differences 
between boys and girls than within-group differences (Maccoby, 1990) 
unless the actual process of gender socialization involves socialization of the 
boy or the girl as a member of a group of boys or group of girls.
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Chapter 4 began to address this question by elaborating on the notion of 
gender as a social category (e.g., Maccoby, 1988). While there is evidence of 
infants’ abilities to make categorical distinctions based on gender throughout 
their first year of life, the ability to meaningfully utilize such categorical 
distinctions occurs somewhat later. By age three, however, children’s 
propensity to not only categorize along gender lines but to segregate 
according to them is firmly entrenched (Fabes et al., 2003; Maccoby & 
Jacklin, 1983; Powlishta et al., 1993). Regardless of the initial reasons for the 
sex-segregation, boys and girls experience qualitative differences as a result 
of their experiences in these same-sex groups. Thus even if the learning 
process itself is the same for boys and girls, the fact that much of it occurs in 
different contexts would contribute to the different outcomes that are 
frequently observed for boys and girls.
Chapter 5 then examined the learning process in terms of the attention that is 
paid to information, and the retention of (or memory for) that information. 
Specifically, we were interested in sex differences in the memory process. Of 
particular interest were studies by Poulin-Dubois et al. (1998) and Serbin et 
al. (2001) that showed the ability of eighteen-month-old girls, but not boys, 
to reliably match toys to faces, and even verbal labels, based on gender.
In attempting to provide an explanation for these findings, it was suggested 
that they must be a result of either innate cognitive difference that lead to 
boys and girls differentially processing information, or to some external 
social-structural component, such as status or power, that provides
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differential feedback and motivation for boys and girls. A review of the 
literature concerning early development of attentional and memory processes 
revealed no differences between boys and girls in these areas. Thus we began 
to explore possible explanations for the findings of different outcomes, using 
the traditional theories of gender development outlined in Chapter 3. While 
clearly the most useful account was provided by social cognitive theory, it 
was unable to explain sex differences in attention and memory that occur 
prior to behavioural enactment and its consequences.
In Chapter 6, therefore, we turned to the social identity approach in an effort 
to provide a more social psychological account of gender development. In 
particular, we wanted to investigate how categorical gender differences 
become important to the young child. Having ruled out the idea of innate 
biological differences, we chose to explore the impact of the categorization 
process on both boys and girls as groups, or categories, as well as on the 
psychology of the individual boy or girl.
While social identity theory provides an explanation of how categorical, or 
group, memberships impact upon an individual’s behaviour (leading them to 
act in accordance with that group membership), self-categorization theory 
provided the explanation for the psychological shift that occurs between 
acting in terms of one’s group membership(s) and in purely individual terms. 
Although not formulated with this aim, these theories provide us with a 
possible explanation for, not only children’s gender-linked behaviours
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including their motivation for such, but a possible explanation for the 
differential attention paid to gender-relevant information.
Moving away from the idea of mere shared similarity with other group 
members, the meta-contrast ratio articulated in self-categorization theory 
specifies factors that determine the salience of a particular category -  and the 
one to which attention will most likely be paid. The framework provided by 
self-categorization theory, and its utility in explaining the influence process, 
was thus seen as an ideal starting point from which to begin our empirical 
investigation of gender development in children.
The first of the empirical studies (presented in Chapter 7) employed an 
experimental paradigm devised by Bussey and Bandura (1984) and was 
designed to examine children’s imitation of male and female models, 
together with the attention the children paid to these models. Expanding on 
Bussey and Bandura’s work, Study 1 employed adult and child models in an 
attempt to compare child participants’ use of age as well as gender 
categories. It also allowed an initial test of Harris’ hypotheses concerning the 
relative importance of adults and other children as providers of information 
and hence sources of influence.
In this first study, both boys and girls demonstrated a strong preference for 
same-sex imitation of adult models, but when the models were other 
children, same-sex imitation was only apparent for girls. Boys, by 
comparison, made no distinction between imitation of same- and opposite-
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sex child models. Critical to one of the central questions of the thesis, 
however, was the finding that, regardless of children’s imitative behaviours, 
they were able to recall equally the behaviours performed by the models who 
demonstrated the behaviours. It was suggested that these results indicate that 
behavioural enactment is the result of a deliberate choice, made by the child, 
concerning appropriate behaviour.
The “appropriateness” of particular behaviours was not deemed to be purely 
a function of the child’s similarity to that model (or team of models), 
however, since children demonstrated greater imitation of, and greater 
attention to, adult compared to child models. These findings were counter to 
similarity-based accounts of influence, including that proposed by Harris 
(1995).
It was noted, however, that the conclusions drawn from this study relied on 
between-, rather than within-group comparisons, regarding the age of the 
models. Study 2 (presented in Chapter 8) was designed to address this 
problem, as well as to explore the issue of status, or power, differences that 
had been raised in Study 1, and by Bussey and Bandura (1984). Boys’ 
aversion to imitating (adult) females was suggested to arise from boys’ 
acceptance of the stereotype of power being appropriate for males and the 
imitation of stereotypically powerless women thus being inappropriate for 
them. Similarly, it was suggested that the greater imitation of adult models 
by the child participants in Study 1 may have reflected children’s awareness 
of the status, or power, difference between adults and children.
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By removing gender as an available category, Study 2 demonstrated 
children’s preference for imitating other children in preference to adults. As 
with the previous study, children again demonstrated equal recall for the 
behaviours provided by both groups of models. Children also reported liking 
being a child more than they looked forward to being a grown-up, but boys’ 
higher levels of reported liking (satisfaction) were taken to be consistent with 
their recognition of the higher status of males.
The studies presented in Chapter 9 were designed to further explore the 
issues of imitation and attention, and of satisfaction with category 
membership. In doing so, they also aimed to clarify issues of experimental 
design arising from the first two studies. Study 3 attempted to do this by 
presenting both age and gender categories simultaneously to the child 
participants, a task that, unfortunately, proved to be too difficult, with most 
children demonstrating a recency effect with respect to both their 
performance and recall of behaviours.
Sex differences again emerged on the liking measures in Study 3. While 
both boys and girls indicated high levels of satisfaction with their current 
(age and sex) category membership: boys were happy being boys and girls 
were happy being girls; measures of who the children liked least, and of 
potential category mobility, revealed a different story. Whereas age and 
gender categories were important in determining girls’ preferences, boys’
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preferences were primarily determined along gender lines, with boys’ 
aversion to all things female being once again apparent.
Incorporating the findings of the first three studies, together with the 
assumptions that had been made regarding children’s behavioural choices as 
reflections of their self-categorizations, Study 4 sought to investigate these 
issues by presenting child participants with exactly the same information but 
manipulating the age or gender salience of the context in which that 
information was given.
The results of this study unambiguously confirmed our predictions. Child 
participants demonstrated a clear preference for imitating models of their 
ingroup on the salient dimension. Moreover, this was demonstrated equally 
by boys and girls, a finding that was inconsistent with Study 1 and with 
previous research (Bussey & Bandura, 1984; Fagot, 1985a; Lamb & 
Roopnarine, 1979; Maccoby, 1980). Consistent with the previous studies in 
this thesis, however, was that children again demonstrated equal recall of the 
behaviours that had been demonstrated by both groups of models.
These findings were taken as evidence of pre-schoolers’ flexibility in their 
use of age and gender categories. This is not to say that these children did not 
have firm ideas about what constitutes membership of age and gender 
categories. The identification measures provided by this study, together with 
the gender identity measures of Study 1 and the liking/satisfaction measures 
of Studies 2 and 3, provided firm evidence of this. Rather, we proposed that
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young children are not only cognitively capable of recognizing, but are 
sensitive to, and can adapt their behaviour in accordance with, subtle changes 
in the importance given to categorical distinctions, such as age and gender. 
We argued that the salience manipulations in this study provided a 
meaningful context for the behaviours they were shown, and children’s 
imitation of those behaviours was consistent with the manipulations. Even 
more remarkable, however, was that boys and girls responded equally to 
these salience manipulations, which we took as further evidence against the 
notion of sex differences being the result of innate biological imperatives.
We were then left with the question of whether, and when, sex differences 
emerge throughout life regarding attention to, or memory for, gender­
relevant information. Clearly boys and girls begin to act in gender- 
appropriate ways from a young age, but our studies showed that the 
behaviour occurred after they had paid attention to both male and female 
models. In Chapter 10 we presented evidence of sex differences in adulthood 
in attention to, and memory for, gender-relevant information. The remaining 
studies in this thesis consequently turned to the study of this developmental 
progression.
Study 5 (presented in Chapter 10) represented the first step in addressing this 
issue by having adult participants view exactly the same information that had 
been presented to the child participants in Study 1, and measuring adult 
participants’ memory for the behaviours. While not statistically significant, 
there was a trend for females to recall more male-oriented stimuli than there
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was for males to recall female-oriented stimuli. Given the consistency of this 
trend with previous research, we took the bold step in Study 6 (Chapter 11) 
of examining the developmental progression of attention to gendered 
information (measured by recall of that information) at three distinct time 
periods throughout participants’ lives.
Although less evident concerning memories of early or middle childhood, 
sex differences were patently apparent concerning memories of adolescence. 
Despite the increased time teenage boys and girls spent with each other 
(compared to early or middle childhood), and the abandonment of sanctions 
for mixing with the opposite sex, it was at this time period that the greatest 
number of sex differences appeared. While women continued to demonstrate 
teenage knowledge of both male- and female-related activities etc., men 
displayed a marked decrease in their adolescent knowledge of female-related 
activities, while continuing to demonstrate considerable knowledge of male- 
related ones. We concluded in that chapter that the difference in attention 
paid to information, and the recall of that information, between the preschool 
years and adulthood must occur some time during adolescence.
The earlier studies in this thesis involving child participants all pointed to the 
fact that, despite the sex- or age-categorical imitative behaviours enacted, 
children do pay attention to information provided by members of both 
categorical ingroups and outgroups. By adulthood, however, females 
continue to pay attention to male-relevant information, but males show a 
tendency to ignore female-relevant information. We have suggested that this
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is due to the fact that males are afforded a higher status than are females. 
Future research could well extend the detailed focus of this thesis on 
preschoolers to children in primary and high school to determine if 
adolescence is indeed a time when males, while paying attention to females 
as objects, cease paying attention to them as actors.
Taken together, the empirical studies in this thesis were also seen to support 
the application of social psychological theory to the study of gender 
development. Specifically, social identity and self-categorization theories 
provided useful frameworks from which to study gender differences as they 
apply to groups of males and groups of females.
Limitations of the Thesis and Future Directions
While the studies presented in this thesis provide further support for the 
continued integration of social and developmental psychology, we must be 
careful to avoid an over-application of social psychological theory to 
developmental domains. Specifically we need to avoid a theoretical 
application that makes gender development adevelopmental, in the same way 
that an over-reliance on pursuing developmental trajectories has resulted in 
asocial investigations of some domains. In pursuing an integrated approach 
to gender development, we need to be able to specify, not only at what ages, 
or levels of cognitive ability, children will reach a level of understanding that 
impacts upon their behaviour, but conditions under which these abilities and 
behaviours may be ameliorated. Nesdale’s (2001, 2004) stage-based account
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of the development of prejudice (and specifically the display of ethnic 
dislike) provides a good model to follow in this regard.
With respect to gender development, the empirical work in this thesis has 
gone some way to achieving this aim by specifying conditions under which 
children are more likely to use gender as a guide to their behaviour. Through 
the application of social identity and self-categorization principles, we have 
noted that the manipulation of the salience of gender, or that of an alternative 
category such as age, can intensify or diminish the likelihood of children 
choosing to enact behaviours consistent with gender expectations. Most 
notable in this regard is that this can be achieved in children, both boys and 
girls, as young as three.
We recognize, however, that this finding occurred in an individual setting. 
Future research aimed at replicating these results in a group setting could be 
most productive, although the potential concrete and administrative problems 
of such research cannot be underestimated.
Nevertheless, we suggest that the ability to specify social conditions that can 
affect children’s expressions of gender knowledge represents an advance on 
the explanations provided by the dominant theories of gender development. 
In particular, we feel that this has added explanatory power to that provided 
by the comprehensive accounts of cognitive developmental theory (e.g., 
Bussey & Bandura, 1999).
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A significant feature of this thesis was the discovery that young children do 
indeed pay attention to an array of potentially instructive information, and 
that their actual enactment of behaviours is selected from this array. Counter 
to the predictions of cognitive-developmental theory in particular, children 
do not direct their attention only toward people who share their gender 
identity and then imitate those behaviours in a relatively automatic way. That 
these findings were replicated across the studies, and applied equally to boys 
and girls, provided strong evidence against the innate sex differences 
perspective.
Although our findings did reveal strong evidence for the emergence of sex 
differences during adolescence, we remain unable to discriminate between 
whether people, or more specifically males, forget opposite-sex information 
over time because it was not enacted, or because the information was not 
considered important enough to retain, or indeed to pay attention to in the 
first place. This applies to both long-term memory of female-relevant 
information recalled from childhood, as well as short-term memory of, and 
attention to, information pertaining to females in the here and now. Future 
research could be usefully directed at distinguishing between these 
possibilities.
Our studies imply that the critical time period in which males’ attention to 
female-relevant information begins to wane is during adolescence and, as 
already suggested, further research could be directed at specifying a more 
precise time for this occurrence. We suggest, however, that simply trying to
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pin down a time would be less fruitful than research aimed at determining the 
reasons for this change, along with the conditions under which it occurs. For 
example are, as we suggest, adolescent males more conscious than younger 
boys of females’ lack of status? Do teenage boys from families containing 
high-achieving women and girls pay more attention to girls’ activities than 
do boys from more traditional families? Studies addressing such questions 
would provide a greater understanding of adult sexual discrimination.
In fact, the theme of status differences between males and females was 
evident throughout this thesis. Although it remained a minor focus of the 
empirical work, further exploration of this issue at all ages, not just 
adolescence, could prove extremely useful to the area of gender development 
in particular, as well as children’s use of categorical information (for 
example the proposed age status difference mentioned in Chapter 8) in 
general. While the examination of status and sex differences is not new (e.g., 
Ridgeway, 1991, 2001), its application to children remains relatively 
unexplored. Continuing the attempt to specify a developmental progression, 
investigating the notion of changes in both males’ and females’ awareness of 
these status differences (beginning in early childhood) would be an area 
worthy of pursuit.
Of course, for younger children in particular it would probably be fruitless to 
ask about such abstract concepts as power and status, but it should be 
possible to demonstrate them and measure children’s attitudes and 
behavioural reactions towards males and females (or adults and children,
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Anglo-Europeans and an ethnic minority) who display them. For example, 
Bussey and Bandura (1984) operationalized power by showing a video in 
which either the men’s team or the women’s team controlled a room full of 
desirable toys. Showing either boys or girls being named as school captains, 
or “boss of the playground” or, more subtly, showing a mixed school room in 
which either the boys or the girls were given superior attention by the 
teacher, could also demonstrate power and status in ways that would be 
familiar and understandable to children. Bussey and Bandura measured the 
effect of demonstrated power on children’s willingness to imitate the 
powerful and powerless group, but such measures as reported liking, and 
willingness to play with, could also be useful, as would a measure of how 
“normal” or “usual” children felt the demonstration to be.
We began this thesis looking at the role of imitation in the learning process, 
and focused specifically on the role of imitation in children’s learning about 
gender. We have argued that sex differences in children’s imitation are the 
result of choice at a behavioural level, and not the result of prior focussed 
attention, or of innate differences between boys and girls. We presented 
evidence suggesting that even very young children’s propensity to act in 
accordance with gender stereotypes can be modified according to the context 
in which those actions occur. Moreover, we have speculated that the 
existence of sex differences that emerge later in life are a result of both 
males’ and females’ awareness of the social structural importance of gender.
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We have not attempted to propose broad measures aimed at promoting 
change at the wider social level. Such analyses and efforts to engineer social 
change occur at a much wider political level and are outside the scope of this 
thesis. What we have attempted to explicate, however, are the psychological 
processes involved in learning about, and understanding gender. We have 
done this in a way that integrates social phenomenon into the psychology of 
the individual. Learning about gender involves an integration of social 
categorical information into one’s personal self-definition. Our efforts to 
articulate this, however, have not been at the expense of developmental 
psychology. On the contrary, we believe that the theoretical arguments, 
together with the empirical work presented in this thesis, represent a truly 
social developmental approach to thinking about gender.
280
References:
Aboud, F. E. (1988). Children and prejudice. Oxford: Blackwell.
Aboud, F. E. & Amato, M. (2001). Developmental and socialization 
influences on intergroup bias. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), 
Blackwell handbook in social psychology: Intergroup processes, Vol.
4. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M., Waters, E. & Wall, E. (1978). Patterns of 
Attachment. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Allen, V. L. & Wilder, D. A. (1975). Categorization, belief similarity, and 
intergroup discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 32, 971-977.
Allen, V. L. & Wilder, D. A. (1979). Group categorization and attribution of 
belief similarity. Small Group Behaviour, 10, 73-80.
Allport, F. (1924). Social psychology. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Allport. G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison- 
Wesley.
Andersen, S. M. & Bern, S. L. (1981). Sex typing and androgyny in dyadic 
interaction: Individual differences in responsiveness to physical 
attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 74- 
86 .
Bahrick, L. E., Netto, D. & Hernandez-Reif, M. (1998). Intermodal 
perception of adult and child faces and voices by infants. Child 
Development, 69(5), 1263-1275.
Banaji, M. R. & Prentice, D. A. (1994). The self in social contexts. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 45, 297-332.
281
Bandura, A. (1962). Social learning through imitation. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, pp. 211-274.
Bandura, A. (1965). Vicarious proceses: A case of no-trial learning. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vo/. 2, 
ppl-55). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Bandura, A. (1969). Social-learning theory of identificatory processes. In D. 
A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (pp. 
213-262). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social 
cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (1991). Self-regulation of motivation through anticipatory and 
self-reactive mechanisms. In R. A. Dienstbier, (Ed.), Perspectives on 
Motivation: Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol 38, pp. 69-194. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Bandura, A. (1992). Social cognitive theory. In R. Vasta (Ed.), Six theories 
of child development: Revised formulations and current issues, pp. 1- 
60.
Bandura, A. & Walters, R. H. (1963). Social learning and personality 
development. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Barrett, M. (2000). The development of national identity in childhood and 
adolescence. Inaugural lecture presented at the University of Surrey, 
UK. Available at:
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/Psvchology/staff/papers/mb-inaugural.html.
282
Bates, J. E. (1980). The concept of difficult temperament. Merrill-Paimer 
Quarterly, 26, 299-319.
Bates, J. E., Freeland, C. A. & Lounsbury, M. L. (1979). Measurement of 
infant difficulties. Child Development, 50, 794-803.
Bauer, P. J. (1993). Memory for gender-consistent and gender-inconsistent 
event sequences by 25-month-old children. Child Development, 64, 
285-297.
Bauer, P. J. (1995). Recalling past events: From infancy to early childhood. 
Annals of Child Development, 11, 25-71.
Bauer, P. J., Wenner, J. A., Dropik, P. L. & Wewerka, S. S. (2000). 
Parameters of remembering and forgetting in the transition from 
infancy to early childhood. Monographs of the Society for Research in 
Child Development, 65 (4, Serial No. 263).
Baumrind, D. (1966). Effects of authoritative control on child behaviour. 
Child Development, 37(4), 887-907.
Baumrind, D. (1967). Child care practices antededing three patterns of 
preschool behaviour. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 75, 43-88.
Baumrind, D. (1973). Will a day care centre be a child development centre? 
Young Children, 28(3), 154-169.
Baumrind, D. (1975). The contributions of the family to the development of 
competence in children. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 14, 12-37.
Baumrind, D. (1989). Child development today and tomorrow. The Jossey- 
Bass social and behavioural science series, (pp. 349-378). San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
283
Baumrind, D. & Black, A. (1967). Socialization practices associated with 
dimensions of competence in preschool boys and girls. Child 
Development, 38(2), 291-327.
Bell, M. A., & Fox, N. A. (1992). The relations between frontal brain
electrical activity and cognitive development during infancy. Child 
Development, 63, 1142-1163.
Bell, R. Q. (1968). A reinterpretation of the direction of effects in studies of 
socialization. Psychological Review, 75, 81-95.
Bern, S. L. (1979). Theory and measurement of androgyny: A reply to the 
Pedhazur-Tetenbaum and Locksley-Colten critiques. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1047-1054.
Bern, S. L. (1981). Gender schema theory: A cognitive account of sex typing. 
Psychological Review, 88 (4), 354-364.
Bern, S. L. (1983). Gender schema theory and its implications for child 
development: Raising gender-aschematic children in a gender- 
schematic society. Signs, 8 (41), 598-616.
Bern, S. L. (1984). Androgny and gender schema theory: A conceptual and 
empirical integration. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 32, 179- 
226.
Bern, S. L. (1989). Genital knowledge and gender consistency in preschool 
children. Child Development, 60, 649-662.
Bern, S. L. (1993). Is there a place in psychology for a feminist analysis of 
the social context? IV. Feminism and Psychology, 3(2), 230-234.
284
Bern, D. J. & Allen, A. (1974). On predicting some of the people some of the 
time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behaviour. 
Psychological Review, 81, 506-520.
Bern, S. L. & Lenney, E. (1976). Sex typing and the avoidance of cross-sex 
behaviour. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 48-54.
Bennett, M., Barrett, M., Karakozov, R., Kipiani, G., Lyons, E., Pavlenko, V. 
& Riazanova, T. (2004). Young children’s evaluations of the ingroup 
and of outgroups: A multi-national study. Social Development, 13(1), 
124-141.
Bennett, M., Lyons, E., Sani, F. & Barrett, M. (1998). Children’s subjective 
identification with the group and in-group favouritism. Developmental 
Psychology, 34(5), 902-909.
Bennett, M. & Sani, F. (2004). Introduction: Children and social identity. In 
M. Bennett and F. Sani (Eds). The Development of the Social Self 
Hove and New York: Psychology Press.
Bennett, M., Sani, F., Hopkins, N., Agostini, L. & Malucchi, L. (2000). 
Children’s gender categorization: An investigation of automatic 
processing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 18, 97-102.
Bianchi, S. M., Milkie, M. A., Sayer, L. C. & Robinson, J. P. (2000). Is 
anyone doing the housework? Trends in the gender division of 
household labour. Social Forces, 79 (1), 191-228.
Bijou, S. W. & Baer, D. M. (1961). Child development. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
285
Billig, M. & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in
intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 3(1), 
27-52.
Bjorkland, D. F. & Jacobs, J. W. (1985). Associative and categorical 
processes in children’s memory: The role of automaticity in the 
development of organization in free recall. Journal of Experimental 
Chid Psychology, 39, 599-617.
Bjorkland, D. F., Miller, P. H., Coyle, T. R. & Slawinski, J. L. (1997).
Instructing children to use memory strategies: Evidence of utilization 
deficiencies in memory training studies. Developmental Review, 17, 
411-441.
Black-Gutman, D. & Hickson, F. (1996). The relationship between racial 
attitudes and social-cognitive development in children: An Australian 
study. Developmental Psychology, 32(3), 448-456.
Block, J. H. (1983). Differential premises arising from differential
socialization of sexes: Some conjectures. Child Development, 54, 
1335-1354.
Borstelmann, L. J. (1983). Children before psychology: Ideas about children 
from antiquity to the late 1800’s. In P. H. Müssen (Ed.), Handbook of 
Child Psychology, 4,h Edition. Vol 1. pp.1-40. New York: Wiley.
Boston, M. B. & Levy, G. D. (1991). Changes and differences in
preschoolers’ understanding of gender scripts. Cognitive Development, 
6, 417-432.
Bower, T. G. (1977). A primer of infant development. Oxford, England: W. 
H. Freeman.
286
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss. Vol. 1: Attachment. New York:
Basic Books.
Bowlby, J. (1988). A Secure Base: parent-child attachment and healthy 
human development. New York: Basic Books.
Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the 
same time. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 475-482.
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or 
outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55 (3), 429-444.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1960). Freudian theories of identification and their 
derivatives. Child Development, 31, 15-40.
Brown, P. M. & Turner, J. C. (2002). The role of theories in the formation of 
stereotype content. In C. McGarty, V. Y. Yzerbyt & R. Spears (Eds.) 
Stereotypes as explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about 
social groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-89.
Bruner, J. S. (1957). On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review, 64, 
123-152.
Burns, A. & Hornel, R. (1986). Sex role satisfaction among Australian 
children: Same sex, age, and cultural comparisons. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly, 10, 285-296.
Bussey, K. (1986). The first socialization. In N. Grieve & A. Burns (Eds.), 
Australian women: New feminist perspectives. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press.
Bussey, K. & Bandura, A. (1984). Influence of gender constancy and social 
power on sex-linked modelling. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 47(6), 1292-1302.
287
Bussey, K. & Bandura, A. (1992). Self-regulatory mechanisms governing 
gender development. Child Development, 63,1236-1250.
Bussey, K. & Bandura, A (1999). Social cognitive theory of gender
development and differentiation. Psychological Review, 106(4), 676- 
713.
Bussey, K. & Perry, D. G. (1982). Same-sex imitation: The avoidance of 
cross-sex models? Sex Roles, 8(7), 773-784.
Cahill, B. & Adams, E. (1997). An exploratory study of early childhood 
teachers’ attitudes toward gender roles. Sex Roles, 36 (718), 517-529.
Cairns, R. B. (1983). The emergence of developmental psychology. In P. H. 
Müssen (Ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology, 4th Edn, Vol 1, pp.41- 
102. New York: Wiley.
Caldera, Y. M., Huston, A. C. & O’Brien, M. (1989). Social interactions and 
play patterns of parents and toddlers with feminine, masculine and 
neutral toys. Child Development, 60, 70-76.
Caldwell, B. M. (1964). The effects of infant care. In M. L. Hoffman & L. 
W. Hoffman (Eds.) Review of child development, (Vol.l, pp. 9-87). 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Cameron, J. A., Alvarez, J. M., Ruble, D. N. & Fuligni, A. J. (2001). 
Children’s lay theories about ingroups and outgroup: 
Reconceptualizing research on prejudice. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 5, 118-128.
Carter, D. B. & Levy, G. D. (1988). Cognitive aspects of children’s early 
sex-role development: The influence of gender schemas on
288
preschoolers memories and preferences for sex-typed toys and 
activities. Child Development, 59, 782-793.
Chodorow, N. (1978). The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and 
the sociology of gender. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour. Language, 
35, 26-129.
Chomsky, N. (1968). Language and mind. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World.
Cleverley, J., & Phillips, D. C. (1976). From Locke to Spock: Influential 
Models of the Child in Modern Western Thought. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press.
Cohen, L. B. (2004). Modeling the development of infant categorization. 
Infancy, 5(2), 127-130.
Collie, R. & Hayne, H. (1999). Deferred imitation by 6- and 9- month-old 
infants: More evidence of declarative memory. Developmental 
Psychobiology, 35, 83-90.
Coltrane, S. (2000). Research on household labour: Modelling and measuring 
the social embeddedness of routine family work. Journal of Marriage 
and the Family, 62 (4), 1208-1233.
Condry, J. & Condry, S. (1976). Sex differences: A study of the eye of the 
beholder. Child Development, 47, 812-819.
Cornell, E. H. (1974). Infants’ discrimination of photographs of faces 
following redundant presentations. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 18, 98-106.
289
Corsaro, W. A. (1990). The underlife of the nursery school: Young
children’s social representations of adult rules. In G. Duveen & B. 
Lloyd (Eds.). Social representations and the development of 
knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crawford, M., Chaffin, R. & Fitton, L. (1995). Cognition in social context.
Learning and Individual Differences, 7(4), 341-362.
Crick, N. R. & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggresstion, gender and 
social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710-722. 
Crisp, R. J. & Farr, M. J. (2004). Moderation of intergroup memory bias via 
crossed categorization. Current Research in Social Psychology, 9(9). 
Crisp, R. J. & Hewstone, M. (1999). Differential evaluation of crossed 
category groups: Patterns, processes and reducing intergroup bias. 
Group Processes and Inter group Relations, 2, 303-333.
Crisp, R. J., Hewstone, M. & Rubin, M. (2001). Does multiple categorization 
reduce ingroup bias? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
27(1), 76-89.
Croll, P. (1985). Teacher interaction with individual male and female pupils 
in junior-age classrooms. Educational Research, 27(3), 220-223. 
Diamond, A. (1988). Abilities and neural mechanisms underlying AB 
performance. Child Development, 59, 523-527.
DiPietro, J. (1981). Rough and tumble play: A function of gender.
Developmental Psychology, 17, 50-58.
Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R. & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). 
Guilty by association: When one’s group has a negative history. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 (4), 872-886.
290
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., Johnson, C., Johnson, B. & Howard, A.
(1997). On the nature of prejudice: Automatic and controlled 
processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 510-540.
Durkin, K. (1985). Television, Sex Roles and Children: A developmental 
social psychological account. Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open 
University Press.
Duveen, G. R. & Lloyd, B. (1986). The significance of social identities. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 219-230.
Eisenberg, N. & Murphy, B. (1995). Parenting and children’s moral
development. In M. H. Bornstein (Ed.). Children and parenting (Vol. 
4) Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eisenberg, N. & Valiente, C. (2002). Parenting and children’s prosocial and 
moral development. In M. H. Bornstein (Ed.) Handbook of parenting 
(2nd ed.) Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Emerson, R. W. (1962). Power-dependence relations: Two experiments. 
American Sociological Review, 27, 31-41.
Emmerich, W., Goldman, K. S., Kirsh, B. & Sharabany, R. (1977). Evidence 
for a transitional phase in the development of gender constancy. Child 
Development, 48, 930-936.
Fabes, R. A., Hanish, L. D., & Martin, C. L. (2003). Children at play: The 
role of peers in understanding the effects of child care. Child 
Development, 74(4), 1039-1043.
Fabes, R. A., Martin, C. L., & Hanish, L. D. (2003). Young children’s play 
qualities in same-, other-, and mixed-sex peer groups. Child 
Development, 74(3), 921-932.
291
Fagan, J. F. (1976). Infants’ recognition of invariant features of faces. Child 
Development, 47, 627-638.
Fagan, J. F. & Singer, L. T. (1979). The role of simple feature differences in 
infants’ recognition of faces. Infant Behaviour and Development, 2, 39- 
45.
Fagot, B. I. (1973). Influence of teacher behaviour in the preschool. 
Developmental Psychology, 9(2), 198-206.
Fagot, B. I. (1974). Sex differences in toddlers’ behaviour and parental 
reaction. Developmental Psychology, 10, 554-558.
Fagot, B. I. (1978). The influence of sex of child on parental reactions to 
toddler children. Child Development, 49, 459-465.
Fagot, B. I. (1985a). The child’s expectations of differences in adult male 
and female interactions. Sex Roles, 11(7-8), 593-600.
Fagot, B. I. (1985b). Beyond the reinforcement principle: Another step 
toward understanding sex-role development. Developmental 
Psychology, 21, 1097-1104.
Fagot, B. I. (1986). Beyond the reinforcement principle: Another step toward 
understanding sex role development. Developmental Psychology,
21(6), 1097-1104.
Fagot, B. I., Hagan, R., Leinbach, M. D., & Kronsberg, S. (1985).
Differential reactions to assertive and communicative acts of toddler 
boys and girls. Child Development, 56, 1499-1505.
Fagot, B. I. & Leinbach, M. D. (1989). The young child’s gender schema: 
Environmental input, internal organization. Child Development, 60, 
663-672.
292
Fagot, B. I. & Leinbach, M. D. (1993). Gender-role development in young 
children: From discrimination to labelling. Developmental Review, 13, 
205-224.
Fein, G., Johnson, D., Kosson, N., Stork, L., & Wasserman, L. (1975). Sex 
stereotypes and preferences in toy choices of 20-month old boys and 
girls. Developmental Psychology, 11, 527.
Feinman, S. & Lewis, M. (1991). Influence lost, influence regained. In M. 
Lewis & S. Feinman (Eds.), Social Influences and Socialization in 
Infancy. New York: Plenum Press.
Feiring, C. & Lewis, M. (1987). The child’s social network: Sex differences 
from three to six years. Sex Roles, 17, 621-636.
Feeney, J. & Noller, P. (1996). Adult attachment. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Fiske, S. T. & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, 
from category-based to individuating processes: Influences of 
information and motivation on attention and interpretation. In M. P. 
Zanna (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (vol. 23, 
pp.1-73). New York: Random House.
Fiske, S. T. & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition. NY: McGraw-Hill Inc.
Frable, D. E. S. & Bern, S. L. (1985.) If you are gender schematic, all
members of the opposite sex look alike. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 49 (2), 459-468.
Frederickson, B. L., Roberts, T.-A., Noll, S. M., Quinn, D. M. & Twenge, J. 
M. (1998). That swimsuit becomes you: Sex differences in self­
objectification, restrained eating and math performance. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 269-284.
293
French, V. (1977). History of the child’s influence: Ancient Mediterranean 
Civilizations. In R. Q. Bell & L. V. Harper, Child Effects on Adults. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Freud, S. (1917). A general introduction to psychoanalysis. New York: 
Washington Square Press.
Freud, S. (1924). Collected papers. New York: International Psychoanalytic 
Press.
Freud, S. (1933). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis (J. Strachey, 
trans.). New York: W. W. Norton.
Freud, S. (1940/1949). An outline of psychoanalysis. (J. Strachey, trans.). 
London and New York: W. W. Norton.
Furnham, A. & Gasson, L. (1998). Sex differences in parental estimates of 
their children’s intelligence. Sex Roles, 38(1-2), 151-162.
Furnham, A. & Singh, A. (1986). Memory for information about sex 
differences. Sex Roles, 15, 479-486.
Gay. P. (1964). Reading about Rousseau: A blueprint for a biography. The 
Party of Humanity: Essays in the French Enlightenment. New York: 
Knofp.
Geer, J. H. & McGlone, M. S. (1990). Sex differences in memory for erotica. 
Cognition and Emotion, 4(1), 71-78.
Gelman, R. (1969). Conservation acquisition: A problem of learning to 
attend to relevant attributes. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 7, 67-87.
Gewirtz, J. L. (1961). A learning analysis of the effects of normal
stimulation, privation and deprivation on the acquisition of social
294
motivation and attachment. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants of infant 
behaviour. New York: Wiley.
Goldberg, G. (1985). Supplementary motor area structure and function:
Review and hypotheses. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 8, 565-616.
Goldberg, S., & Lewis, M. (1969). Play behaviour in the year old infant:
Early sex differences. Child Development, 40, 21-31.
Grusec, J. E., (1992). Social learning theory and developmental psychology: 
The legacies of Robert Sears and Albert Bandura. Developmental 
Psychology, 28(5), 776-786.
Gwynn, A. (1926). Roman Education: From Cicero to Quintilian. London: 
Clarendon Press.
Halverson, C. F. & Waldrop, M. F. (1973). The relations of mechanically 
recorded activity level to varieties of preschool play behaviour. Child 
Development, 44, 678-681.
Hamilton, D. L. & Trolier, T. K. (1986). Stereotypes and stereotyping: An 
overview of the cognitive approach. In J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner 
(Eds.) Prejudice, discrimination and racism. New York and Orlando, 
FL: Academic Press, pp. 127-163.
Harris, J. R. (1995). Where is the child’s environment? A group socialization 
theory of development. Psychological Review, 102, 458-489.
Harris, J. R. (1998). The nurture assumption: Why children turn out the way 
they do. London: Bloomsbury.
Hartup, W. W. & Rubin, Z. (1986). Relationships and development. Hilsdale 
NJ: Erlbaum.
295
Helmreich, R.L., Spence, J. T. & Holahan, C. K. (1979). Psychological
androgyny and sex role flexibility: A test of two hypotheses. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1631-1644.
Herrman, D. J., Crawford, M. & Holdsworth, M. (1992). Gender-linked 
differences in everyday memory performance. British Journal of 
Psychology, 83(2), 221-231.
Hewstone, M., Hantzi, A. & Johnston, L. (1991). Social categorization and 
person memory: The pervasiveness of race as an organizing principle. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 517-528.
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M. & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 53, 575-604.
Huston, A. C. (1983). Sex-typing. In E. M. Hetherington (Ed.), Handbook of 
child psychology: Socialization, personality and social development, 
(Vol. 4, pp.388-467). New York: Wiley.
Huston, A. C., Wright, J. C., Marquis, J. & Green, S. B. (1999). How young 
children spend their time: Television and other activities. 
Developmental Psychology, 35(4), 912-925.
Huttonlocker, J., Haight, W., Bryk, A., Seltzer, M. & Lyons, T. (1991). Early 
vocabulary growth: Relation to language input and gender. 
Developmental Psychology, 27, 236-248.
Hyde, J. S. (1981). How large are cognitive gender differences? A
developmental meta-analysis using omega squared and d. American 
Psychologist, 36, 892-901.
Hyde, J. S. (1990). Meta-analysis and the psychology of gender differences. 
Signs, 16(1), 55-73.
296
Hyde, J. S. (1996). Gender and cognition: A commentary on current 
research. Learning and Individual Differences, 8(1), 33-38.
Jacklin, C. N. & Reynolds, C. (1993). Gender and childhood socialization. In 
A. E. Beall and R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The psychology of gender 
(pp. 197-214). New York: Guilford Press.
Jackson, L. A. & Hymes, R. W. (1985). Gender and social categorization: 
Familiarity and ingroup polarization in recall and evaluation. Journal 
of Social Psychology, 125, 81-88.
Jones, R. A. (1982). Perceiving other people: Stereotyping as a process of 
social cognition. In A. G. Miller (Ed.) In the eye of the beholder: 
Contemporary issues in stereotyping. New York: Praeger.
Katz, P. A. (1976). The acquisition of racial attitudes in children. In P. A. 
Katz (Ed.), Towards the elimination of racism (pp. 125-154). New 
York: Pergamon Press.
Katz, P. A. & Kofkin, J. A. (1997). Race, gender, and young children. In S.
S. Luthar, J. A. Burack, D. Cicchetti, & J. Weisz (Eds.) Developmental 
psychopathology: Perspectives on adjustment, risk, and disorder, (pp. 
51-74). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kessen, W. (1965). The child. New York: Wiley.
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H. & Norasakkankit, V. (1997). 
Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: Self­
enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in Japan. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(6), 1245-1267.
297
Kochanska, G., Murray, K., Jacques, T. Y., Koenig, A. L., & Vandegeest, K. 
A. (1996). Inhibitory control in young children and its role in emerging 
internalization. Child Development, 67, 490-507.
Kohlberg, L. (1966). A cognitive-developmental analysis of children’s sex- 
role concepts and attitudes. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development 
of sex differences (pp. 82-173). Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.
Kroll, J. (1977) The concept of childhood in the Middle Ages. Journal of the 
History of the Behavioural Sciences, 13, 384-393.
Kuehner, C. (2003). Gender differences in unipolar depression: An update of 
epidemiological findings and possible explanations. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 108, 163-174.
LaFreniere, P., Strayer, F. F., & Gauthier, R. (1984). The emergence of 
same-sex affiliative preferences among preschool peers: A 
developmental/ ethological perspective. Child Development, 55, 1958- 
1965.
Lamb, M. E. (1977). The development of parental preferences in the first two 
years of life. Sex Roles, 3, 495-497.
Lamb. M. E. & Roopnarine, J. L. (1979). Peer influence on sex role
development in preschoolers. Child Development, 50, 1219-1222.
Leaper, C. (1991). Influence and involvement in children’s discourse: Age, 
gender and partner effects. Child Development, 62, 797-811.
LeBon, G. (1895, translated 1947). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. 
London: Ernest Benn.
298
Levin, H. & Sears, R. R. (1956). Identification with parents as a determinant 
of doll play aggression. Child Development, 27, 135-153.
Lewis, M., & Goldberg, S. (1969). The acquisition and violation of
expectancy: An experimental paradigm. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 7, 70-80.
Lloyd, B. & Duveen, G. (1992). Gender identities and education: The impact 
of starting school. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Locke, J. (1938). Some thoughts concerning education. London: Churchill. 
(Original work published 1699.)
Lyman, R. B. (1988). Barbarism and religion: Late Roman and early
medieval childhood. In L. DeMause (Ed.) The History of Childhood: 
The Untold Story of Child Abuse. New York: Psychohistory Press.
Lytton, H. & Romney, D. M. (1991). Parents’ differential socialization of 
boys and girls: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 267-296.
Maccoby, E. E. (1980). Social development: Psychological growth and the 
parent-child relationship. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Maccoby, E. E. (1988). Gender as a social category. Developmental 
Psychology, 24, 755-765.
Maccoby, E. E. (1990). The role of gender identity and gender constancy in 
sex-differentiated development. New Directions for Child 
Development, 47, 5-20.
Maccoby, E. E. (1998). The two sexes: Growing up apart, coming together. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Maccoby, E. E. (1992). The role of parents in the socialization of children: 
An historical overview. Developmental Psychology, 28(6), 1006-1017.
299
Maccoby, E. E. (2002). Gender and group processes: A developmental
perspective. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11(2), 54-58.
Maccoby, E. E. & Jacklin, C. N. (1974). The psychology of sex differences. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Maccoby, E. E. & Jacklin, C. N. (1987). Gender segregation in childhood. In 
H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behaviour (Vol. 
20, pp239-287). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Maccoby, E. E. & Jacklin, C. N. (1983). The “person” characteristics of
children and the family as environment. In D. Magnussen and V. Allen 
(Eds.), Human development: An interactional perspective. New York: 
Academic Press.
Maccoby, E. E. & Martin, J. A. (1983). Socialization in the context of the 
family: Parent-child interaction. In P. H. Müssen (Series Ed.) & E. M. 
Hetherington (Vol Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol 4: 
Socialization, personality and social development. New York: Wiley.
Mackie, D. M. & Smith, E. R. (1998). Intergroup relations: Insights from a 
theoretically integrative approach. Psychological Review, 105 (3), 499- 
529.
Main, M. & Cassidy, J. (1988). Categories of response to reunion with the 
parent at age 6: Predictable from infant attachment classifications and 
stable over a 1-month period. Developmental Psychology, 24, 415-426.
Marcus, D. E. & Overton, W. F. (1978). The development of cognitive 
gender constancy and sex role preferences. Child Development, 49, 
424-444.
300
Markus, H. R. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the 
self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63-78.
Martin, C. L. & Fabes, R. A. (2001). The stability and consequences on 
young children’s same-sex peer interactions. Developmental 
Psychology, 37, 431-446.
Martin, C. L. & Halverson, C. F. (1981). A schematic processing model of 
sex typing and stereotyping in children. Child Development, 52, 1119- 
1134.
Martin, C. L. & Halverson, C. F. (1983). The effects of sex-typing schemas 
on young children’s memory. Child Development, 54, 563-574.
Martin, C. L. Ruble, D. N. & Szkrybalo, J. (2002). Cognitive theories of 
early gender development. Psychological Bulletin, 128(6), 903-933.
Marvick, E. W. (1988). Nature versus nurture: Patterns and trends in
seventeenth-century French child-rearing. In L. DeMause (Ed.) The 
History of Childhood: The Untold Story of Child Abuse. New York: 
Psychohistory Press.
McGarty , C. & Penny, R. E. C. (1988). Categorization, accentuation and 
social judgement. British Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 147-157.
McGarty, C. & Turner, J. C. (1992). The effects of categorization on social 
judgement. British Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 253-268.
McGarty, C., Yzerbyt, V. Y. & Spears, R. (2002). Stereotypes as
explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, M. M. (1988). Survivors and surrogates: Children and parents 
from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries. In L. DeMause (Ed.) The
301
History of Childhood: The Untold Story of Child Abuse. New York: 
Psychohistory Press.
Medin, D. L. (1989). Concepts and conceptual structure. American 
Psychologist, 44, 1469-1481.
Medin, D. L., Goldstone, R. L. & Gentner, D. (1993). Respects for similarity. 
Psychological Review, 100, 254-278.
Medin, D. L. & Wattenmaker, W. D. (1987). Category cohesiveness,
theories, and cognitive archaeology. In U. Neisser (Ed.) Concepts and 
Conceptual Development: Ecological and Intellectual Factors in 
Categorization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meltzoff, A. & Moore, K. (1994). Imitation, memory and the representation 
of persons. Infant Behaviour and Development, 17, 83-100.
Meltzoff, A. N. & Moore, M. K. (1999). A new foundation for cognitive 
development in infancy: The birth of the representational infant. In E. 
K. Skolnick, K. Nelson, S. A. Gelman & P. H. Miller (Eds.), 
Conceptual development. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Miller, N. E. & Dollard, J. (1941). Social learning and imitation. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Mischel, W. A. (1966). A social learning view of sex differences in
behaviour. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development of sex differences. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization 
of personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252-283.
Mischel, W. (1977). On the future of personality measurement. American 
Psychologist, 32(4), 246-254.
302
Mischei, W. (1979). On the interface of cognition and personality: Beyond 
the person-situation debate. American Psychologist, 34(9), 740-754.
Miller, C. L. (1983). Developmental changes in male/female voice
classification by infants. Infant Behaviour and Development, 6, 313- 
330.
Miller, C. L., Younger, B. A. & Morse, P. A. (1982). The categorization of 
male and female voices in infancy. Infant Behaviour and Development, 
5, 143-159.
Möller, L. C. & Serbin, L. A. (1996). Antecedents of toddler gender
segregation: Cognitive consonance, gender-typed toy preferences and 
behavioural compatibility. Sex Roles, 35, 445-460.
Murphy, G. L. & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual 
coherence. Psychological Review, 92, 289-316.
Neisser, U. (1987). (Ed.) Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological 
and intellectual factors in categorization. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Nelson, C. A. (1995). The ontogeny of human memory: A cognitive
neuroscience perspective. Developmental Psychology, 31, 723-728.
Nesdale, D. (2001). The development of prejudice in children. In M.
Augostinos and K. Reynolds (Eds.). Understanding prejudice, racism 
and social conflict. London: Sage.
Nesdale, D. (2004). Social identity processes and children’s ethnic prejudice. 
In M. Bennett and F. Sani (Eds.). The development o f the social self. 
Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
303
Nesdale, D. & Flesser, D. (2001). Social identity and the development of 
children’s group attitudes. Child Development, 72(2), 506-517.
Nesdale, D., Maass, A., Griffiths, J. & Durkin, K. (2003). Effects of ingroup 
and outgroup ethnicity on children’s attitudes towards members of the 
ingroup and outgroup. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 
27, 177-192.
Oakes, P. J. (1987). The salience of social categories. In J. C. Turner, M. A. 
Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher & M. S. Wetherell, Rediscovering the 
social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A. & Turner, J. C. (1994). Stereotyping and social 
reality. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell.
Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C. & Haslam, S. A. (1991). Perceiving people as 
group members: The role of fit in the salience of social categories. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 30(2), 125-144.
O’Brien, M. and Huston, A. C. (1985). Development of sex-typed play 
behaviour in toddlers. Developmental Psychology, 21, 866-871.
Perdue, C. W., Dovidio, J. F., Gurtman, M. B. & Tyler, R. B. (1990). Us and 
them: Social categorization and the process of intergroup bias. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 475-486.
Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. New York: 
International Universities Press.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child. New York: 
Basic Books. (Original work published 1966.)
Piccinelli, M. & Wilkinson, G. (2000). Gender differences in depression. 
Critical Review. British Journal of Psychiatry, 177, 486-492.
304
Pitcher, E. G. & Schultz, L. H. (1983). Boys and girls at play: The
development of sex roles. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey.
Poulin-Dubois, D., Serbin, L. A. & Derbyshire, A. (1998). Toddlers’ 
intermodal and verbal knowledge about gender. Merrill-Paimer 
Quarterly, 44(3), 338-354.
Powlishta, K. K. (1995). Intergroup processes in childhood: Social
categorization and sex role development. Developmental Psychology, 
31(5), 781-788.
Powlishta, K. K., Serbin, L. A., & Möller, L. C. (1993). The stability of
individual differences in gender-typing: Implications for understanding 
sex segregation. Sex Roles, 29, 723-737.
Pronin, E., Steele, C. M. & Ross, L. (2004). Identity bifurcation in response 
to stereotype threat: Women and mathematics. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 40, 152-168.
Rapoport, R., Rapoport, R. N. & Strelitz, Z. (1977). Fathers, mothers and 
society. New York: Basic Books.
Rheingold, H. L. & Cook, K. V. (1975). The contents of boys’ and girls’
rooms as an index of parents’ behaviour. Child Development, 46, 445- 
463.
Richters, J. E., and Waters, E. (1991). Attachment and socialization: The 
positive side of social influence. In M. Lewis & S. Feinman (Eds.), 
Social Influences and Socialization in Infancy. New York: Plenum 
Press.
Ridgeway, C. L. (1991). The social construction of status value: Gender and 
other nominal characteristics. Social Forces, 70, 367-386.
305
Ridgeway, C. L. (2001). Gender, status and leadership. Journal of Social 
Issues, 57, 637-655.
Rodin, M. J. (1987). Who is memorable to whom: A study of cognitive 
disregard. Social Cognition, 5(2), 144-165.
Roopnarine, J. L. (1986). Mothers’ and fathers’ behaviours toward the toy 
play of their infant sons and daughters. Sex Roles, 14 (7-2), 59-68.
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch and B. B. Lloyd 
(Eds.) Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rose, S. A., Feldman, J. F. & Jankowski, J. J. (2004). Infant visual 
recognition memory. Developmental Review, 24, 74-100.
Ross, J. B. (1988). The Middle-Class Child in Urban Italy, Fourteenth to 
Early Sixteenth Century. In L. DeMause (Ed.) The History of 
Childhood: The Untold Story of Child Abuse. New York:
Psychohistory Press.
Ruble, D. N. (2000). Gender constancy. In A. Kazdin (Ed.). Encyclopaedia 
of psychology. Washington, DC and New York: American 
Psychological Association and Oxford University Press.
Ruble, D. N. & Martin, C. L. (1998). Gender development. In W. Damon and 
N. Eisenberg, (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology, Vol 3, pp 933- 
1016.
Rubin, J. Z., Provenzano, F. J. & Luria, Z. (1974). The ey of the beholder: 
Parents’ views on sex of newborns. American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry, 44, 512-519.
306
Schaffer, H. R., Colllis, G. M. & Parsons, G. (1977). Verbal interchange and 
visual regard in verbal and preverbal children. In H. R. Schaffer (Ed.), 
Studies in mother-infant interaction. London: Academic Press.
Schneider, W. & Pressley, M. (1997). Memory development between two 
and twenty. (2nd Edn.) Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Schofield, V. W. (1981). Complimentary and conflicting identities: Images 
of interaction in an interracial school. In S. A Asher and J. M. Gottman 
(Eds.). The development of children’s friendships. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sears, R. R. (1951). A theoretical framework for personality and social 
behaviour. American Psychologist, 6 , 476-483.
Sears, R. R., Maccoby, E. E., Levin, H. (1957). Patterns of child rearing. 
Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Sears, R. R., Rau, L. & Alpert, R. (1966). Identification and child rearing. 
Oxford, England: Stanford U. Press.
Sears, R. R , Whiting, J. W. M., Nowlis, V. & Sears, P. S. (1953). Some 
child-rearing antecedents of dependency and aggression in young 
children. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 47, 135-234.
Serbin, L. A., Möller, L. C., Gulko, J., Powlishta, K. K. & Colburne, K. A. 
(1994). The emergence of gender segregation in toddler playgroups. In 
C. Leaper (Ed.) Childhood gender segregation: Causes and 
consequences. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Serbin, L. A., O’Leary, D. K., Kent, R. N. & Tonick, I. J. (1973). A 
comparison of teacher response to the preacademic and problem 
behaviour of boys and girls. Child Development, 44(4), 796-804.
307
Serbin, L. A., Poulin-Dubois, D., Colburne, K. A., Sen, M. G. & Eichstedt, J. 
A. (2001). Gender stereotyping in infancy: Visual preferences for and 
knowledge of gender-stereotyped toys in the second year. International 
Journal of Behavioural Development, 25(7), 7-15.
Serbin, L. A., Powlishta, K. K. & Gulko, J. (1993). The development of sex­
typing in middle childhood. Monographs for the Society for Research 
in Child Development, 58 (Serial No. 232).
Serbin, L. A., Tonick, I. J., & Sternglanz, S. H. (1977). Shaping cooperative 
cross-sex play. Child Development, 48, 924-929.
Sheldon, (1992). Conflict talk: Sociolinguistic challenges to self-assertion 
and how young girls meet them. Merrill-Paimer Quarterly, 38(1), 95- 
117.
Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L. & Ambady, N. (1999). Stereotype susceptibility: 
Identity salience and shifts in quantitative performance. Psychological 
Science, 10(1), 80-83.
Siegal, M. (1987). Are sons and daughters treated more differently by fathers 
than mothers? Developmental Review, 7, 183-209.
Signorella, M., Bigler, R. S. & Liben, L. S. (1993). Developmental 
differences in children’s gender schemata about others: A meta- 
analytic review. Special issue: Early gender-role development. 
Developmental Review, 13, 147-183.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behaviour. New York: Macmillan.
Slaby, R. G. & Frey, K. S. (1975). Development of gender constancy and 
selective attention to same-sex models. Child Development, 46, 849- 
856.
308
Spelke, E. S. (1976). Infants’ intermodal perception of events. Cognitive 
Psychology, 8, 553-560.
Sroufe, L. A. (1985). Attachment classification from the perspective of 
infant-caregiver relationships and infant temperament. Child 
Development, 56, 1-14.
Stangor, C. & Ruble, D. N. (1987). Development of gender role knowledge 
and gender constancy. In L. S. Liben & M. L. Signorella (Eds.), 
Children’s Gender Schemata. New Directions for Child Development, 
38. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual 
identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52(6), 613-629.
Steele, C. M. & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test 
performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 69(5), 797-811.
Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal o f Social Issues, 
25, 79-97.
Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. Social Science 
Information, 13, 65-93.
Tajfel, H. (1978a). The achievement of group differentiation. In H. Tajfel
(Ed.), Differentiation between groups: Studies in the social psychology 
of intergroup relations (pp. 77-98). London: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. (1978b). Interindividual behaviour and intergroup behaviour. In H. 
Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between groups: Studies in the social 
psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 27-60). London: Academic 
Press.
309
Tajfel, H. (1978c). Social categorization, social identity and social
comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between groups: Studies 
in the social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 61-76). London: 
Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Social stereotypes and social groups. In J. C. Turner and H. 
Giles (Eds.) Intergroup Behaviour. Oxford: Blackwell; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 144-167.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 33, 1-39.
Tajfel, H. & Billig, M. G. (1974). Familiarity and categorization in
intergroup behaviour. Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology, 
10(2), 159-170.
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P. & Flament, C. (1971). Social
categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal o f Social 
Psychology, 1(2), 149-178.
Tajfel, H., Sheikh, A. A. & Gardner, R. C. (1964). Content of stereotypes 
and the inference of similarity between members of stereotyped 
groups. Acta Psychologia, 22, 191-201.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup
conflict. In W. G. Austin and S. Worschel (Eds.) The social psychology 
of inter group relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup 
behaviour. In S. Worschel and W. G. Austin (Eds.) Psychology of 
inter group relations (2nd Ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
310
Tajfel, H. & Wilkes, A. L. (1963). Classification and quantitative judgement.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 54, 101-114.
Taylor, S. E. & Crocker, J. (1979). Schematic bases of social information 
processing. In E. T. Higgins, P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The 
Ontario symposium in personality and social psychology, Vol 1. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S. T., Etcoff, N. L. & Ruderman, A. J. (1978).
Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, US-193.
Thomas, A. & Chess, S. (1977). Temperament and development. Oxford, 
England: Brunner/Mazel.
Thomas, A., Chess, S. & Birch, H. G. (1968). Temperament and behaviour 
disorders in children. Oxford, England: New York University Press. 
Thorne, B. (1986). Girls and boys together, but mostly apart. In W. W.
Hartup and Z Rubin (Eds.), Relationships and development. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum.
Tittle, C. K. (1986). Gender Research and Education. American 
Psychologist, 41(10), 1161-1168.
Tronick, E., Als, H. & Brazelton, T. B. (1980). Monadic phases: A structural 
descriptive analysis of infant-mother face to face interaction. Merrill- 
Palmer Quarterly, 26, 3-24.
Tucker, M. J. (1988). The child as beginning and end: Fifteenth and sixteenth 
century English childhood. In L. DeMause (Ed.) The History of 
Childhood: The Untold Story of Child Abuse. New York:
Psychohistory Press.
311
Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects 
for intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 5- 
34.
Turner, J. C. (1984). Social identification and psychological group formation. 
In H. Tajfel (Ed.) The social dimension: European developments in 
social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self concept: A social
cognitive theory of group behaviour. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.) Advances in 
Group Processes (Vol. 2) Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. 
(1986). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Turner, J. C. & Oakes, P. J. (1989). Self-categorization theory and social 
influence. In P. B. Paulus (Ed.) The psychology of group influence. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Verkuyten, M. (2004). Ethnic identity and social context. In M. Bennett & F. 
Sani (Eds.), The development of the social self. (pp. 189-216). New 
York: Psychology Press.
Walker, K. & Armstrong, L. (1995). Do mothers and fathers interact
differently with their child or is it the situation that matters? Child: 
Care, Health & Development, 21 (3), 161-181.
Walker, P. & Antaki, C. (1986). Sexual orientation as a basis for
categorization in recall. British Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 337- 
339.
312
Walker-Andrews, A. S., Bahrick, L. E., Raglioni, S. S. & Diaz, I. (1991). 
Infants’ bimodal perception of gender. Ecological Psychology, 3(2), 
55-75.
Watson, J. B. (1924). Behaviourism. New York: Norton.
Watson, J. B. (1928). Psychological care of infant and child. New York: 
Norton.
Wellman, H. M., Somerville, S. C. & Haake, R. J. (1979). Development of 
search procedures in real-life spatial environments. Developmental 
Psychology, 15, 530-542.
Wilder, D. A. (1981). Perceiving persons as a group: Categorization and 
intergroup relations. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.) Cognitive processes in 
stereotyping and inter group behaviour. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wilder, D. A. & Allen, V. L. (1978). Group membership and preference for 
information about others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
4, 106-110.
Winkler, D., Pjrek, E., Heiden, A., Wiesegger, G., Klein, N., Konstantinidis, 
A. & Kasper, S. (2004). Gender differences in the psychopathology of 
depressed inpatients. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical 
Neuroscience, 254, 209-214.
Wright, D. B. & Loftus, E. F. (1998). How misinformation alters memories. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 71, 155-164.
Yarrow, M. R., Campbell, J. D., & Burton, R. V. (1968). Child rearing: An 
inquiry into research and methods. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Yee, M. & Brown, R. (1994). The development of gender differentiation in 
young children. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 183-196.
313
Yellond, N. (1998). (Ed.), Gender in Early Childhood. London: Routledge.
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Rocher, S. & Schadron, G. (1997). Stereotypes as
explanations: A subjective essentialistic view of group perception. In 
R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. Ellemers and S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The 
psychology of stereotyping and group life (pp. 20-50). Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Zanna, M. & Pack, S. (1975). On the self-fulfilling nature of apparent sex 
differences in behaviour. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
77,583-591.
Zhou, Q., Eisenberg, N., Losoya, S. EI., Fabes, R. A., Reiser, M., Gutherie, I. 
K., Murphy, B. C., Cumberland, A. J. & Shepard, S. A. (2002). The 
relations of parental warmth and expressiveness to children’s empathy- 
related responding and social functioning: A longitudinal study. Child 
Development, 73, 893-915.
314
